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Abstract 
This research aims to explore and investigate the interrelationship between performance 
measures and determinants of Sudanese Islamic banks. To generate a comprehensive 
picture of such interrelationship, three models are built.  
To achieve the study objectives a secondary source of information presented in the annual 
reports of twenty-seven Sudanese Islamic Banks, covering the period 2005-2013, was 
utilised.  
Empirical evidence from the first model indicates that the management of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks lacks the capability to predict and avoid the risk associated with leverage.  
With regards the profitability determinants, in relation to the Islamic banking industry, 
the model prove that PLS (Modarabah and Mosharakah) have a significant positive 
impact on profitability. This is due to the policy of the Central Bank of Sudan which 
encourage banks to use Mosharakah mode for financing all economic activities as well as 
giving each bank the right to determine the Modarabah’s percentage share in the profits. 
Evidence from the second model shows that the presence of women in departmental 
managers’ positions has significantly negative impact on the profitability of banks. This 
due the restricted role of women in the Islamic culture which lead women to have career 
development barrier.  
Meanwhile, due to coordination and communication problems resulting from enlarging 
the board size and higher cost of directors’ salaries and remunerations, the impact of the 
size of the board of director on the profitability of Sudanese banks is proved to be negative 
and significant.  
Findings from the third model suggest that females’ departmental managers at Sudanese 
banks have a risk aversion attitude which leads to more performance stability of these 
banks. 
Finally, the model proves that the proportion of Ph.D. holders in corporate governance 
positions enhance the managers’ understanding of decision making and risk taking 
techniques.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1. Research Background  
Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, the Sudanese Banking Industry has passed through 
many phases. The first phase was the transformation from a totally traditional banking 
system to a dual banking system, which includes a traditional and Islamic banking. The 
final stage saw the transformation to a total Islamic banking, which involved a complete 
adherence to pure Islamic financial rules, and thus making Sudan become one of only two 
countries in the world to adopt such a system (Pakistan and Iran been the others).  
The country has also witnessed a civil war, which has exhausted the Sudanese economy 
for more than two decades and ended with the secession of some of the southern parts of 
the country from the north in 2011. Recent years also witnessed the discovery and 
production of oil in Sudan, which is considered to be a significant boost to the economy. 
All these transformations and events justify the importance of studying the performance 
of Sudanese banks.  
In summary, this study uses latest approaches to identify a set of main performance 
determinants and their impact on the performance of Islamic banks operating in Sudan. 
To evaluate the performance of Sudanese banks, profitability measures were assessed, 
and for a comprehensive understanding, risk measures were also analysed, with a 
particular focus on corporate governance. Risk measures are included because in recent 
years it has been shown to have a great impact on performance 
1.2. Research Problem   
The first generation of Islamic banks in Sudan was established in the 1970s. Since then, 
however, no in-depth practical study has been conducted to comprehensively assess their 
performance in terms of profitability and risk. It is thus essential to evaluate the financial 
performance of these banks using these two performance measures so that professionals 
and academics are offered a clear view of the performance of Sudanese Islamic banks. 
This becomes more important when considering the fact that Sudan is one of only three 
countries that are fully committed to the Islamic financing system. It is, therefore, 
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important to recognize factors that impact the performance of Sudanese Islamic banks so 
as to provide both academics and professional with a deep understanding of the practice 
of Sudanese Islamic Banks performance. 
1.3 Research aims and Objectives 
The broad aim of this research is to identify the internal factors that affect the profitability 
of Sudanese Islamic Banks. The period analysed is from 2005 to 2013. Although data 
availability prior 2005 is very limited, the period of 2005-2013 provides a solid data set 
to perform the required analysis and achieve reliable results. The study will also compare 
the impact of the designed profitability determinants on state-owned banks and private 
banks performance.  
Aside from identifying the impact of profitability determinants, the research also aims to 
provide evidence on the impact of the structure of corporate governance of these banks 
on their profitability and risk-taking behaviour.  In this respect, three factors – gender 
diversity in top management, educational background of the members of the top 
management team and size of the board of directors – are focused upon.    
More specifically, the research seeks to accomplish the following objectives: 
1. To explore the major performance characteristics of Sudanese Islamic Banks. 
2. To define the major profitability determinants of Sudanese Islamic Banks. 
3. Compare and evaluate the financial performance of state and private owned Sudanese 
Islamic Banks. 
4. To investigate and compare the relative importance of each profitability determinant 
on the performance of the two sets of banks.  
6. To investigate the relative importance of gender diversity on the profitability of 
Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
7. To investigate the relative importance of gender diversity on the risk-taking behaviour 
of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
Bearing in mind that sustainable profitability and healthy performance are vital in 
maintaining the stability of the banking system (Vong and chan 2009; Flamini et al., 
2009; Javaid et al., 2011), the study attempts to identify the profitability and risk 
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determinants of Sudanese Islamic Banks in order to provide practical overview of 
performance in these institutions. 
1.4. Research Questions  
In line with the research aim and objectives the study seeks to answer the following 
questions:          
1. What is the current practice of the financial performance of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks in terms of profitability? 
2.  Does the existence of gender diversity on corporate governance of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks affect their profitability performance? 
3. Does female representation in the corporate governance of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks impact bank risk performance?  
4. What is the impact of board of directors’ size on the performance of Sudanese 
Islamic banks? 
5. Does the existence of a highly educated top management team impact risk 
performance in Sudanese Islamic banks? 
 
In order to answer question one the following sub-questions are proposed: 
1.1 Does liquidity (cash availability) affect the profitability of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks? Does it have the same effect on both state-owned and private banks? 
1.2 Does capitalisation (paid up capital and reserves) affect the profitability of 
Sudanese Islamic Banks? Does it have the same effect on both state-owned and 
private banks?  
1.3 Does leverage (gearing) affect the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks? 
Does it have the same effect on both state-owned and private banks?  
1.4 Does assets utilisation (ideal use of assets) affect the profitability of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks? Does it have the same effect on both state-owned and private 
banks?  
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1.5 Does overhead expenses (staff expenses) affect the profitability of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks? Does it have the same effect on both state-owned and private 
banks?  
1.6 Does management efficiency affect the profitability of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks? Does it have the same effect on both state-owned and private banks?  
1.7 Does credit risk (probability of losing all or part of loan or assets) affect the 
profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks? Does it have the same effect on both 
state-owned and private banks?  
1.8 Does bank size (total assets) affect the profitability of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks? Does it have the same effect on both state-owned and private banks?  
1.9 Does ownership type affect the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks?  
1.10 Does commitment to profit and loss sharing (PLS) modes of finance and/or 
non-PLS modes of finance (principals of Islamic finance on which Islamic banks' 
operations are based) affect the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks? Does it 
have the same effect on both state-owned and private banks?  
1.11 Does Commitment to the agricultural sector through Salam mode of finance 
(a kind of contract which is usually used to invest in agricultural production) affect 
the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks? Does it have the same effect on both 
state-owned and private banks? 
In order to answer question two the following sub-questions are proposed: 
2.1 Does female representation on the board of directors impact the profitability 
of Sudanese Islamic Banks?  
2.2 Does female representation at the departmental managers’ level impact the 
profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks? 
In order to answer question three the following sub-questions are proposed: 
3.1 Do female board members encourage a less risky conduct of business?  
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3.2 Does female representation at the departmental managers’ level encourage a 
less risky conduct of business?  
In order to answer question five the following sub-questions are proposed: 
5.1 Do highly educated board members increase or reduce bank risk-taking?  
5.2 Do highly educated departmental managers increase or reduce bank risk-
taking?  
1.5. Research Contributions and Significance 
There is extensive empirical literature investigating the financial performance of the 
Islamic Banking industry including bank profitability, efficiency/productivity, 
competition, and risk. Few examples of these literature are Haron (1996), Iqbal (1997), 
Bashir (2001), Haron (2004) and Siddiqui (2008). In the Sudanese Islamic Banking 
context, a few research, though not in-depth, have been conducted in the area of financial 
performance assessment; e.g. Hussein (2003), Abdel Mohsin (2005), Ahmed (2008) and 
Alam (2010). However, the questions of profitability determinants and the impact of the 
structure of corporate governors on bank risk-taking in Sudan were elided. 
In essence, this research contributes to existing knowledge on banks performance by 
extending the current literature in the following directions:  
1. The study provides an examination of the impact of a comprehensive set of internal 
profitability determinants on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks. This, it is 
believed, will create a solid base for understanding the actual profitability determinants 
of these banks.  
2. The study will be the first to investigate and compare the impact of profitability 
determinants on the two categories of Islamic Banks that are operating in Sudan (the state-
owned and privately owned banks). By so doing, it is hoped the findings of this study will 
be instrumental in helping these banks to improve their financial performance as well as 
benefit from each other’s experiences. 
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3. The study will also be the first to investigate the effect of PLS versus non-PLS modes 
of finance on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks; at this stage, it is worth 
mentioning that all Islamic banking and finance processes are based on PLS or non-PLS 
methods of finance. Therefore, the study will assess and compare the impact of the two 
methods on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks. 
4. Based on the fact that Sudan is famous for its agricultural lands, the study investigates 
the effect of Salam mode of finance on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks. 
Findings of such investigation, it is hoped, will show whether Sudanese Banks is well 
positioned to play a major role in enhancing the agriculture industry and supporting the 
Economic and social development of the country.  
5. In addition, this research will also be the first to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance, in terms of gender diversity, education and the board size, on the profitability 
and risk of Sudanese Islamic Banks. 
Overall, at the academic level, the study will fill the gap in the literature on financial 
performance and corporate governance in Sudanese Islamic banking industry by 
explaining the main characteristics and determinants of Sudanese Islamic Banks’ 
performance.  
1.6. Research Data and Methodology  
To achieve the study objectives, the researcher utilises secondary sources of information 
presented in the annual reports of twenty-seven Sudanese Islamic Banks over the period 
2005-2013. These twenty-seven sets are what were available from the thirty-six banks 
currently operating in Sudan. The sample represents the major Sudanese banks that have 
consistently published financial statements over the study period. These data were 
collected from the Banks’ database, where available, and the banks’ official reports: 
banks' financial statements, particularly balance sheet and profit and loss statements were 
the main source of data relating to internal determinants. The banks' balance sheet items 
were viewed as typically reflecting the bank's management behaviour, in terms of policies 
and decisions that are related to the sources, composition, and utilisation of the bank’s 
funds. Additionally, the bank's profit and loss statements are viewed to reflect the 
management's effectiveness in creating revenues and managing costs. 
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The researcher follows Short (1979), Bourke (1989), Bashir (2000), Naceur (2003), and 
Hassan and Bashir (2003) method of using the linear functional form in the empirical 
analysis. This form implies that the relationship between the variables is linear. In 
addition, the researcher used the pooled and panel estimation methods to examine the 
interrelation between bank performance measures and performance determinants. By 
applying the pooled and panel estimation methods, the researcher makes use of its 
advantage of providing more informative analysis, more degrees of freedom, more 
variability, less collinearity among variables, and a higher degree of efficiency.  
The pooled estimation method is based on the assumptions that the intercept value, the 
coefficients of all the independent variables and constant are all the same for all the banks 
and over time. Furthermore, the method assumes that the error term captures the 
differences between banks over the time. 
To gain broader choices on the nature of the impact of the independent variables on the 
dependent one, the study applies the panel estimation method which considers any cross 
banks’ differences among performance determinants.  
In the literature, there are two kinds of panel estimator approaches that can be used in 
financial research: fixed effects models and random effects models (Tanya, 2014). The 
researcher employed the two types of models to estimate the impact of the independent 
variables on the dependent one. The fixed effects model is based on the assumption of the 
individuality of each cross-sectional unit (bank) by letting the intercept vary for each 
company. However, it continues in assuming that the slope coefficients are constant 
across time. On the other hand, the Random Effects Model suggests different and constant 
intercept terms for each company. It also assumes that the interrelationships between the 
explanatory and explained variables are same, both cross-sectionally and over time.  
It is worth mentioning that while the likelihood test is used to select between the pooled 
and panel models, Hausman test is used to choose between the fixed effect and the random 
effect models.  
1.7. Research Structure  
The study is composed of twelve chapters. The details of these chapters are as follows:  
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Chapter One: Is the introductory chapter. It highlights the research aims, objectives, 
justifications, and contribution. 
Chapter Two: Provides an overview of Islamic banking and finance, its definition, 
principals and the operational aspects associated with the industry. 
Chapter Three: Provides an overview of the Sudanese economy and the development of 
the banking industry in Sudan.  
Chapter Four: Reviews past literature, especially those that have investigated bank's 
profitability in various countries. These studies are divided into two categories; single 
country and multi-country studies.  Each category is subdivided into studies that focus on 
traditional banks and studies that focus on Islamic banks. 
Chapter Five: Is devoted to the theoretical framework of the determinants of banks’ 
financial performance. 
Chapter Six: This chapter reviews the methodological approaches that are used to 
estimate the key determinants of the banking industry in Sudan, from 2005 until 2013. It 
also outlines the three steps and the alternative parametric linear functional form which 
are employed by the researcher to measure the impact of each profitability factor.  
Furthermore, this chapter describes the dataset and the variables used for the empirical 
analysis. The chapter also discusses the operational definitions of the variables. 
Chapter Seven: Presents the results of the empirical analysis of the first set of 
profitability determinants and their impact on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks. 
Additionally, the chapter shows the findings of the comparison between profitability 
determinants of private and state banks. 
Chapter Eight: Presents findings of previous studies on corporate governance, including 
the impact of gender diversity of the top management positions and size of the board of 
directors on firms’ profitability in general, and banks’ profitability in particular. The 
chapter also defines the various sets of determinants for the second model. 
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Chapter Nine: shows the empirical results of the impact of the second set of profitability 
determinants on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
Chapter Ten: Contains the literature review on the relationship between bank risk and 
corporate governance, including gender diversity and education. The chapter also defines 
the various sets of determinants for the third model 
Chapter Eleven: Provides empirical results on the third set of performance determinants 
on risk-taking behaviours of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
Chapter Twelve: This chapter offers summary and conclusion of the study and also 
draws attention toward the potential future research.  
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Chapter Two 
Islamic Banking 
2.1. Introduction  
Since the last decade, Islamic finance has become one of the fastest growing sectors in 
the worldwide financial industries. Even after the latest financial crisis, Islamic finance 
was able to show a remarkably average annual growth of 15% to 20% (Weill, 2010 and 
Ibrahim et al., 2012). Sharia-compliant products increased from US$450 billion in 2006 
to beyond US$1 trillion in 2010. It has also been estimated that the assets under Islamic 
management have grown from US$150 billion in the mid-1990s to US$700 billion in 
2007 (Ibrahim et al., 2012).  
Iqbal, (2001) reports that the continuing, steady growth and expansion of Islamic banking 
has been witnessed since the first generation of Islamic banks was established in the 
Middle East. This expansion takes three forms. The first one has been seen in the 
foundation of Islamic Banks worldwide, even in non-Muslim countries, including USA 
and Europe (Siddiqui, 2008; Iqbal, 2001). The second form of expansion is seen as a full 
conversion to the entire Islamic financial system in a number of Muslim countries. This 
includes Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan (Iqbal, 2001). Finally, several established conventional 
institutions have realized the profitable prospect of the Islamic financial market and have 
taken practical actions by investing in Islamic financial windows (Othman, 2012 and 
Solé, 2007). Therefore, Islamic banks nowadays serve both Muslim and non-Muslim 
financial systems and customers. Othman (2012) reports that many indicators show that 
Islamic finance is no longer a second alternative after conventional banking as it is seen 
as a desirable option to the deep-rooted conventional banking system. This chapter aims 
to shed light on the Islamic banking nature, its definition and the principles of an Islamic 
financial system under which the Islamic banks operate. It also highlights the sources of 
funds available to Islamic banks and the modes of finance, which are used in employing 
these funds.  
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2.2. Definition of an Islamic Bank 
The term Islamic banking refers to a full set of banking operations in accordance with 
Islamic principles. Kouser et al., (2011, p.55) define Islamic banks as “a complete system 
based on Islamic rules of financing”. Another definition of the system was by Ali and 
Farrukh (2013, p.28) who reports that Islamic banking system refers to “a conduct of 
banking operation in consonance with Islamic teachings”. Čihák and Hesse (2008, p.4) 
define Islamic banking as “the provision and use of financial services and products that 
conform to Islamic religious practices and laws”. Although these definitions have 
introduced an Islamic banking system in terms of its operating principles, rules, and 
products, it lacks the important component of land regulation. The definition does not 
consider where the Islamic banks trade (which may have rules they may have to abide 
by). The land law component was considered when defining Islamic banking by Ebrahim 
and joo who in 2001 gave a more comprehensive definition in which they report that “an 
Islamic bank is one that by its own choice opts to comply with two sets of law: the law of 
the Land (Jurisdiction); and the Islamic Law (Sharia)”. Therefore, Islamic banks need to 
reconcile their positions to coordinate between the possible conflicts that can appear when 
having some lands in non-Islamic law countries. 
All the above-mentioned definitions agree that the uniqueness of Islamic banking system 
lies in their objectives. These pass the absolute freedom of the ways of achieving profits 
to comply with ethical, economic, social and political restrictions of the Islamic laws 
Ibrahim et al., (2012) report that the principles of Islamic finance are distilled from the 
Islamic law (Sharia), which is represented by the Holy Quran, the Sunnah (the sayings 
and actions of Prophet Mohammed peace be upon him) and the Figh, which embody 
interpretation of the Shariah rules by Islamic scholars. Consequently, to consider an 
Islamic financial product as Sharia compliant the product have to be investigated by 
Islamic scholars to decide if it is well thought-out according to Sharia rules and values. 
If the product is proved as Sharia compliant, it could then be announced to investors. 
Ibrahim et.al (2012) argues that it is the responsibility of the Islamic scholars to guarantee 
that the Islamic product is in line with being Sharia compliant. 
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Further explanations for the nature of Islamic banking has been given by Dar and Presley 
(2001), who report that similar to conventional banks, the Islamic bank does play an 
intermediary role and trustee of other people’s money. However, the key difference that 
distinguishes Islamic banking from the conventional banking system is that Islam 
prohibits Muslims to receive or pay any interest (return of money on money), which 
results from the banking transactions (namely from loan and fixed deposit).  Another term 
that can be used for any return of money on money is usury (Riba). Ibrahim et al., (2009)  
and Abedifar et al., define usury as any return of money on money lending; whether this 
return is fixed or unfixed, simple or complex and at whatever the rate of this return is. 
Ghannadian and Goswami (2004) state that some scholars have clarified Riba as any type 
of interest payments, whilst others interpreted it to include only the extreme interest 
payments.  
The reasons behind this prohibition have been explained by Ghannadian and Goswami 
(2004), who report that the elimination of interest payment under Islamic Sharia comes 
from dealing with money only as a means of exchange, no more, no less. In other words 
money in itself does not have any added value, and therefore, it should not lead to more 
money. Thus, if money is being deposited in a bank or borrowed to someone, no certain 
return (interest) should be gained or derived from it.  
Furthermore, Derbel et al., (2012) refer the term Riba as the offence committed by one 
who lends money at an extremely high rate, whilst he defines the term interest as the 
amount paid for the use of money. Further opinion has been given by Ariff (1988), who   
argues that the general agreement among Muslim scholars is that there is no 
differentiation between usury and interest. Accordingly, any predetermined rate of return 
for money on money, even if it is large or small is strictly prohibited in Islamic law. 
Whatever the nature of this continuing debate on the true meaning and difference of Riba 
and interest, Ibrahim et al., (2012) argue that widespread interpretations of the Islamic 
principles suggest that the ban of Riba implies a prohibition on interest. Siddiqui (2008) 
and Ali and Farrukh (2013) report that Islamic banks are established to hold their 
activities in strict obedience to Islamic Sharia rules and moralities that prohibit Riba.  
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2.3. Importance and Aims of an Islamic Financial System  
The rationale behind the importance of Islamic banks comes from the prohibitions of any 
interest within Sharia law, regardless of its rates and time of charge (Ariff, 1988 and Ali 
and Farrukh, 2013). Therefore, Islamic banking has been found to serve the nations who 
are willing to keep or invest their money in accordance with the traditions, customs, and 
values of Islamic law.  
With regards to the aims of Islamic financial system, as mentioned above, Dar and Presley 
(2001) report that similar to non-Islamic banks, an Islamic bank aims to perform 
intermediary role and trustee for other people’s money with profit maximisation intention.  
Derbel et al., (2011) also report that the intention of a financial institution, whether it is 
Islamic or not, is to employ the financial resources and distribute them among different 
investment plans aiming to optimize both profitability and risk of these investments. 
However, the basic principles which govern an Islamic financial system are different from 
the essence of non-Islamic finance, as the profitability is not the only nor the main 
decisive factor for the Islamic financial institutions and consequently Islamic banks. 
Ebrahim and Joo (2001) report that the main goals of an Islamic banking and financial 
system are to: 
a. Realize the value systems of the Qur'an and the Sunnah (saying and actions of Prophet 
Muhammad peace be upon him) in Muslim socio-economic system.   
b. Promote the growth of the economy for Muslim nations by aiding financial markets. A 
well-developed Islamic financial market will have a great reflection on Muslim 
communities.  
c. Reduce the possibility of being exposed to an economic crisis by promoting risk-
sharing instruments. Financial services with fixed costs can aggressively consume the 
resources of borrowers during a slowdown, which can lead to bankruptcies and 
consequently economy impairment. An Islamic financial system is extremely interested 
in economic growth; however, Islam financial philosophy and consequently Islamic 
banking deal with this as a vital element of wider problems of total human development. 
Islamic banking, as one of the main instruments of the Islamic financial philosophy, aims 
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to lead human development in the correct direction. Therefore, the system deals with 
economic aspects of development in the context of total human development. 
This does not mean that banks should disregard profit maximization plans, but it calls 
attention to comprehensive financing plans that can incorporate the above-mentioned 
aims to be considered besides profitability.   
2.4. Principles of an Islamic Financial System  
The rationale behind financial systems, whether they are conventional or Islamic, is to 
utilise the resources in an optimal method, through directing or redirecting these recourses 
to different investment projects, in order to attain profit maximization. Nevertheless, the 
core rationales which rule the Islamic financial system is not solely profit-maximization. 
Profitability is neither the only nor the decisive factor of the theory for Islamic finance. 
Sharia rules, which governs Islamic finance, is characterised by an integrated and 
comprehensive framework that direct an economic, social and political life (Derbel et al., 
2011). Therefore, the principles of an Islamic financial system reflect the interest of 
sharia on the consequences of the financial structure of other aspects of life. Derbel et 
al., (2011) report that the object of such a system lies in the aspiration to ensure that 
different Islamic financial products are compatible with legal and moral values of Islam.  
The following section explains the main principles of Islamic finance, which are founded 
by both Sharia and other jurisprudence or rulings, known as fatwa, issued by qualified 
Muslim scholars. These principles are risk sharing, as well as the prohibition of interest, 
activities with an element of uncertainty (Gharar), gambling (Maisir) activities, the 
production and sale of goods and services that are forbidden in Islam and zakah.  
2.4.1. Prohibition of Riba (interest) 
From the etymological standpoint, the term Riba is derived from the Arab word “arba”, 
which means to enlarge or to boost. According to the Muslim jurisprudence, Riba is 
defined as any financial benefit or excess established by one of the contractors without 
justifiable and satisfactory equivalent (Derbel et al., 2011). 
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2.4.1.1 Prohibition of Interest in Other Religions 
Visser and McIntosh (2007) report that interest or usury, whether it is at a low or excessive 
rate has been practiced in different parts of the world for no less than four thousand years. 
During this time, there is considerable evidence of a strong displeasure by different 
traditions, foundation and community reformers on the ethical, religious and formal basis. 
The logic and arguments employed by these widespread critics have included work 
morals, community fairness, economic insecurity, and other aspects. Further evidence for 
the existence and prohibition of interest in history has been brought to existence by AL 
Manaseer (2009). He reports that Aristotle disagreed with any amount of interest because 
he considered money as “sterile", which means that it is not supposed to have the ability 
to increase unless it is serving certain purposes. He also provided evidence on cancellation 
of all private and public debts by authorised individuals in old Republican Rome in 594 
BC, as they prohibited interest.   
Derbel et al., (2011) report that barring the practice of interest is not voiceless in other 
religions as it has been found in Judaism, Christianity, as well as Hinduism and 
Buddhism. AL Manaseer (2009) brings evidence that in Judaism, interest (whether it had 
been charged on money, food or anything else) was seen as unacceptable and an unjust 
action, especially if it has been charged for amongst their own nationality. Therefore, 
Jewish societies used ban interest among themselves, but allow interest on money lending 
to other nationalities. Visser and McIntosh (2007) report that Jewish philosophy supports 
the prohibition of interest in order to support the morals of their society. Consequentially, 
this benevolent nature of the prohibition on interest implies that its contravention was not 
seen as an illegal offense that required legal sanctions, but fairly as an ethical misconduct. 
Concerning prohibition of interest in Christianity, AL Manaseer (2009) reports that 
during the Roman Empire, the church prohibited the clergy from accepting interest. 
Furthermore, in the eighth century, usury was seen and dealt as a criminal offence, 
because there was general belief that money is not a commodity and was principally made 
for exchange. However, as time progressed, interest was no longer considered as a 
criminal offence, because there were strong developments in supporting interest, which 
meant that the charging of cautious amounts of interest became an acceptable practice. 
However, to prevent the extreme rate of interest, authorities established the highest 
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interest rates that lenders cannot exceed. AL Manaseer (2009) also reports that this 
practice is still applicable in many countries around the world.    
2.4.1.2. Prohibition of Interest (Riba) in Islam 
The prohibition of Riba in Islam is solely from the Quran and the Sunnah (the sayings 
and doings of the prophet Mohammed SAW). 
According to the Islamic financial system, the exchange between the buyer and seller is 
permissible. The understanding behind the legality of sales and exclusion of Riba in Islam 
has been explained by Ebrahim and Joo (2001). They report that the financial exchange 
between the buyer and the seller is seen as justifiable because the profit is equivalent to 
the labour and time and risk is undertaken to secure or develop specific commodity to 
satisfy the seller. On the other hand, interest is deemed unfair, because the lender is legally 
assured of his principal and premium loan at the time of the agreement. This means that 
the interest paid is not based on the risk taken, labour and the time undertook to develop 
the commodity. From an Islamic ethical point of view, the use of interest is oppressive to 
the borrower, especially in a product or economic collapse. 
According to the Islamic principles, there are two types of Riba:  Riba al-nasi'ah (nasi'ah 
means delay) or credit Riba’ and Riba al-fadl surplus Riba (excess in spot transaction). 
Benamraoui (2008) who defines Riba-nasi’ah as an increase based on deferment. Abdul 
Rahman (2007) explains that this type of Riba occurred when there is a delay in payment 
of an outstanding debt, whether the debt is a result of sold commodity or money lent. He 
reports this kind of Riba comes from a fixed return of money that will be given to the loan 
provider following a certain period of time from when the principal amount was given. 
Abdul Rahman also reports that if the borrower exceeds the time allowed to return the 
money, they will be expected to pay an additional amount of interest. A further definition 
of credit Riba has been found by Ebrahim and Joo (2001) who referred to it as an 
arrangement of loans with a premium on the top of the principal amount that is being 
borrowed until a specific date, in other words, a predetermined interest on a debt 
agreement.  
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The second type of Riba, surplus Riba or Riba’ al-fadl, is more concerned with six kinds 
of goods (gold, silver, wheat, barley, salt, and dates), which are forbidden according to 
the Islamic Sharia from being traded for the same type of items but with a difference in 
amount. This kind of Riba has been defined by Benamraoui (2008) as an increase based 
on the difference in quality. Another definition of Riba’ al-fadl comes from Ebrahim and 
Joo (2001), who define this kind of Riba’ as an increase of additional cost based on the 
difference in quality. Although this definition shades light on the nature of this kind of 
Riba, clearer explanation has been given by Abdul Rahman (2007). He defined Riba’ al-
fadl as the exchanging of any of the same six mentioned items with a disparity in amount. 
He reports that this includes a differentiation in the quantity specified in the original 
contract, or as a result of the delay in the delivery of the commodity afforded. An example 
of this kind of Riba is the selling of gold and pearls in one transaction for a price that does 
not represent the market price. Another example is selling a kilogram of wheat for two 
kilograms or selling a unit of gold for two units, whether this has been specified in 
advance or because the buyer has faced some difficulties in returning the basic amount.  
Reasons behind the prohibition of interest have been discussed by Abdul Rahman (2007) 
who reports that there are principally two rationales for the illegality of Riba. Firstly, 
interest or Riba allows for wealth to be accumulated by a particular sector of society, 
thereby increasing the wealth of the rich (lenders), and the poverty of the poor (borrowers) 
the end result being lenders becoming rich at the expense of the borrowers. Abdul 
Rahman also reports that dealing with interest within society makes the lender less 
concerned about the borrower’s welfare, which lessens the sense of mutual sympathy in 
societies. Further, as the lender’s receipt of interest or Riba is predetermined and definite, 
it is undoubtedly easier for the lender to gain income from Riba than undertaking hardship 
by involving in any economic activities, which will have great consequences on the 
economic and social development of mankind. Finally, it may be worth mentioning that 
according to Benamraoui (2008) Islamic principles excuse sellers for accepting more 
money if the deal of a commodity is accomplished during an economic growth. 
2.4.2. Profits and Loss Sharing (PLS)  
Derbel (2011) reports that conventional financial contract transfers all the risks related to 
an investment to one stakeholder through the predetermined rate of interest. On the 
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contrary, Islamic financial philosophy believes in profit and loss sharing (PLS) modes of 
finance presented in Mudarabah and Musharakah (explained later in this chapter) as an 
alternative to predetermined interest. Through this principal, the consideration of 
stakeholders in profits and losses sharing is legalised. 
Dar and Presley (2001) establish PLS as a dominant subject in the theoretical literature of 
Islamic finance. Dar and Presley (2001), Čihák and Hesse (2008) and AL Manaseer 
(2009) report that the key characteristic of the PLS principle is the promotion of risk 
sharing between the funds’ suppliers (investors) and the funds’ user (entrepreneur).  
On the contrary, under non-Islamic banking system, the fund provider is protected by a 
programmed rate of interest, whether the business achieves a profit or produces a loss. 
Benamraoui (2008) argues that PLS represent an alternative to loans at predetermined 
interest rates through shaping a distinctive partnership with the borrower. 
According to PLS modes of finance, a sharing plan must be established at the signing of 
an agreement to specify the percentage of distribution of expected profit or loss. The 
rationale behind PLS mode of finance is clearly explained by Siddiqui (2001) who reports 
that normally, financial institutions gain extensive profit from trading with the 
accumulation of customer’s deposits, however, these institutions do not share these profits 
with the depositors, although they are the owners of the funds. This unfairness can be 
averted if banks agree to accept PLS as a mode of finance and also allow a sizable amount 
of fund to borrowers on the same basis. If this mode of finance is adopted, it will bring 
prosperity to the society, as a great number of depositors will be receiving higher profits 
on their deposits. 
In practice, PLS has been criticised for showing insufficiency. This has been explained 
by Dar and Presley (2001) who report the following difficulties facing the application of 
PLS mode of finance:  
Firstly, when compared to self-financing owner-manager, the fund user (entrepreneurs) 
in PLS is encouraged to show a minimal profit or apply minimal effort in their 
endeavours, which can be problematic for this mode of finance.  
19 
 
Secondly, to get the best of PLS mode of finance, the contractual agreement requires a 
properly defined property rights, however in the majority of Muslim countries, property 
rights are neither well defined nor properly protected. Consequently, PLS contracts are 
considered to be less pleasant or even vulnerable if used.  
Finally, equity financing has been regarded as impractical or sufficient for financing 
short-term projects because of its high degree of risk. This encourages Islamic banks to 
utilise other modes of finance or even adopt a markup financial policy in order to be 
assured a minimal degree of profits. 
Abdul Rahman (2007) reports that most Islamic banks avert utilising PLS as a major basis 
for their investment because of the previous criticisms. As an alternative, they use other 
Islamic modes of finance based on “mark-ups” that are somehow related to predetermined 
interest lending but under the guidance of Islamic Sharia.  
2.4.3. Prohibition of Activities with Elements of Gharar (Uncertainty) 
According to Ibrahim et al., (2012) and Derbel et al., (2011), the concept of Gharar refers 
to any business activity or trade in which the terms and conditions of the contracts are 
highly uncertain, unclear, vague or characterised by deception. The uncertainty in this 
situation covers nature, quality and price of products/services under contract and/or the 
specifications of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Generally, Gharar 
occurs when there is insufficient relevant information or any important information 
related to the commodity/service under a contract that can lead to ambiguity and 
exploitation or abuse by one of the contracting parties.  
According to Ebrahim and Joo (2001), the exchange is prohibited only if its terms 
implicate deception based on the absence of knowledge related to the goods: that is, if the 
goods cannot be supplied by the seller or the goods are not well described in terms of 
type, quantity or quality. To avoid the case of Gharar, the quality and quantity of any 
goods to be delivered following the signing of the agreements must be well defined so 
that there is a reduced risk of deception. 
Furthermore, it may be worth mentioning that Gharar is not applied if the change is not 
related to basic characteristics of the good. For example, any unexpected change in the 
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economy will not be considered Gharar and the legality of the transaction will be agreed 
by sharia. On the contrary, if the basic characteristic of the goods is majorly different 
from that agreed, Gharar is applied and the transaction is prohibited in Islam.  
In non-Islamic banks, the definite profits on the bank's portfolio of loans are indefinite; 
however the bank obligates itself with predetermined rate of interest to depositors.  
2.4.4. Prohibition of Maisir (Gambling Activities)  
Gambling is referred to as Maisir in Arabic, which means any action that includes a deal 
between two or more parties, each of whom agrees to take a risk of loss; where this loss 
becomes the gain for the other party without assuming any risk or making proportionate 
efforts. AL Manaseer (2009) reports that the gain resulting from such a random 
speculation deal is considered immoral and prohibited in Islam, for the sake of preventing 
individual interest from been deviated from the positive employment of resource to 
acquiring and gathering wealth with no effort. Ibrahim (2009) argues that non-Islamic 
banks are criticized for undertaking activities that involve such kind of deal (speculation 
and conventional insurance). 
2.4.5. Prohibition of the Production and Sale of Goods and Services that are 
prohibited in Islam 
Ali and Farrukh (2013) report that to accomplish the ambition and purposes of an Islamic 
financial system, Islamic banking is expected not only to keep away from interest-based 
dealings prohibited in Islam but also from been thrown in unethical transactions which 
may lead to the society’s or individuals’ destruction or impairment. Contribution in such 
transactions is firmly prohibited in Islamic Sharia as one of its main concerns to 
positively engage with the community in order to attain both economic and social growth 
and prosperity. Chong and Liu (2009) provides examples of these sort of activities by 
reporting that Islamic banking is not allowed to deal in a business that has anything to do 
with alcohol, pork, tobacco, armament, and prostitution.  
2.4.6. Zakah  
Zakah is an amount of money that every Muslim whose wealth surpasses a set limit is 
required to pay to the needy in the Islamic society 
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Unlike charity, Zakah is compulsory and its amount is defined by sharia. Samad (2004) 
defines Zakah as an obligatory religious sum or tax on the wealth of the rich payable to 
the needy. The rationale behind Zakah is to redistribute wealth to offer a fair standard of 
living for the poor.  
Zakah is one of the five pillars of Islam; therefore, all Islamic banks are required to pay 
Zakah on their earned profits. In consequence, Islamic banks pay two taxes, Zakah, and 
corporate business tax, while non-Islamic banks only pay corporate business tax. 
Recently, the Islamic banking system developed a new service through which they are 
able to collect Zakah from eligible Muslims.  
2.5. Islamic Banks' Sources of Funds  
As in conventional banks, Islamic banks have two sources of funds; internal and external. 
The internal source is the shareholders’ funds. External sources of funds consist of current 
accounts (demand deposits), savings accounts and investment deposits. Bashir (1984), 
Khan and Mirakhor (1990), Haron (1996a), Deehani (1999) and khan et al., (2007) 
explain both types of funds as follows: 
2.5.1. Shareholders' Fund  
Shareholders' fund (equity capital) is the single source of equity finance that an Islamic 
bank uses: this is acquired through the sale of common shares to the public. It enables 
their holders to have the sole control over the bank management. It also includes any 
reserves that have been accumulated over the years by the bank. Unlike conventional 
banks, Islamic banks do not issue preference shares as it requires predetermination of 
fixed dividends for their holders (AL Manaseer, 2009 and Deehani, 1999). Khan and 
Mirakhor (1990) report that equity capital in Islamic banks is a guarantee of the financial 
rights of depositors in current accounts in case of a business operation resulting in a loss.  
2.5.2. Current Accounts demand deposit or transaction deposit 
Current accounts in Islamic banks are akin to current accounts of conventional banks 
(Haron, 1996a). A customer who holds current accounts in Islamic banks is supposed to 
sign an agreement with the bank under which they give their clear endorsement to the 
bank to use their funds, with no return (Khan and Mirakhor, 1990 and Bashir, 1984). By 
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signing this agreement they gain the advantage of withdrawing their money on demand 
(Deehani, 1999). Khan and Mirakhor (1990) report that reliable amount of deposits in the 
current account is normally retained by the bank as cash reserves to meet customers’ 
demands on their accounts. They also report that the bank uses the rest of this credit to 
generate profits by engaging in various activities. Any profits obtained from the deposits 
of the current accounts will be taken by the shareholders. In contrast, they emphasise that 
in the case of loss shareholders pay the customers of current accounts from their equity.  
The reasoning behind the current accounts not receiving distributed profit is two folds; 
firstly, according to Sharia a share in profit is permitted only in case of risk sharing, which 
is not available under current account contract. Secondly, any customer’s credit to current 
account is considered as loans from depositors to the bank. Therefore, the banks are 
committed to paying back only the initial amount, any increase over the principal amount 
will be seen as interest which is completely prohibited in Islamic Sharia. 
2.5.3. Saving Accounts  
Haron (1996a) and Khan et al., (2007) report that unlike savings account at conventional 
banks where depositors are automatically given a fixed predetermined interest on their 
deposit,  Islamic banks accept saving deposits from customers under the condition of 
authorising the bank to utilise the deposit at the bank’s own risk. However, according to 
Haron (1996a), the bank is expected to pay voluntary profit as it is totally at the judgment 
of the banks to decide how much to pay to reward the depositors. He also reports that 
when the contract between the depositor and the bank is based on Mudarabah modes of 
finance, returns is based on the pre-agreed profit/loss-sharing ratio.  
2.5.4. Investment Accounts or Investment Deposit  
Haron (1996a) reports that Islamic banks offer investment account facilities that are 
compatible with the fixed or time deposit facilities at traditional banks. However, with 
this type of deposit, there is no pre-determined interest rate attached to the deposits. 
Investment account considers the depositors as investors, who are entitled to receive profit 
through their investment deposits. Khan and Mirakhor (1990) and Deehani (1999) explain 
this source of fund by describing it as neither liability as current account deposit nor 
equity finance. As an alternative, it represents a distinctive source of fund but with 
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predetermined maturity date that gives the Islamic bank the right to group this money in 
one pool with its equity and invest it for their contributors with the promise of sharing 
future profit or loss at pre-agreed proportions. khan and Mirakhor (1990) and Deehani 
(1999) report that, as the investment accounts owner are not guaranteed a predetermined 
return, they are permitted to receive profit depending on the profitability of the accounting 
period.  
Haron (1996) explains three types of investment account facilities available at Islamic 
banks. Firstly, time investment accounts (three months, six months, etc). Secondly, 
investment accounts based on notice, which means the depositor must give notice before 
withdrawal. Thirdly, specific investment accounts or deposits for particular sort of 
investment or projects. In this aspect, Bashir (1984) states that the predetermination of 
the profit-sharing ratio is normally reliant on the nature of the deposit account and 
whether the distribution of profits is decided to be on a long or short-term basis. He reports 
that the long-term deposit accounts are supposed to have a higher profit-sharing ratio as 
the bank consider these sorts of funds as more stable, which enable the bank to utilise this 
fund for long-term investments. Bashir (1984) also reports that all these types of 
investment account facilities are managed under Mudarabah modes of finance.   
Khan and Mirakhor (1990) and Deehani (1999) report that as owners of investment 
accounts accept full risk of losing their deposits if the business operations result in a loss, 
investment deposits do not form a financial risk to the bank. 
Depositors of investment account, whether their deposit is for the long or short period are 
allowed to withdraw their fund at any time taking into their consideration that their 
predetermined profit (or loss) sharing ratio will be affected accordingly. Therefore, they 
will need to keep their investment deposit for the minimally contracted period. Bashir 
(1984) reports that predetermined profit (or loss) sharing ratio would not pay/charge for 
a six-month deposit account if the depositor withdraws his or her deposit after five 
months. He argues that to reduce the liquidity risk associated with these feature Islamic 
banks require notice to be given before allowing the withdrawal. 
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Finally, it may be worth mentioning that under both internal and external source of fund 
Islamic banks use the deposits to offer finance through special Islamic modes (discussed 
in the next section), and either obtain a commission as a fee or receives a percentage of 
the expected profit as a reward or return for their efforts.The profit/loss sharing ratio 
between the bank and depositors is determined in the contract; however, the definite 
amount of return which will ultimately be paid to investors is not prearranged. As Islamic 
modes of finance are commonly used to finance trade in terms of commodities and 
services and to aid the actual production processes, the profit/loss sharing ratio is strictly 
related to the real economy’s performance. Additionally, it is linked to the performance 
of each bank in terms of its management skills and choices of investment. 
2.6. Islamic Banks' Uses of Funds or Islamic Banks Modes of Finance 
According to the rules of conventional banks borrowers has to be responsible for all risk 
associated with project activity. Therefore, they pay this rate regardless of the profitability 
of the project that being funded; no matter if the project activities result in making a loss. 
Accordingly, conventional banks place great emphasis on the collateral or 
creditworthiness associated with the receiving of interest. In addition to that, in the case 
of bankruptcy, the bank has the right for the first claim on the value of the liquidated 
assets (Smith and Gierthy 2010). 
On the contrary, as Islamic banks are forbidden from paying or receiving interest 
according to Sharia law, Islamic financial system utilise both Sharia law and previous 
experiences to form suitable and practicable modes of finance.  Abdul Rahman (2007) 
reports that the practice of Islamic banks is governed by Islamic rules on transactions, 
known as “Figh Al-Muamalat”, which utilise special Islamic Sharia arrangements for 
structuring the main outlines of Islamic modes of finance. According to these modes of 
finance, the profitability of the projects is considered to be the key determinant of 
financing, not the customers’ credit merit and solvency or the securities and collaterals. 
This type of financing gives considerations to the economic morals and ethics that unite 
both material and spiritual qualities to demonstrate its system and accomplish its 
objectives (Ariff, 1988 and Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). 
Dusuki (2007) reports that this policy holds the motivation that encourages all individuals 
to contribute to the society’s development. That aside, it will support economically 
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profitable projects that have both social and economic prosperity and settlement for the 
whole society. This will be seen in different signs such as creating additional job 
opportunities, increasing production and introducing new types of technology. He also 
reports that adopting policy which emphasises society moral values and needs does not 
conflict with the aim of profit maximization but it reveals the importance of favouring 
investments  that reflect both the needs of the majority of the population (such as food 
provision, investing in education and health services) and entails a considerable rate of 
economic and social benefits (such as opening additional job opportunities and lessening 
district imbalances and migration to the main cities in search for improved services).  
To adopt these comprehensive socio-economic policies, Islamic banks utilise Islamic 
financial instruments. These instruments have been explained by Haron (1996a) who 
report that Islamic modes of finance are classified into the following three groups: 
   a. Modes that are founded on profit sharing PLS. 
   b. Modes that are founded on fixed charges non-PLS 
   c. Free of charge mode.  
The modes of Mudarabah (trust-finance) and Musharaka (joint-venture) represent PLS 
modes of finance, whereas modes such as Murabaha (cost plus profit markup), Salam 
(advance purchase or sales contract) and Ijara (lease) represent the group of fixed charges 
or markup. Finally, the mode of Qard Hassan (benevolent loan) is the only mode of free 
of charge principle. The structure of the Islamic modes of finance is illustrated in figure 
2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Structure of Islamic Finance 
Source: created by the author 
Further details on these modes are discussed below. 
2.6.1. Mudarabah (Trust-Finance) 
Shahinpoor (2009) defines Mudarabah as an agreement between two parties in which one 
party supply the funds and the other commit the entrepreneurial abilities such as labour 
and management duties. Siddiqui (2008) explained Mudarabah as a partnership contract 
but with no equity partnership. Further explanation for Modaraba was given by Aljifri 
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(2013) who reports that within this partnership, the lender does not interfere with the 
enterprise administration, however, he has the right to access and monitor work-related 
information. 
Sarker (2000) reports that Mudarabah can be divided into restricted and unrestricted 
Mudarabah. He stated that within restricted Mudarabah the lender allows the 
entrepreneur to trade by his capital but according to certain conditions. These conditions 
are connected to the kind of product or service which is subject to the deal, the place of 
trading, the person with whom the entrepreneur should trade and the time of the trade. On 
the other hand, he explains unrestricted Mudarabah as the case where the lender applies 
no restrictions on the commodity, the place of trading, the person with whom the 
entrepreneur should trade and the time of the trade.  
Shahinpoor (2009) reports that in Mudarabah, the financier (Rabbul Almal) is not allowed 
to call for collateral to lessen credit risk. However, according to Mudarabah agreement, 
he is entitled to clearly state predetermined percentage of the expected profit or loss 
according to the business outcomes. Therefore, profit cannot be claimed unless 
Mudarabah obtained profit. In the case of loss, the financier is not responsible for any 
losses if it is greater than his capital contribution. Additionally, Abdul Rahman (2007) 
reports that any losses resulted from this type of contract must be remunerated by future 
profits. Furthermore, according to Shahinpoor (2009), the entrepreneur is not liable for 
losses beyond his loss of time and efforts in attempting to administrate the enterprise 
unless it is clearly shown that the loss is due to his dereliction of commitment 
(mismanagement). Abdul Rahman (2007) establishes that after full settlement of 
Mudarabah, the enterprise is expected to be owned by the entrepreneur. The structure of 
the Mudarabah contract is illustrated in figure2.2. 
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2.6.2. Musharakah (Joint venture)  
Ibrahim et al., (2012) define Musharakah as an equity-based agreement in which the bank 
and a business partner (entrepreneur) perform partnership to finance their business 
through taking an equity stake in the venture. According to the definition, both the Islamic 
bank and the customer has a stake in the equity capital. Rights of partners are based on 
each partner's share given to the investment. With regards to profit distribution in a 
Musharakah contract, Ibrahim et al., (2012) report that if a business result in a profit, it 
will be distributed to all partners according to the predetermined ratio agreed upon in the 
contract. However, in the case of a loss, Siddiqui (2008) reports that loss will be 
distributed to the fund providers according to their equity participation proportion. 
It is also common that Musharakah contract ends up with the transfer of the project 
ownership to the business partner. This normally happens through what is known as a 
diminishing partnership or Musharakah Mutanaqisah. Abdul Rahman (2007) reports that 
within the concept of Musharakah Mutanaqisah the capital sum reduces following each 
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payment made by the entrepreneur towards the capital.This will boost the total capital for 
the entrepreneur in anticipation of transferring the total ownership of the business to him. 
The repayment period is dependent upon the pre-agreed period. The structure of the 
Mosharakah contract is illustrated in figure 2.3. 
 
2.6.3 Morabahah (cost plus profit markup) 
Siddiqui (2008) establishes Morabahah as one of the broadly employed mode of financing 
by the Islamic banks. Nevertheless, it is commonly implemented in short-term trade 
financing.  
Haron (1996a) and Siddiqui (2008) explain that Morabahah is an agreement of three 
parties (the bank, the client and the original seller/supplier). Based on an obligatory prior 
promise to purchase contract signed initially between the bank and the client, the bank 
purchases the meant asset from the original seller. After acquiring the asset, the bank 
resells it to the customer after agreeing a predetermined resale price based on cost plus 
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markup price. Customer payment method and whether it should be paid in full upon 
maturity or by instalments will be specified in the agreement.  
It may be worth mentioning that the entrepreneur has to repay all the debt under the 
contract to the bank regardless of losses and profits incurred by the entrepreneur following 
the cash conversion of goods. Abdul Rahman (2007) reports that the Islamic bank 
normally becomes the possessor of the commodity until settlement of its full price (cost 
plus markup) is made. He states that the benefits of Morabahah is widely recognizable, 
and entrepreneurs with a perfect reputation for settlement will be offered extra finance. 
As Morabahah is based on the markup or cost plus sale contract, it may come to mind 
that there is a sort of similarity between Morabahah and interest based loans provided by 
conventional banks. In other words, one can observe this markup sale agreement as an 
equivalent to predetermined interest contract used by non-Islamic banks as it seems that 
interest is being charged but is called a pre-agreed profit. However, this has been defended 
by Siddiqui (2008) and Ghannadian and Goswami (2004) who report that Islamic scholars 
have defended this idea by arguing that markups included in Morabahah are not interest, 
since the true owner of the goods is the bank, even if this possession is temporary. 
Therefore, Morabahah embodies a kind of trade agreement as it represents a resale 
contract. The recognition of trade and its associated profits is well known in the Islamic 
financial principles.  
The structure of the Morabahah contract is illustrated in figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Structure of Morabahah Contract 
 
Source: created by the author  
2.6.4. Ijarah (leasing) 
Ijarah is a long-term rental agreement, which is similar to leasing in conventional banks 
but subject to certain conditions that comply with Islamic Shariah.  Within this mode of 
finance, the Islamic bank (the lessor) should purchase the assets (property, car, equipment 
etc.) before conducting the Ijarah contract. After acquiring the assets, the bank rents the 
assets for the client (the lessee) who pays the rent at regular intervals. The Islamic bank 
holds the accountability of monitoring the asset’s usage. If it requires any maintenance –
but not due to wear and tear- the Islamic bank calls for or employs a suitable maintenance 
unit for the purpose of maintenance. The bank is also accountable for the risks related to 
the asset. Meanwhile, the lessee will be accountable for safeguarding the asset (Abdul 
Rahman, 2007 and Amba and Almukharreq, 2013).  
A developed type of Ijarah is Ijarah Muntahia Bitamleek. Ibrahim et al., (2012) report 
that within this concept of Ijarah the possession of the assets will be transferred to the 
lessee at the end of the contract. Abdul Rahman (2007) reports that the asset ownership 
will be transferred to the lessee by one of three ways:  
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Firstly, the transferral occurs at the price that has already been fixed at the time of the 
contract. Secondly, the transferral occurs through progressive and gradual transferral of 
ownership during the period of the contract. Finally, the ownership can be transferred as 
a gift or token price, as the sale price has already been paid through the instalments.  
The structure of the Ijarah contract is illustrated in figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5: Structure of Ijarah Contract
Source: created by the author 
2.6.5. Salam (advance purchase or sales contract) or postponed delivery 
Salam is a postponed delivery contract whereby delivery of commodity takes place at a 
specific future date in exchange of price that has been received in advanced (Hassan and 
Lewis 2007). Aljifri (2013) reports that Salam is a contract in which a bank agrees to buy 
a specified quantity of goods on a specified date in the future. Therefore, the bank makes 
an advance payment to the customer who uses this payment for financing the production 
of his project. According to Kaleem and Abdul Wajid (2009), Salam agreement supplies 
small needy farmers with the required capital and cost of operations to produce their 
crops.  
Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), Siddiqui (2008), and AL Manaseer (2009) report that Salam 
contract supplies farmers with cash when it is needed, whether the cash is needed just 
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before harvesting or for fertilizing or even at the time of sowing. They also report that as 
the asset subject to Salam agreement is not in existence at the time of the contract, Shariah 
specifies strict rules to be adhered to protect the right of all parties. These rules cover 
specification of quality and quantity of the commodity, date and place of collection and 
all other aspects that help in settling the contract and protect both parties. 
Salam contract is fully acceptable under modern banking, however, the only concern is 
that banks generally desire to deal in money rather than products. This problem can be 
solved through parallel Salam contracts in which the bank enters into two separate 
agreement through which it acts as an intermediary between the two parties, firstly with 
the farmer who sell the product and secondly with the buyer of the product.  
It may be worth noting that the contracts with both parties should be entirely independent 
of one another (http://www.financialislam.com/salam.html). 
Siddiqui (2008) report that Salam contract is favourable for the two parties as the seller 
benefit from receiving the money in advance while the buyer (the bank in this case) 
benefits from entering into a Salam contract because, usually, a Salam price is cheaper 
than a cash purchase which secures the bank against price fluctuations. However, the bank 
still bears the rare risk of a price deflation or a market crash when post Salam prices 
decrease to lower than the price of Salam contract prices. Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) and 
AL Manaseer (2009) report that the buyer can legally ask the seller for a collateral to 
secure his money and to reduce lending risk. The structure of the Salam contract is 
illustrated in figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6: Structure of Salam Contract 
Source: created by the author 
 
2.6.6. Istisnaa (commissioned manufacture) 
Referring to Ibrahim et al., (2012) and Amba and Almukharreq (2013), Istisnaa is a 
concept of commissioned and manufacturing agreement that can be used in the finance 
of manufactured goods, construction, and infrastructure projects. Within this contract, one 
party agrees to undertake the task of producing a certain commodity and at a 
predetermined price and the promise of delivering it at a certain future date. Ibrahim et 
al., (2009) define Istisna as an agreement for the sale of certain commodity to be 
manufactured within a certain completion period of time and delivered upon completion 
by the manufacturer to the customer. Further explanation for Istisna is given by Ibrahim 
et al., (2012) and Amba and Almukharreq (2013) who report that Istisna is often utilised 
to finance long-term plans.  Within this mode of finance, the bank represents the service 
provider (contractor) who agrees to manufacture or build a certain asset for the customer 
at a predetermined price and predetermined description of the depicted product and within 
a specified period of time. The purchase price is payable by the customer in the future by 
agreed instalments. According to Ibrahim et al., (2012) Istisna often involves two 
contracts; the first one represents the customer agreement to buy the asset from the Islamic 
bank upon completion. The second contract is between the bank and the service provider 
for manufacturing the same product with another contractor. In this contract the bank sets 
another specific predetermined price in a way that enables it to generate a reasonable 
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profit, bearing in mind that the bank holds the responsibility for the construction to match 
the contracted standards and specification. 
It may worth mentioning that both Salam and Istisna represent future contracts in which 
the purchaser and seller agree to a specific price, quality, quantity and delivery date. 
However, Salam is prearranged for commodities, whilst Istisna is for manufactured 
goods.  
The structure of the Istisnaa contract is illustrated in figure 2.7 below. 
 
2.6.7. Qardh Hasan (benevolent or interest-free loan) 
Qardh Hasan represents another case of Islamic finance that deals on a zero return basis. 
In other words, the borrower repays the same amount they initially borrowed from the 
bank without any interest payments (interest-free loans). The borrower usually has to 
refund the loan within a predetermined period of time; the repayment terms are normally 
instalments that are clearly specified in the agreement (Abdul Rahman, 2007 and Khan et 
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al., 2007).  Additionally, Abdul Rahman (2007) reports that according to this mode of 
finance the bank is permitted to charge for loan administration. He also reports that an 
entrepreneur who has good potentials to make full repayment and is in need of instant 
cash are more likely to be chosen for this kind of interest-free loan. He also reports that 
as the Islamic bank will bear the credit risk, they need to select the accurate technique to 
ensure that the instalments will be received as agreed. Shahinpoor, (2009) argues that 
Qardh Hasan is often given to charitable institutions or people with an unexpected need 
for funds (such as natural disaster), therefore, Qardh Hasan is expected to give both 
financial and moral support for the borrower.  
After discussing the uses of funds in Islamic banking it is appropriate to know that the 
above-mentioned set of modes of finance represent neither all the potential contracts that 
Islamic law permits nor are those used in practice. Generally, there is a good opportunity 
for innovating in the formation of new types of contracts, as long as there is no 
prearranged interest charge or other contradictions with principles of an Islamic Financial 
system. 
The following table which is adapted from Haron (1976a), Ariff (1988), Bashir (1999), 
Dar and Presley (2001), Samad (2004), (Dusuki and Abdullah (2007), Cihák and Hesse 
(2008), Smith and Gierthy (2010), Ika and Abdullah (2011) and Ibrahim et al., (2012) 
shows comparison between conventional finance and Islamic finance. It also summarises 
the unique features of Islamic finance. 
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Table 2.1. Comparison of Some of the Features of Conventional and Islamic Finance 
 Conventional Banking Finance Islamic Banking Finance 
1 Predetermined rate of interest is certain 
for the investor. 
Supports risk sharing between the fund 
providers (investor) and fund users 
(entrepreneurs). 
2 It takes aim at profit maximization 
without any restraint.  
Profit maximisation is restrained by 
Islamic law requirements. 
3 The basic and most important function 
of conventional banks is to lend money 
and get it back with compounding 
interest.  
The basic and most important function 
of Islamic banks is to participate in the 
partnership business.  
4 Collateral or security provided by the 
customer is the main determinant of 
financing. 
The projects profitability is the main 
determinant of financing.  
5 In the case of defaulters additional 
penalty and compounded interest can be 
applied. 
At the agreement no condition to 
charge any additional money to the 
defaulter. Additionally, according to 
the bank’s judgment discount is given 
for early settlement. 
6 The relation between the conventional 
bank and its clients is creditor and 
debtors relationship. 
The relation between the Islamic bank 
and its clients is investors, partners and 
buyer and seller. 
7 The conventional banks grant greater 
emphasis on the credit worthiness of the 
customers. 
The Islamic banks grant greater 
emphasis to the viability and the 
benefit of the financed projects. 
8 It often happens that the bank’s own 
interest becomes prominent and 
overcomes the customer’s interest.  
It gives great emphasis to public 
interest. 
9 It does not contend with Zakah 
 
 
In addition to that Islamic banks is 
obligated to pay annual Zakah, recently 
Islamic banking system has developed 
new service of being a Zakah 
Collection Centre. 
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10 All kinds of deposits are assured. Only deposits for current and saving 
accounts can be assured. Nevertheless, 
if the account is based on the 
Murdarabah concept, the money still 
cannot be assured and the client in the 
case of loss has to share according to 
the contract conditions and 
proportions. 
Source: created by the author 
 
2.7. Summary  
This chapter describes the rationale of Islamic banking system, which lays in profit 
maximisation that is consistent with Sharia law and principles. It also focuses on the 
distinctive characteristic of the Islamic banks. The next chapter gives a general idea about 
the history of Sudanese Islamic Banks and the environment in which they operate. 
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Chapter Three 
The Sudanese Economy and Banking Industry 
3.1. Introduction 
As the subject of this research is to assess the financial performance of Sudanese Islamic 
banks, a general overview of the Sudanese economy and the banking environment is 
given in this chapter.  
This chapter sheds light on the economic environment in which the Sudanese Islamic 
Banking industry operates, their development and performance. This chapter discusses 
the major characteristics of the Sudanese economy as well as the main features of the 
evolution of these banks and their performance indicators. 
3.2. Overview of Sudan 
Sudan is located in the northeastern part of the African continent. The country 
encompasses an area of 695,000 sqm (it was the largest country in Africa until 2011, 
when the south of Sudan was detached from the north). Sudan is surrounded by the red 
sea on the northeastern side and also borders seven African countries, Egypt to the north, 
Eritrea, and Ethiopia to the east and southeast, South Sudan at the southern border and 
the Central African Republic on the south-western border. The western border is shared 
with Chad and its north-western border with Libya. Sudan terrains are generally flat with 
distributed mountains in the east and west. Khartoum, the capital city, is located on the 
concourse of the Blue and White Nile Rivers. Its climate is desert and savanna in the north 
and central areas and tropical in the south. The country is divided administratively into 
15 States. Sudan's population is one of the most multicultural in Africa, with Arab and 
sub-Saharan Africa constituting the major cultures. The total population in July 2011 was 
33,419,625 with an annual population growth rate of 2.8% in 2011. The average literacy 
rate in Sudan was 69% in 2011 and a life expectancy 42-55 years of age. The official 
Language is Arabic and Islam was declared as the official State religion in 1983, when 
the government, under the second military regime of president Numeiri, started the 
application of Sharia laws. 80% of the country’s workforce are in the agricultural sector, 
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13% in the government sector and 7% in the industry and commerce sectors (Countries 
of the World: Republic of the Sudan, Jan2012). 
The Legal system in Sudan is founded on both the English common law and sharia law, 
as of January 1991, as imposed by the government then (Ahmad, 2007). 
Sudan has witnessed a civil war for more than twenty-two years, which has decelerated 
Sudan’s economic and political development and led to a massive internal displacement 
of its people. The war ended with the secession of northern Sudan from southern Sudan 
after the South voted in a referendum in January 2011 and officially declared an 
independent republic on July 2011. However, several violent conflicts have emerged by 
the end of 2011 in Darfur and in the three border states of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and 
the Blue Nile (Khalfalla, 2011). 
3.2.1. Structure of the economy 
3.2.1.1. Agriculture 
Sudan's economy has always been mostly agricultural, with its massive arable lands and 
ample running water from rivers and seasonal rains that irrigate enormous numbers of 
agricultural projects in various parts of the country. The agricultural sector contributes 
48% of the GDP and provides employment to 80% of the population. It also supplies 
Sudan with around 85% of its export earnings (the main primary agricultural export goods 
are cotton, sorghum, peanuts, Arabic gum, oilseeds, and livestock) as well as contributing 
raw materials to the industrial sector, which in turn provides about 17% of the GDP for 
the country (Hussein, 2003). 
3.2.1.2. Industry 
Industrial activities in Sudan are all of a basic nature, with the manufacturing of cotton, 
leather, and wooden products being the main types. However, its contribution has 
increased to around 43% of GDP in response to the recent development in the oil industry. 
The major industrial products are textiles, leather, and cement. The main industries are 
food processing industries such as sugar and flour, and oil industries. 
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3.2.1.3. Petroleum 
Sudan's oil production started in the late 1990s and has grown rapidly, giving the 
industrial sector a good boost. In 2010, oil production accounted for over 90% of Sudan's 
foreign exchange earnings and 36% of government revenues (before South Sudan's 
secession in July 2011). After losing the main oil field that was located in Southern Sudan, 
the remaining production in Sudan barely covers domestic use. However, new fields have 
been discovered in Kosti, in north Sudan (Global Energy Market Research: Sudan, 
Mar2013).  
3.2.2. Selected Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators of Sudanese Economy since 
2005 
A general overview of Sudan’s economic growth is pertinent, given that it influences the 
banking performance, the theme of this research. Table 3.1 contains the performance of 
the macroeconomic indicators over the entire period of study. 
Between 2005 and 2010, the GDP showed unstable movement ranging between 5.6 and 
9.9, reaching its maximum in 2006. However, it dropped down to 1.4 and 1.9 in 2011 and 
2012 respectively, which could be interpreted to be because of the loss of the oil resources 
that was ceded to the southern Sudan. Nonetheless, GDP increased in 2013 to 3.6, 
indicating that the government has started to cope with the country’s new situation. 
The table also shows that although inflation increased from 8.4 in 2005 to 18.1 in 2011, 
a marked increase is observed between 2012 and 2013 as the rate reached 44.1 and 42 
respectively. This could also be related to the secession of southern Sudan. The table also 
shows the price of Sudanese pound against the American dollar during the Study period. 
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Table 3.1. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators of Sudan, 2005-2013 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Growth Domestic 
Product %  
5.6 9.9 8.1 7.8 6.1 
5.2 1.9 1.4 3.6 
Inflation Head 
line annual 
average ” % 
8.4 7.3 8.1 14.3 11.2 13.1 18.1 44.1 
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Exchange Rate of 
SDG Against US 
Dollar:     Annual 
Average 
2.43 2.17 2.01 2.09 2.32 
 
2.09 
2.31 5.7 
 
4.4 
Industrial Sector 
Contribution In 
The GDP % 
22.0 23.7 29.2 29.2 23.9 
 
21.1 
 
23.1 
 
20.1 
 
21.2 
Services Sector 
Contribution In 
The GDP % 
44.8 44.7 41.9 41.5 45.0 
 
47.7 
 
48 
 
48.4 
 
48 
Source: Bank of Sudan’s annual reports 2005-2013 
3.3. Sudanese Banking Industry: History and current situation 
Distinct from many other African and Arab systems, the Sudanese banking system has 
gone through several changes since the independence of the country in 1956. These 
alterations are mainly due to frequent changes in the political regime that have reflected 
on the economic and financial policies taken to follow the ideological beliefs approved 
by each political system. The development of the Sudanese Banking industry can be 
divided into six major phases. The following section explains these stages and the major 
events that accompanied the development.    
3.3.1. The Banking Industry 1956-1983 (Post Independence and Nationalisation) 
3. 3.1.1. Post-Independence Period: 1956-1969 
After independence, the traditional banking system that was introduced when Sudan was 
still part of the British Colony continued to operate. All banks at that time were part of 
the foreign institutions and there were neither a central bank nor local currency (Abdel 
Mohsin, 2005). These financial institutions that were all branches of foreign banks 
include the National Bank of Egypt, Banque Misr, Barclays DCO, the Ottoman Bank and 
Credit Lyonnais. During this period of time, the banking sector was fully managed by 
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Barclays Bank. The year 1956 witnessed the establishment of the first national bank in 
Sudan (Sudan Commercial Bank) and a branch of the Arab Bank (Jordan). In 1957, the 
branches of foreign banks were unwilling to assist in agriculture because of the failure of 
the cotton season at the time, therefore, the Ministry of Finance decided to establish an 
agricultural specialized bank (the Agricultural Bank of Sudan) that started its operations 
in 1959. 
After the independence, there was a need for a Central Bank to replace the National Bank 
of Egypt that opened in Khartoum in 1901 and used to operate as the semi-official central 
bank; it assisted in serving as the fiscal agent and lender of last resort for other commercial 
banks as well as operating as a commercial bank (Bank of Sudan, 2006). However, 
establishing a Central Bank to formulate the country’s monetary and financial policies, 
and to cope with new policies became an essential requirement after the independence. 
Bank of Sudan commenced its roles in February 1960 and is one of the first operational 
central banking institutions in Africa. The main objectives of the Bank are to issue 
currency of all types (coin and paper), conduct monetary and financing policies, organize 
and monitor banking business and strive to achieve economic stability as the bank of 
the government (Bank of Sudan, 2006). 
In 1958, the Ethiopian Commercial Bank opened a branch in Khartoum as an initiative of 
good relations between the countries; the bank was renamed as El-Neilein Bank after the 
Sudanese government took over 60% of its capital. During this period of time, the bank 
of Sudan encouraged the formation of specialised banks by opening two specialized 
banks, the Industrial Bank of Sudan in 1961 and the Real Estates Bank in 1967. In 
addition, in 1969, the National and Grindleys bank was founded and started taking over 
the assets of the Ottoman Bank (Ahmed, 2008). 
In conclusion, it may be worth mentioning that fourteen years after independence, the 
structure of the Sudanese banking system included the Central Bank, six branches of 
foreign banks, three specialised banks, one national bank and one mixed national and 
foreign bank. It may also be worth mentioning that the period 1956-1996 witnessed three 
political regimes, the first democracy period 1956 -1958, the first military regime 1958- 
1964 and the second democracy period 1964 -1996, each of which added its own 
fingerprints on the development of the Sudanese banking system (Ahmaad , 2007). 
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3.3.1.2. Period of Nationalisation: 1970-1975 
In 1969, Nimeiri, president of Sudan between 1969 and 1985, ended the second 
democracy government with a famous military coup and started the second military 
regime. The new regime adopted nationalisation policy through which it mainly aimed to 
increase income from exports, develop banking services in rural areas to encourage 
competition between banks and attract the savings of Sudanese people working abroad. 
It also aimed to terminate the demonstration of foreign capital over the national economy. 
To attain these aims, the regime, in 1970, declared the nationalisation of all banks 
including foreign banks, foreign firms, and all famous Sudanese business families. The 
nationalisation included Sudan Commercial Bank (the only national bank at that time). 
All banks came under direct government control. According to the new legislations, 
Barclays DCO became State Bank for Foreign Trade, National and Grindleys became 
Omderman National Bank, The Ethiopian Commercial Bank became Juba Commercial 
Bank, The Arab Bank became Red Sea Commercial Bank and Banque Misr became 
Peoples' Cooperative Bank.  El-Neilein Bank, Sudan Commercial Bank, and the three 
specialized banks continued their activities under the same names. By this time, the 
Central Bank of Sudan had completely absorbed all the responsibilities of the National 
Bank of Egypt (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). 
In 1973, some banks changed their names to cope with the new regulations of the 
nationalisation. Accordingly, State Bank for Foreign Trade became Bank of Khartoum, 
El-Nilein Bank combined with Red Sea Commercial Bank, Omderman National Bank 
combined with Juba Commercial Bank for Juba Omderman Bank (was renamed Unity 
Bank in 1975). Other banks, Sudan Commercial Bank, Peoples' Cooperative Bank, 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan, Industrial Bank of Sudan and Real Estates Bank maintained 
their names. The period of nationalisation also witnessed the establishment of Sudanese 
Savings Bank in 1973 (Ahmaad, 2007).  
In 1975, eight private foreign banks were allowed to operate in Sudan again, alongside 
with the nationalised banks. Nevertheless, these banks were not allowed to deal with all 
Sudanese people as at that time: the policy allowed these banks to only open accounts for 
Sudanese nationals working abroad and import-export agents. These foreign banks 
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included the bank of Oman, the Arab Emirates Bank, Abu Dhabi National bank and five 
other banks (Abdel Mohsin, 2005). 
3.3.2. The Emergence of Islamic Banking: the First Islamization Period 
The emergence of Islamic banks in Sudan was an extension to the foundation of the first 
Islamic Bank (Savings bank), in the neighbouring country Egypt in 1963. It was also an 
extension of the same developing movement in the Arab region, which has witnessed the 
Middle East oil boom and the enormous accumulation of petrodollar surpluses, 
accompanied by people’s wishes to invest their monies in accordance with their religion’s 
teachings. Accordingly, the existence of Islamic banks developed into a reality in the Gulf 
countries. The first Islamic bank was the Dubai Islamic bank (1975) followed by the 
Islamic commercial bank of Abu Dhabi (1977). This was soon followed by the foundation 
of a whole group of Faisal Islamic banks in various Muslim countries. Sudan was not far 
from this development as Faisal Islamic bank of Sudan was established in 1977 (Abdel 
Mohsin, 2005).  
The foundation of Faisal Islamic bank in Sudan can be seen as the first step towards the 
Islamisation of the Sudanese banking system. The portion of Faisal Islamic bank’s shares 
was divided between Saudis Sudanese and other Muslims in the ratio of 4:4:2 
respectively. The step was welcomed by a great endorsement from both the Sudanese 
government and citizens who were uncomfortable using interest-based traditional banks. 
This was undoubtedly ascertained by the dramatic growth in the bank’s capital that 
increased from 0.6 to 2m Sudanese dinars in less than four years. This growth represented 
17% of the total paid up capital of eighteen private commercial banks and 30% of the 
total paid up capital of national banks. 
The success of the Faisal Islamic bank in this limited period encouraged the government 
to establish other Islamic banks. Al Tandamun Islamic bank was established in 1980, the 
Sudanese Islamic bank and the Islamic Cooperative Development bank were established 
in 1982, Albaraka Bank opened in 1983 followed by the Islamic bank of western Sudan. 
The five banks were able to attract more depositors; therefore, more branches were 
established over different Sudanese regions.  
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The success of these Islamic Banks encouraged the government to convert the entire 
financial system into an interest-free system, following the same policy used in Iran and 
Pakistan (Haron, 1997 and Abdel Mohsin, 2005).  
Another strong boost to this directional conversion to an Islamic banking system came 
when the Sudanese government decided in September 1983 to adopt Islamic sharia as the 
main source of law for the country. In 1984, the Civil Transactions Act banned the use of 
interest in the whole financial system, and the banking industry was no exception. 
Accordingly, termination of all interest-based bank activities and a full Islamisation of 
the Sudanese Banking system was completed (Khalid, 2007). Consequently, conventional 
banks operational in Sudan, whether they are national or foreign, were demanded to 
operate on the basis of the interest-free banking system (Abdel Mohsin, 2005). Banks 
were required to make activities compatible with the new requirement from the first of 
July 1984. The Central banks allowed the banks only a few months to complete the 
conversion, which made it difficult for them to be prepared supportive pre-studies or 
consulting religious committee to get guidelines for the sudden shift to the Islamic 
banking system (Kaalid, 2007). It has also reported that Central Bank has applied no 
supervisory instruments on the application of the new the regulations (Ahmaad, 2007). 
3.3.3. Post Islamization Period: 1985-1989 
The year 1985 witnessed the start of famous Sudanese revolt, which ended the sixteen 
years of the second military regime and started the third democracy period. The 
application of Islamic Sharia was criticised by some of the political parties that were very 
opposed to the idea of the adoption of Islamic Sharia in 1983. During this period of time, 
banks were allowed to choose between interest-free or interest-based financing formulas. 
Accordingly, many of the traditional banks chose to snap back to their conventional 
routine (Bashir, 1999). 
This period of time also witnessed the establishment of three Sudanese banks, the 
Sudanese-Saudi Bank 1986, National Workers Bank (1988) and Al-Shamal Islamic Bank 
(1989) (Ali, 2001). It may be worth mentioning that some of these banks were established 
based on ethnicity and professional basis. For example, sponsors from Northern Sudan 
established AI-Shamal Islamic Bank in 1990 jointly with citizens working abroad from 
the north and some Arab businessmen. Similarly, businessmen and citizens from Western 
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Sudan developed the western province, an Islamic Bank for Western Sudan. On the other 
hand, the National Workers Bank was initiated by the Sudan Workers Union. Afterwards, 
Ivory Bank was established as a bank for the South (Ahmaad, 2007). 
3.3.4. The Second Islamization Period: 1989-2005 
In June 1989, the third military government regime took over, backed up by the National 
Islamic Front Party (NIF). The regime eliminated the choice given to banks of being an 
interest-free or an interest-based financing system. A decision was made to Islamise all 
the banking system in the same year (Ali, 2001). In 1990, the government started the 
application of the Islamic Sharia in the banking sector by introducing new Banking 
Regulation Law of 1991 that replaced the Company Law of 1925.The new law established 
that no banking law or practice should contradict with Shariah law.  
The year 1991 witnessed the privatization of the Sudan Commercial Bank, which came 
under the ownership of the Farmers' Bank for Rural Development, as a holding company. 
In the same year, a new law was introduced to give the bank of Sudan the right to 
supervise and organise the banking sector and other financial institutions in Sudan. In the 
same year, the Central Bank of Sudan issued some new regulations that encouraged the 
opening of new commercial banks branches. In 1992, another set of rules were established 
and they allowed the central bank to apply administrative and financial penalty policies 
for banking irregularities (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). 
In August 1992 and for the first time in Sudan's modern history a Securities Market was 
established with the aim of enhancing resources development, however, it started trading 
only in January 1995 (Ahmad, 2007). 
In March 1993, further rules were issued by the central Bank to control the Murabahah 
mode of finance, aiming to purify the banking industry from any traces of usury that 
remained from the old conventional banking system. These rules specified the legal 
requirements of Murabahah contracts (Ahmad, 2007). 
The central bank also established its own Sharia Board with the main aim of deepening 
the Islamization of the banking system, the issuance of religious edict and guidance on 
how to solve problems on Sharia basis and teach and train banks’ staff on Islamic methods 
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and formula. Different commercial banks followed the same step taken by the central 
bank by establishing their own Sharia Supervisory committee with the main aim of 
ensuring the purification of their transactions from any traces of usury (Bank of Sudan, 
1990-2005).  
The year 1993 also witnessed the foundations of three more banks; Omderman National 
Bank (which is known by its strong relation with the military regime), Animal Resources 
Bank, which aims to develop and promote the animal resources of the country and AI 
Safa Credit Bank (Bank of Sudan, 1990- 2005). This year also witnessed the merging, 
renaming, and liquidation of some banks. Unity Bank and National Export-Import Bank 
were merged into Bank of Khartoum and renamed Bank of Khartoum Group. Also, the 
Industrial Bank of Sudan and El-Neilein Bank were merged and renamed as El-Neilein 
Industrial Development Bank Group. Oman Bank Ltd was renamed as Al Mashriq Bank.  
The Middle East Bank and Bank of Credit and commerce international were liquidated. 
(Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005).  
It may be worth mentioning that in 1994, Sudanese Banks were required to rearrange their 
financial structure to comply with the recommendations of capital efficiency, as specified 
by the Basle Committee, within three years, starting in the same year, in order to 
reorganize these banks. 
In the year 1995, a new bank, supported by the government, named Ivory, was 
established, with the main objective of financing human development in the southern 
regions of Sudan (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). During 1996-1999, the Sudanese Savings 
Bank was transformed to the Savings and Social Development Bank.  Citibank was closed 
and Nima Bank liquidated in 1999 (Bank of Sudan, 1990-2005). 
3.3.5. The Dual Banking System: 2005-2011 
In 2006, the peace agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), a representative for south Sudan. 
According to the agreement, the regulations of Central Bank of Sudan were restructured, 
so as to introduce two sets of banking systems in Sudan. The duality of the banking system 
was established in 2006, as a result, conventional banks were allowed to operate in the 
Sothern part of Sudan. 
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It also required the establishment of the Bank of Southern Sudan in the southern part of 
the country, which was managed by a deputy governor of Central Bank of Sudan. The 
aim was to organise and manage the conventional part of the system in applying the 
monetary policy adopted by the Central Bank in the north of the country.  
As Banks of Sudan has already had the experience of managing and regulating a dual 
banking system in the past, this situation did not present any serious challenge. In reality, 
in countries such as Malaysia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia their 
Islamic banks operate side by side with conventional banks in a dual banking system. In 
light of these countries experience, the dual banking systems have not been a cause or 
presented any serious banking management problems (Ahmaad, 2007).  
The year 2006 witnessed the establishment of joint ownership banks, either between the 
Sudanese government and the neighbouring countries (such as Aljazeera Sudanese 
Jordanian Bank and Sudanese Egyptian Bank) or Sudanese individuals and institutions 
and foreign individuals and institutions such as United Capital Bank (Kuwait, Lebanon, 
and Egypt). El-Neilein Bank was sold to Alsalam Bank (United Arab Emirate 
Investments) in the same year (Bank of Sudan, 2006). 
3.3.6. The Islamic Banking System: 2011 and After  
A referendum took place in Southern Sudan in January 2011 on whether the region should 
continue as a part of Sudan or become independent. 98.83% voted in favour of 
independence, which took place in June of the same year. The separation was a painful 
blow to the Sudanese economy, especially since three-quarters of the daily oil production 
is located in south Sudan. Consequently, GDP dropped from 5.2 in 2010 to 1.4 in 2012 
and inflation increased from 13.1% in 2010 to 44.1% in 2013 (The United States Institute 
of Peace, 2012). 
With respect to the banking industry after the separation of southern Sudan, the country 
returned to a single Islamic banking system. It may be worth mentioning that this did not 
have a big impact on the performance of Sudanese Islamic Banks, as Islamic Banks were 
allowed to operate only in the north and conventional banks in the southern part of the 
country (Bank of Sudan, 2012).  
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The years after the secession of southern Sudan witnessed the foundation of Abu Dhabi 
Islamic Bank in 2012 and Qatar Islamic Bank in 2013, which are foreign banks, and 
Alroaad Bank for Development and Investment in 2013, which is a national bank 
established by Sudanese residing in the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Britain (Bank 
of Sudan, 2014). 
3.4. Organisational Structure of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
3.4.1. Board of Director 
As with any board of directors, the board of a Sudanese Islamic Bank is a group of 
individuals that are headed by a board chairman, either elected or chosen by the bank 
shareholders to be accountable for the organization's performance in their stead. They are 
also accountable for establishing broad policies and objectives, selecting, assigning, 
supporting and reviewing the performance of the chief executive. The size of the board 
of Sudanese banks ranges from 5 to 16 people, averaging 10.  
 3.4.2. Executive Management 
Executive management consists of a team of individuals who are appointed by the board 
of directors at the highest level of management to manage the day-to-day responsibilities 
of banks. This management level consists of the bank’s general managers and functional 
executives of financial affairs, banking affairs, risk department, investment and affairs 
and corporate sector management. The executive management is responsible for 
authorising the funding of banks resources.  
The organisational structure of Sudanese Islamic banks is illustrated in figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: organisational chart of Sudanese Islamic banks.  
Chart adapted from Banks annual reports. 
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3.5. The Performance of the Sudanese Banking Industry 2005-2013 
Sudanese banks are very small if compared to international standards. The paid-up 
capital, together with the reserves of the Sudanese banking industry as a whole , at the 
end of 2013 was 13,149 million Sudanese pounds ($1,314million) with an increase of 
21% from the year before (Bank of Sudan, 2013). The total asset of Sudanese banks was 
77,479.8 million Sudanese pounds ($7,748 million) with an increase of 15.6% from the 
year before (Bank of Sudan, 2013). 
Table 3.2 summarizes some selected financial and performance indicators of the 
Sudanese Banking system during 2005-2013.  
Table 3.2 Selected Financial and Performance Indicators of Sudanese Banks, 2005-
2013 
year Total 
assets in 
million 
pounds 
Total 
equity  
in 
million 
pounds 
Total 
equity 
to 
total 
assets 
% 
LLP to 
total 
loan 
Total 
Liab. 
to total 
assets
% 
Current 
assets 
to total 
assets 
% 
Pls to 
total 
finance 
% 
 
non-
PLS to 
total 
finance 
% 
Salam 
to total 
finance 
% 
2005 16,979 2,336 14 16 0.64 01 35 43 2 
2006 23,144 3,890 17 12 0.56 01 26 53 1 
2007 26,197 4,606 18 12 59 02 17 58 0.6 
2008 30,650 5,248 17 11 59 02 18 46 2 
2009 36,666 6,678 18 12 66 02 18 55 2 
2010 43,107 7,477 17 11 67 02 16 54 1.20 
2011 46,504 6,678 14 12 65 02 13 61 0.7 
2012 67,049 6,717 10 12 66 02 16 49 1.9 
2013 77,479 13,149 17 11 63 02 16 
 
53 2 
Source: Source: calculated by the author from Bank of Sudan’s annual reports from 2005 
to 2013 
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According to the table, the paid-up capital together with the reserves of the Sudanese 
banking industry as a whole has increased from 2,336 in 2005 to 13,149, in 2013 (463%). 
The total asset of Sudanese Islamic banks increased from 16,979 to 77,479 million 
Sudanese pounds: that is a 356% increase. However, total equity to total assets increased 
from 14% in 2005 to 17% in 2013, indicating that there is no remarkable change in the 
proportion of the total assets that are financed by stockholders. The solvency position of 
Sudanese Islamic Banks remains almost the same during the study period. A deeper view 
about their solvency position is found by calculating the leverage ratio, as measured by 
total liability to total assets, which shows a high but stable leverage ratio during the period 
of study. 
Using current assets to total assets as a liquidity measure Sudanese Islamic Banks have 
almost stable liquidity ratios over the years 2005-2013 (1%-2%). Meanwhile, loan loss 
provision to total loan as credit risk has ranged between 11% and 16% indicating 
fluctuations in banks’ credit risk during the study period.  
With respect to Islamic Banks modes of finance, table 5.2 shows that the total amount of 
funds specified for PLS modes of finance has decreased from 35% in 2005 to only 16% 
in 2013, reflecting that this type of finance is not the desirable investment for Sudanese 
Islamic Banks. In contrast, non-PLS mode of finance has fluctuated between 43% and 
61% during the study period, ending with 53% in 2013. This indicates that this mode of 
finance has the largest share of investment from amongst other modes of finance, 
including PLS. 
Finally, although the fact that Sudan is famous for its fertile lands, Salam mode of finance 
has interestingly contributed only 0.6% to 2% of total modes of finance. This could 
possibly be justified by the argument by Alnabulsy (2014), who report that most of the 
banks are not interested in funding agricultural activities because these activities are 
surrounded by many types of risks, most of which are related to the uncertainty of prices, 
products, and fulfilment of the agreement by the farmers. 
3.6. Summary 
The development of Islamic Banking in Sudan can be divided into six main stages. The 
first phase of Islamic Banking started by the foundation of the first Islamic bank, Faisal 
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Islamic Bank, in 1977. This was followed by the establishment of three more banks 
opened in 1983, Sudanese Islamic Bank, Tadamoun Islamic Bank, and Islamic 
Cooperative bank. These Islamic banks used to operate in an environment that were ruled 
by traditional banking systems. However, their formation was received by high 
acceptance from the public who were uncomfortable with investing their money in a 
traditional banking system. This gave the Islamic Banks a chance to grow in terms of 
assets, deposits, and profitability. The second phase began when the whole financial 
system of Sudan started to be transformed to Islamic system in September 1983. During 
this period two more Islamic banks were founded; the Islamic Bank of Western Sudan 
and AlBaraka Bank Sudan. The third phase started after the downfall of the second 
military regime in 1985 and terminated with the beginning of the third military regime of 
1989. During this phase, Islamic banks were enforced to operate in an unfriendly 
environment supported by negative media coverage and regulations. Consequently, some 
banks returned back to operate as conventional banks. The fourth phase started in 1989 
when the Sudanese economy was governed by Islamic law. The fifth phase began after 
the peace agreement of 2005 during which the system was restructured to be able to adapt 
to a dual banking system, Islamic in the north and Conventional in the south. The final 
phase started in 2011, after the separation of northern and southern parts. In this period, 
only Islamic Banks are allowed to operate in Sudan. 
This chapter acts as a foundation chapter in presenting the necessary literature on the 
nature of the economy of Sudan, the development, the organisational structure, and the 
main performance characteristics of Sudanese Banking Industry. The next chapter aims 
to discuss the theoretical framework of the determinants of banks' performance, which 
are used to formulate the research questions. 
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Chapter Four 
Literature Review of Studies of the Determinants of Banks’ Profitability 
4.1. Introduction  
Empirical Studies on the determinants of profitability within the banking industry are 
numerous. Some of them are country specific and few of them focus on a panel of 
countries. Examples of studies aimed at explaining bank profitability in a single country 
are Berger (1995), Samad and Hassan (1999), Bashir (1999), Naceur (2003), DeYoung 
and Rice (2004), Athanasoglou et al., (2005), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009), Ramadan 
(2011), Ahmad et al., (2012) and Qudah and Jaradat (2013). Studies aim at analysing 
bank profitability in groups of countries include Bashir (2003), Goddard et al., (2004), 
Athanasoglou et al., (2006), Flamini et al., (2009) and Karim et. al., (2010). With regards 
the nature of the banking system, these studies can be divided into two groups. Studies 
that focus on the profitability determinants of a conventional banking system and those 
that focus on Islamic banking system. A small number of studies has been carried out on 
the comparisons of profitability determinants between Islamic and conventional banks. 
4.2. Single Country Studies 
4.2.1. Traditional Banks: 
Earlier, Berger (1995) examines a sample of US banks during 1983-1992 to understand 
the relationship between return on equity and capital to asset ratio. He found a positive 
relationship between these two variables. 
Lter, Guru et al., (2002) investigate the determinants of better performing deposit banks 
in Malaysia. They utilise a sample of seventeen banks during 1986-1995. Their study uses 
liquidity, capital adequacy, expenses management, assets composition and firm size as 
explanatory variables. Their findings reveal that poor expenses management is the main 
contributor to poor profitability performance. Liquidity was found to be negatively and 
significantly related to profitability. Guru et al., (2002) also reveal that high capitalisation 
and assets composition are negatively and significantly related to profitability in 
Malaysian commercial banks. From among the variables they used, only bank size was 
shown to have no impact on the profitability of Malaysian banks. 
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Ben Naceur and Goaied (2008) examine the impact of bank characteristics and financial 
structure on Tunisian banks’ profitability during 1980-2000. They suggest that 
capitalisation and overhead expenses are positively and significantly related to the 
profitability of Tunisian banks. Their findings also suggest that Tunisian private banks 
are relatively more profitable than their state-owned counterparts 
Heffernan and Fu (2010) use ROA, ROE, and NIM as a measure of performance of 
Chinese banks during 1999 and 2006. They use bank size, ownership, specialisation and 
whether a bank is listed on a stock exchange or not as determinants of performance. They 
found that banks, which are specialised in rural development, are more profitable than 
other types of banks. This indicates a positive relationship between specialisation and 
bank profitability. They also found that bank listings, ownership, and size all have no 
significant impact on profitability. 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009) utilise a sample of 453 banks to investigate the financial 
performance of commercial banks in Switzerland during 1999-2006. They use a wide 
range of internal determinants such as capital, the cost to income ratio and bank’s credit 
quality. Other determinants they used include bank size, interest income share, bank age, 
bank ownership and nationality. Their findings show evidence of a large variation in 
profitability between the sampled banks. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009) found a 
positive relation between capitalization and profitability.  Another positive relationship 
was found between bank loans and profitability, especially when bank’s loan volume is 
growing faster than the market. They also establish bank age as having no influence on 
bank profitability. In addition, the geographic distribution was shown to have a slight 
effect on profitability. With regards to ownership, foreign banks were found to be less 
profitable than Swiss owned banks. Likewise, privately owned banks were shown to be 
more profitable when compared to state-owned banks. Their empirical evidence does not 
show a significant impact of cost to income ratio and bank size on the profitability of 
Switzerland banks. 
Athanasoglou et al., (2005) utilise a broad range of data, which covered the period from 
1985 to 2001, to examine the effect of Bank-specific and Industry-specific factors on the 
profitability of Greek banks. Bank-specific determinants include bank capital, credit risk, 
operating efficiency, expenses management and bank size. The industry-specific factors 
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include industry concentration and ownership. They found that with the exclusion of size, 
all bank-specific determinants affect bank profitability significantly and positively. 
However, bank size was found to have no impact on bank profitability. They also showed 
a negative relationship between bank profitability and operating expenses and increased 
exposure to credit risk. Factors related to the industry structure appear to have no 
significant impact on profitability.  Kosmidou (2008), who uses a set of specific financial 
ratios to study 30 Greece banks over the period 2003-2004, supports the findings of 
Athanasoglou et al., (2005) and concludes that banks which are better capitalised with 
less operating cost earn a higher return on assets.  
Alper and Anbarb (2011) utilise a sample of 10 Turkish commercial banks during 2002 
– 2010 to investigate the bank’s profitability. They focus on its size, capital adequacy, 
and deposit. They establish a positive and significant relationship between bank size and 
profitability, measured by both ROA and ROE. Their findings provide evidence for the 
impact of economies of scale on profitability. Non-interest income/assets ratio was also 
shown to have a positive and significant effect on ROA. This reflects that greater activity 
diversification results in greater returns. They found that assets quality set up has a 
negative and significant influence on ROA, which means that credit portfolio, size and 
asset quality impact ROA negatively. Alper and Anbarb (2011) also prove a negative 
relationship between loans and profitability exist. Additionally, all other remaining 
internal profitability determinants - capital adequacy, liquidity, deposits and net interest 
margin – were shown to have no impact on the profitability of Turkish banks. This is 
contradicted by the findings of Gulhan and Uzunlar (2011), who investigate the financial 
performance of the Turkish banks over the period 1990-2000. In their findings, they 
establish significant effects of both capital adequacy and liquidity on ROA.  
Atemnkenf and Joseph (2006) utilise ROA, ROE, and ROC as performance measures to 
investigate major determinants of financial performance of three leading Cameroon 
commercial banks during 1987 to 1999. The explanatory variables are risk, size, expenses 
control, time and savings deposits to total deposits and deposit composition. Their 
findings prove no significant effect of a bank’s size and deposits on profitability. Finally, 
Atemnkenf and Joseph provide evidence of a positive relationship between risk, measured 
by loan to deposit ratio, and profitability.  
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Naceur (2003) uses NIM and ROA to assess the influence of capital ratio, overhead, loan 
and financial structure on the Tunisian banking industry. His study includes a sample of 
10 deposit banks during 1980 to 2000. From this study, he proves that there is a positive 
relationship between the two profitability measures and the amount of capital. He shows 
that a well-capitalized bank is characterised by lower cost of capital and reduced expected 
bankruptcy costs.  He also proves that high ROA is also significantly connected with large 
overheads and bank loans. In addition, Naceur demonstrates that due to scale 
inefficiencies, bank size has mostly a negative and significant impact on profitability. 
Therefore, he suggested that a bank’s profitability can be enhanced by reducing the size 
of large banks to optimal levels.  This finding is, however, in contradiction with the 
finding of DeYoung and Rice (2004), who studied US commercial banks between 1989 
and 2001. They demonstrate a strong positive relationship between profitability, 
measured by non-interest income, and large banks size. Furthermore, Naceur (2003) 
suggests that bank profitability stems mainly from interest-bearing assets because non-
interest bearing assets have no significant influence on return on assets.  
Within a single country study, Lee (2012) compares the determinants of profitability of 
Korean national and regional banks during 1994-2008. He shows that the banking nature 
and characteristic have a significant effect on variables that explain a bank profitability. 
He reports that due to economies of scale, asset size is significantly positive when 
associated with ROA for the regional banks, but insignificant for the national banks.  
Concerning the relationship between bank capital and profitability, Lee proves that 
capitalization has significantly positive association with ROA for both national and 
regional banks. His findings also establish that loan ratio is important and positively 
related to ROA for regional banks. However, it is not as important for national banks, as 
loans are better managed by regional banks. Focusing on the effects of leverage on 
profitability measures, he found that fixed asset ratio has a positive effect on regional 
banks and a negative effect for the national banks. Lee (2012), reports that the profitability 
determinants are more significant on the regional banks than national banks. He justifies 
the differences in performance by management decisions because the management of 
regional banks has taken strategically better, more supportive and aggressive decisions 
within different bank operations. 
59 
 
Chirwa (2003) investigates the factors affecting profitability within eight commercial 
Banks in Malawi during 1970-1994. He uses ROA, ROE and Return on Capital (ROC) 
as measures of profitability while the explanatory variables take account the ratio of 
capital to assets, loans to assets, demand deposits to total deposits and bank size. He found 
that loan to assets ratio has a positive and significant influence on a commercial bank’s 
profitability in the long and short-run. This suggests that there is risk reduction in the 
behaviour among bank managers. Moreover, he found that the demand deposit to deposits 
ratio has a positive and significant influence on commercial bank profitability, proving 
that demand deposit is a cheaper source of funds for the banking industry in Malawi. 
Using ROA as profitability measure, Al-Omar and Al-Mutairi (2008) build a five variable 
model to assess their impact on the profitability of seven Kuwaiti national commercial 
banks during 1993-2005. Their explanatory variables include capitalization, risk, non-
interest assets to assets ratio, operating expenses to assets ratio, and bank size. They found 
that almost 67% of ROA are justified by equity, loan-assets ratio, operating expenses ratio 
and total assets. Al-Omar and Al-Mutairi findings establish that only capitalization, non-
interest assets ratio, bank size are significant. Other findings also emphasise the 
importance of improving the capital adequacy and decreasing non-interest assets to 
enhance profitability. Additionally, they prove a positive effect of bank size, which an 
indication to scale efficiency, signalling a possibility of more profitability when enlarging 
the size of the bank.  
Ahmed (1999) examines the impact of business risk, market size and the size of the bank 
on financial performance in a sample of eleven commercial banks in Saudi Arabia during 
1987-1992. He utilises three profitability measures, which are ROE, ROA and percentage 
change in earnings per share as dependent variables. He found that only business risk and 
bank size have a significantly negative influence on a banks' profitability when measured 
by ROA and ROE.  
Holden and El-Bannany (2004) utilise a sample of ten UK banks to investigate the 
introduction of information technology systems, presented as Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs) on a bank’s profitability during 1976-1996. They apply ROA, as a profitability 
measure, while the internal variables are bank size and capital. They prove that there was 
a positive impact on the number of ATMs installed by a bank, which saw an increase of 
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profitability. It also reduced labour and transactions costs, as well as producing revenues 
from charges associated with using ATMs.  
4.2.2. Islamic banks 
Karim et al., (2010) report that studies emphasising only on Islamic banking profitability 
are not numerous, but they can still be found in the literature. Such studies focusing on a 
particular country can be seen in work of Bashir (1999), Samad and Hassan (2000), 
Ramadan (2011) and Qudah and Jaradat (2013).  
Ramadan (2011) uses unbalanced data from Jordanian Islamic banks between 2000 and 
2010 to investigate the impact of capital adequacy, credit risk, and liquidity management 
efficiency. He also investigates bank size, expenses management efficiency, non-interest 
earning and bank size on their profitability. His results show that well-efficient 
management, higher credit risk, and capital adequacy lead to higher return on assets and 
profit margin. Additionally, he found that efficient management of operating expenses 
influences the profit margin positively and significantly. Yet, it has no significant 
influence on the ROA. Additionally, his findings suggest that bank size and non-interest 
earning seems to have no significant influence on the profitability of Jordanian Islamic 
Banks. Ramadan (2011) reports that because of the distinctive characteristics of each 
bank, the effects of its internal determinants on profitability are varied amongst Jordanian 
Islamic Banks.  
Qudah and Jaradat (2013) assess the profitability of two Jordanian Islamic banks during 
2000–2011. Their findings show that capital adequacy on Islamic banks in Jordan has a 
positive and significant impact on both ROA and ROE. Banks with a higher capital are 
expected to gain higher profits due to their use of a low-cost and low-risk financing 
sources. Qudah and Jaradat found that a bank’s size is an excellent determinant of the 
profitability of Jordanian Islamic banks. Their findings also establish a negative and 
significant relationship between leverage, as measured by total deposits to total assets, 
and ROA and ROE. This has been justified by the fact that banks are more open to credit 
risk, which may lead to profitability reduction. Additionally, the findings show that 
liquidity has an insignificant impact on ROA and a negative significant impact on ROE.  
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In the case of Pakistani Islamic banks, Javaid et al., (2011) and Ali et al., (2011) 
investigate the profitability determinants of a banking sector. Javaid et al., (2011) utilise 
ROA to investigate the influence of factors affecting the profitability of the top 10 
Pakistani banks during 2004-2008. They found that higher total assets may not essentially 
lead to higher profits as diseconomies of scale may give adverse effects. This due to the 
possibility of bureaucratic strategies and managerial incapability of excessively large 
banks. However, their impact is not significant, which mean that more assets can increase 
profitability, but with less significance on overall profitability. Javaid et al., (2011) also 
found that equity and deposits have a positive significance on profitability, whilst loans 
are proven to be unimportant. They also report that when a bank shows a loss, there will 
be a negative association of loans and profitability. 
Ali et al., (2011) utilise both ROA and ROE as profitability measures to examine the 
performance of 22 public and private sector commercial banks in Pakistan over the period 
2006-2009.  Their findings suggest that the positive ROA of these banks are due to bank 
size. On the contrary, in the case of profitability, which is measured by ROE, bank size 
is proven to have a negative effect. Ali et al., (2011) also report a negative relationship 
between capital and credit risk on one hand and ROA on the other hand. They also prove 
that operating efficiency, portfolio composition, and asset management have affected 
ROE positively. On the other hand, they prove that operating efficiency and credit risk 
are negatively influencing profitability.  
Ahmad et al., (2012) investigate the internal determinants of Pakistani domestic 
commercial banks during 2001-2010. The results show that cost, ratio of share capital as 
a percentage of total assets and loan are significantly and negatively related to the return 
on assets. They also establish a negative and insignificant association between liquidity 
and ROA. 
Idris et al., (2011) use quarterly data from nine banks, which consist of both foreign and 
local Islamic banks allocated in Malaysia to investigate their profitability determinants 
during 2007-2009. He proves that bank size is the main factor, which significantly 
determines a Malaysian Islamic bank’s profitability. He also establishes that other factors 
such as capital adequacy, expenses management, credit risk and liquidity have no effect 
on a Malaysian bank’s profitability.  
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Similar findings of Idris et al., (2011) come from an earlier study of Izhar and Asutaya 
(2007), who investigate the profitability of Bank Muamalat Indonesia during 1996-2001 
and found an insignificant relation between profitability and capital. Izhar and Asutaya 
(2007) also found an insignificant relationship between profitability, leverage, overheads 
and liquidity, but positive relationships between risk and profitability indicating that the 
Islamic bank has incentives to undertake more risks. They also establish a negative 
relationship between total financing as a percentage of total assets and profitability, 
indicating that the Islamic bank’s portfolio is seriously biased in the direction of short-
term trade-based financing loans.  
In the context of single country studies, some compare the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks in countries where a dual banking system is adopted. These types of 
studies can be seen in Samad and Hassan (2000) and Samad (2004). 
The work by Samad and Hassan (2000) is considered one of the pioneering studies that 
focus on the efficiency and the performance of Islamic banks. They use risk and solvency, 
liquidity and community involvement to assess the performance of Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad and compare it to a group of 8 conventional banks for the period 1984-1997. They 
suggest that the bank has relatively more liquidity, less risk, and more solvent. Their 
findings also revealed that there is no progress or difference in community involvement 
between the two banking systems. Additionally, Samad and Hassan (2000) compare the 
performance of Islamic and conventional banks, in terms of community financing and 
contributions in a government project. Their findings do not show any difference during 
the year of study. With regards to profitability, they prove that the bank has made a 
significant increase in profitability when measured by both ROA and ROE. They also 
find that Islamic banks tend to become inefficient when operating in an environment of 
dual banking.  
Samad (2004) examines the performance of Bahrain Islamic and conventional banks 
during the post-Gulf War period with respect to profitability, liquidity risk, and credit 
risk. He utilises sample of 15 conventional banks and 6 Islamic banks during 1991-2001 
using ROA, ROE and cost to income ratio as performance measures. He concludes that 
there is no main dissimilarity in profitability and liquidity between the two kinds of banks. 
63 
 
Yet, based on ROA findings, he proves that the Islamic banks are more profitable and 
enjoy lower credit risk than conventional banks. 
4.3. Panel Country Studies 
The panel country studies can be shown in studies done by Bourke (1989), Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992), Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Bashir (2000), Al-Tamimi (2005) and 
others. 
4.3.1 Traditional Banks: 
Bourke (1989) was first to explore profitability determinants in a study involving cross-
country banks in Europe, North America, and Australia. He uses capital, liquidity, and 
staff expenses as independent variables and net profit before taxes to total capital and net 
profit before taxes to total assets as dependent variables. Bourke’s findings suggest that 
all these variables are positively related to the profitability of all cross countries banks. 
Further study is carried out by Molyneux and Thornton (1992) who duplicate Bourke 
study using a sample containing 371 -671 banks from 18 European countries during the 
1986-1989 period. They establish that government ownership and the level of interest 
rates have a significant positive association with ROE. They also found that staff expenses 
have a strong positive relationship with ROA. Conversely, liquidity effect investigation 
proves a weak inverse relationship with profitability due to the cost associated with 
liquidity holdings.  
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) overall results from a mix of 80 banks from developed and 
developing countries during the period 1988-1995 confirm a positive relationship 
between capital ratio and profitability.  They report that a well-capitalised bank faces a 
lower cost of funding because of a lower probability of bankruptcy costs as well as having 
a lower need to borrow for assets acquisition. They also found that banks that use deposits 
as the main source of funding are less profitable. They justify this inverse relationship by 
the nature of deposits which required high branching and other expenses. Additionally, 
they found no relationship between profitability and overhead expenses as banks forward 
these cost to customers. Moreover, a negative relationship between profitability and non-
interest earning assets was established as banks with high non-interest earning assets were 
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found to be less profitable. Kunt and Huizinga (1999) also prove that loans to total assets 
have a negative influence on profitability, whilst short-term funding has a negative and 
significant impact on profitability. Finally, they found that foreign banks gain higher 
profitability than domestic banks in developing countries, whereas banks in developed 
countries are characterised by the opposite.  
Flamini et al., (2009) utilise a sample of 389 banks in 41 Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
(SSA) for the period 1998-2006 to study their determinants of bank profitability. They 
also investigate the reasons behind the extreme increase in profitability of African banks.  
They found that nearly all foreign banks in SSA focus their activities on the service sector, 
avoiding the financing of riskier activities such as agricultural investments. Their findings 
show that higher ROA is associated with a larger bank size, which is consistent with the 
findings of Athanasoglou et al., (2006). The association also contradicts the earlier 
findings of Goddard et al., (2004), who identify a negative association between bank size 
and profitability in six European banks. Furthermore, Flamini et al., (2009) found that a 
higher ROA is associated with high activity diversification and private ownership. They 
also establish that credit risk has no significant impact on a bank profitability.   
Al-Tamimi (2005) compares the determinants of bank performance between UAE 
national and foreign commercial banks in the period 1987-2002. His findings suggest that 
a banks’ size and portfolio composition are the most significant determinants of 
profitability of national banks. With regards to foreign banks, he found the most 
significant profitability determinants are capitalisation and leverage. Liquidity is found to 
less significant in determining national banks profitability, whereas variables of portfolio 
composition and costs are established as less significant for foreign banks. 
Goddard et al., (2004) investigate the performance of European banks across six 
countries. They found a positive relationship between profitability, liquidity, and capital 
to assets. They also show an insignificant relationship between the profitability of 
European banks and bank ownership, size and off-balance-sheet transactions. Their 
sample shows that English banks are the only one that shows a significant positive 
relationship between off-balance-sheet activities and profitability.  
Later, Athanasoglou et al., (2006) investigate the profitability of the south-east Europe 
banking industry over the period 1998-2002. Their results indicate that a bank size has a 
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positive and significant impact on its profitability. This contradicts the earlier finding of 
Goddard et al., (2004), who found a weak relationship between bank size and 
profitability. Athanasoglou et al., (2006) also establish that capital has a positive and 
significant impact on a banks' profitability. This is consistent with earlier findings of 
Goddard et al., (2004) who identify a positive relationship between banks profitability 
and capital. Athanasoglou et al., (2006) also document that loan-loss provisions and 
operating expenses have a negative and significant impact on south-east Europe banks’ 
profitability. Furthermore, they prove that bank loans have an insignificant impact on 
profitability.  
4.3.2. Islamic Banks  
In the Islamic Banking context, the empirical work of Haron (1996a) represents the first 
attempt to explore factors that contribute towards the profitability of Islamic banks. He 
examines the impact of liquidity, total expenses and source of funds (current accounts, 
saving accounts and investment accounts) on the profitability of Islamic Banks in Middle 
East, Africa and Asia for the period 1984 to 1994. He also investigates the impact of PLS 
versus non-PLS, capital, and reserves. His findings suggest a positive relationship 
between profitability and non-PLS modes of finance as measured by Morabahah and 
negative relationship between PLS and profitability. He also finds a positive impact of 
liquidity, capital and reserves and total expenses on profitability. Findings of Haron 
(1976a) also indicate that savings and investment deposits represent costs to the banks.  
Further, Bashir (2003) investigates the profitability determinants of 14 Islamic Banks 
from 8 Middle Eastern Countries during 1993 to 1998. He concludes that there is a 
positive relationship between profitability and short-term funding, capitalisation, loan 
ratios and overhead expenses. He also found that due to technological advantages foreign 
ownership affect profitability positively.  
Haron (2004) studies the impact of liquidity, capitalisation, overheads and credit risk on 
the profitability of Islamic banks in five countries over 1984-2002. He also examines the 
impact of total expenditures, PLS mode of finance and Morabahah. His findings suggest 
that capitalisation and liquidity increase the profitability of these banks, whilst PLS, 
where relation exist, is significantly and negatively associated with profitability. He also 
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found that Morabahah, overheads, credit risk, total expenditures have no significant 
relationship with profitability. 
Recently, Noor and Ahmad (2011) investigates the impact of the operating expenses, 
equity and non-performing loans to total loans on the profitability of 78 Islamic banks in 
25 countries during 1992 to 2009.  They found that the operating expenses and equity 
have a positive and significant effect on the financial performance of Islamic banks whilst 
non-performing loans are proved to be insignificant. 
Haron and Azmi (2004) investigate the profitability determinants of a sample of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia, Bangladesh United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Bahrain for the period 
1984 to 2002. They prove that liquidity is the only factor that has a significant positive 
relationship with profitability. 
Karim et al., (2010) examine the profitability determinants of African Islamic banks over 
the period 1999-2009. Their findings showed that bank capital and size increase 
profitability whereas assets quality, credit risk, and operating efficiency reduce it.  
Alkassim (2005) investigates the profitability determinants of Islamic and Conventional 
banks in GCC countries between 1997 and 2004. He focused on the impact of bank size, 
capitalisation, deposits composition, total expenses and overhead expense. His findings 
show that bank size has a positive relationship with the profitability of Islamic banks and 
negative relationship with Conventional banks one. With regards to capitalisation, he 
proves that higher capital ratios of Islamic banks support profitability and give positive 
relation. Meanwhile, a negative relation between capitalisation and profitability of 
conventional banks was found. Additionally, Deposits impact Islamic banks profitability 
negatively whereas it supports Conventional banks profitability. Alkassim (2005) also 
proves a positive relation between total expenses and the profitability of Islamic banks 
and negative relation for Conventional banks. Additionally, total loans and overhead 
expense assist the performance of both Islamic and conventional banks.  
Srairi (2010) assesses the impact of a number of bank-specific on the profitability of 
Islamic and conventional banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council over the period 1999-
2007. He establishes a negative association between operational efficiency and 
profitability of the two types of banks. He also found that the profitability of the two sets 
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of banks is positively affected by a bank financial risk and size. He also suggests a 
negative relationship between liquidity and profitability, owing this to the surplus of 
liquid assets that is kept by the banks. His finding on credit risk shows a positive relation 
with profitability for Islamic banks and negative for conventional, which has been 
justified by soaring loan loss provisions and default costs in conventional banks. Srairi 
(2010) shows that financial risk as measured by total liabilities to total assets, as well as 
economies of scale, enhance the profitability of Islamic banks.  
In his comparison between the profitability determinants of Islamic and conventional 
banks, Haron (1996b) investigates the performance of fourteen Islamic and conventional 
banks in ten countries. He found that Islamic banks in competitive markets gain more 
than those which operate in monopolistic ones.  
4.3. Earlier studies on Sudanese Banking Performance: 
In Sudanese context, there have been extensive researches in the area of banking and 
finance (e.g., Hussein, 2003; Abdel Mohsin, 2005; Ahmed, 2008; Alam, 2010 and Eljelly 
and Elobeed 2013), however, Bashir (1999) is the only one that focuses on an explicit 
analysis of the profitability determinants of Sudanese Islamic banks. Thus, a 
comprehensive and recent analysis of the determinants of Sudanese Islamic banks is 
indeed lacking 
Bashir (1999) is the first to investigate the financial performance of Sudanese Islamic 
banks utilising data from two Sudanese banks Faisal Islamic Bank (FIBS) and Tadamon 
Islamic Bank (TIBS). He examines the relationships between bank size and profitability 
using 15 years’ data for FIBS and 10 years for TIBS.  His findings show that the two 
variables are significantly and positively correlated, proving that Islamic banks gain more 
profits as they grown in size. Yet, he reveals that larger banks are economically efficient 
but at the same time they are highly levered. Additionally, he confirms that there are 
significant negative impacts of the risk variable on bank size, which means that as the 
Islamic banks expand in size, their operating risk is lessened. 
Abdel Mohsin (2005) uses data over the period 1992-1999 to identify that the Sudanese 
banks play a great role in gathering and redirecting saving to be invested in different 
sectors. These sectors include the small project in agricultural, industrial, crafts and social 
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sectors. He also traced the increasing amount of deposit by savers to the expansion of the 
banks in all region of Sudan. In other words, opening more branches in different regions 
enhanced the development of different sectors. Abdel Mohsin (2005) findings also show 
that Murabahah is the most widely used mode of finance when compared to others modes, 
followed by Musharakah and Mudarabah respectively.  
Ahmed (2008) utilise Sudanese banks’ annual reports for the period 1990-2004 and 
survey to investigate the reason behind the small size of investment in PLS modes of 
finance. He found that the lack of well-informed and trained bankers who take decisions 
on selecting, assessing and supervising profitable projects is a major reason that lessens 
the investment in the PLS mode of finance. He also proves that Sudanese Islamic banks 
gain high profitability but are exposed to high-risk at the same time.  
Hussein (2003) investigates the operational efficiency of 17 Sudanese banks for the 
period 1990-2000. He classifies banks according to their ownership into joint, state-
owned and foreign banks. His findings show efficiency variation across the three types of 
banks. A smaller size foreign banks are found to be more efficient than government -
owned and joint ownership banks, suggesting a negative relationship between the cost 
efficiency and the bank size. He justifies that by the limited size of the Sudanese economy 
which prevents large banks from setting up enough projects to make the most of their 
resources utilisation and costs minimisation. Hussein (2003) also identifies cost 
inefficiency related to human capital development as the survey results show that 
spending on staff development and training is quite low. He also reports a negative 
relationship between the cost efficiency and the level of domestic equity and government 
equity.  
Alam (2010) examines the potential effect of introducing modern technology presented 
in the online banking in the Sudanese Islamic banks. He documents that none of the 
Sudanese banks (including foreign banks with their significant technological 
advancements) utilise this service. Yet, 95% of Sudanese bankers believe that online 
banking will have great reflect on their bank’s performance.  
Eljelly and Elobeed (2013) use data from the nine oldest and largest Sudanese banks to 
explain the common performance characteristics of banks operating in Sudan over the 
period the 1998-2007. They found that most of the variation in Islamic banks performance 
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are justified by their liquidity risk, efficiency, profitability and capital adequacy ratio. 
They also found that the impact of these factors is constant over time.  
4. Summary 
Table 4.1 below provides a brief summary of the variables that were used as profitability 
determinants in the studies reviewed. 
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Table 4.1: Variables that are used as Determinants of Banks' Profitability, their 
Signs, and Significance 
Variable Positive and 
significant 
Negative and 
significant 
Insignificant 
Bank Type: 
Ownership  
 
- Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) 
- Bashir (2003) 
- Athanasoglou et 
al., (2006) 
- Heffernan and Fu 
(2010) 
- Berger et al., 
(2009) 
- Bashir (1999) 
- Bourke (1989) - Flamini et al., 
(2009) 
 
Bank Type: 
Specialisation 
 
-Heffernan and Fu 
(2010) 
 Maudos et al., 
(2002) 
Naceur and Goaied 
(2008) 
Bank Age 
 
-Beck et al., (2005)  
-Beck and Kunt 
(2006) 
 - Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2009) 
Bank size 
 
-Short (1979)  
-Alkassim (2005)  
-Flamini et al., 
(2009) 
-Naceur (2003)  
-Athanasoglou et 
al., (2008) 
-Goddard et al., 
2004 
-Athanasoglou et 
al., (2005) 
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-AL-Omar & AL--
Mutairi (2008) 
- Karim et al., 
(2010) 
-Javaid et al., 
(2011) 
 
-Atemnkenf and 
Joseph (2006) 
-Lee (2012) 
Capitalisation 
 
-Bourke (1989) 
 -Molynuex and 
Thorton (1992) 
- Berger (1995) 
-Goddard et al., 
(2004) 
- Guru et al., 
(2002) 
- Hassan and Bashir 
(2004) 
- Karim et al., 
(2010) 
-Hassan and  
-Bashir (2003) 
- Ali et al., (2011) 
- Izhar and Asutaya 
(2007) 
 
-Short (1979) 
-Alper and Anbar 
(2011) 
Liquidity  
 
- Bourke (1989) 
-Al-Tamimi (2005) 
- Haron (2004) 
- Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) 
- Bashir (2000) 
- Hassan and Bashir 
(2003) 
Qudah and Jaradat 
(2013) 
Credit Risk  
 
-Heffernan and Fu 
(2010) 
-Srairi (2010) 
-Athanasoglou et 
al., (2005) 
-Athanasoglou et 
al., (2006) 
-AL-Omar & AL-
Mutairi (2008) 
- Flamini et al., 
(2009) 
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-Karim et al., 
(2010) 
 
Leverage 
 
- Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) 
-  Goddard et al., 
(2004) 
- Ben-Naceur 
(2003)  
- Al-Tamimi (2005) 
- Bashir (1999) 
- Lee (2012) 
- Qudah & Jaradat 
(2013) 
-Izhar and Asutaya 
(2007) 
  
-Short (1979) 
-Javaid et al., (2011 
-  Ali et al., (2011) 
  
 
 
Overhead 
 
-Haslem (1968) 
-Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992)  
-Naceur (2003) 
- Hassan and  
-Bashir (2003) 
Ben Naceur and 
Goaied (2008) 
- Bourke (1989) -Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999 
-Flamini et al., 
(2009 
Mgt Efficiency 
 
-Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) 
-Haslem (1968) 
-Lai and Li (2014) 
- Haron (2004) 
-Athanasoglou et al 
., (2005) 
- Karim et al., 
(2010) 
-AL-Omar & AL-
Mutairi (2008) 
-Ramadan (2011) 
-Idris et al., (2011) 
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Asset Utilisation 
 
-Ramadan (2011) 
Ali et al., (2011) 
-Naceur and Goaied 
(2008) 
-Lai and Li (2014) -Akhtar (2011) 
 
PLS 
 
 -Haron (1996a) 
-Samad and Hassan 
(2000) 
- Haron (2004) 
 
Murabah   
 
-Samad and Hassan 
(2000) 
 -Haron (1996a)    
- Haron (2004) 
Source: Created by the author 
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Chapter Five  
Theoretical Framework 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework underpinning the determinants of banks' 
performance, as measured by their profitability. From this theoretical framework, the 
research questions are formulated. Generally, the determinants of banks' profitability are 
divided into two main categories; internal and external.    
The internal profitability determinants are viewed as those that are controllable by 
management, such as the sources and distribution of funds, capital and liquidity 
management and expenses management. On the contrary, the external determinants of a 
commercial bank’s profitability are viewed as those that are out of the control of the 
banks’ management. These factors can be further subdivided into two types, one is of 
those that are linked to the firm’s operating environment, such as regulation, growth 
domestic products and inflation, and the other, firm-specific factors such as firm size and 
ownership. This study focuses on internal profitability determinants as well as bank-
specific factors. As the studied banks are all located in the same country, the 
environmental factors will be eliminated because it will have the same impact on all 
banks. 
The following section examines the variables used in this study. The ROA and ROE are 
used as dependent variables. The independent variables include the banks’ age, size, and 
type, as measured by ownership and specialisation. Bank capital, liquidity, credit risk, 
leverage, operational efficiency, staff expenses, and assets utilisation are also used as 
independent variables. The set also includes profit and loss sharing (Modarabah and 
Mosharkah), non-profit and loss sharing (Morabahah) and Salam mode of finance.  
To measure these variables, either a ratio method or dummy variables were used. Each of 
the two measures has its own advantages, and both have been widely used in the past (see 
Haron, 1996a and Samad and Hassan, 2000, for instance). The advantage of using a ratio 
method is reported by authors such as Samad (2004) who states that the user of this 
method benefits from its ability to compensate disparities of economic entities. Samad 
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also remarked that since banks are varied in their sizes, the use of ratio removes the 
disparities in sizes and brings them at par. In contrast, the use of dummy variables has 
been reported by authors such as Wooldridge (2005) as helpful in calculating regression 
coefficients for temporal effects, qualitative variables and some cases of quantitative 
variables.  
5.2. Profitability Measures  
Traditionally, there are two ratios that are mostly used in assessing a bank’s overall 
performance; ROA and ROE. These ratios are considered by authors such as Al-Tamimi 
(2005), Heffernan and Fu (2010) and Alper and Anbar (2011) as the best measures of a 
bank’s overall performance. Some studies utilise other performance measures such as net 
interest margin (NIM) and Return on Capital (ROC) as measures of financial performance 
(see Naceur; 2003, Alkassim; 2005; Ben Naceur and Goaied, 2008 and Heffernan and Fu, 
2010). As Islamic Banks are interest-free banks, NIM is excluded in this study: NIM 
reflects the difference between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of 
total assets. ROC is also excluded as the researcher prefer to use a more comprehensive 
measure of performance that is in relation to a wider meaning of capital, which is ROE.   
5.2.1. Return on Assets (ROA)     
Return on Assets is defined as the rate of return on an asset or net income over total assets 
(Naceur, 2003; Atemnkenf and Joseph, 2006 and Flamini et al., 2009). It represents a 
general and comprehensive measure of bank profitability and overall performance. It 
echoes banks capability to achieve a return from its total operations on its sources of fund. 
Although ROA has been criticised by authors such as Alkassim (2005) and Flamini et al., 
(2009) for being bias due to excluding off-balance-sheet activities, it remains the most 
widely used profitability and performance measure. Reasons behind the popularity of 
ROA are provided by Bashir (1999), Samad and Hassan (2000), Samad (2004), Alkassim 
(2005) and Athanasoglou, et al., (2005b) who all report that, ROA reflects the capability 
and effectiveness of management in allocating asset to produce net profit. Bashir (2003) 
also states that ROA is widely used by regulators because believe that ROA is the best 
measure of bank performance. Accordingly, it remains a superior measure of banks' 
financial performance and managerial efficiency. 
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5.2.2. Return on Equity (ROE) 
Return on equity represents a measure of how much profit a bank has generated on funds 
supplied by shareholders (Alkassim, 2005 and Flamini et al., 2009). ROE determines how 
efficiently the bank’s management utilises shareholders’ funds (Alkassim, 2005). Bashir 
(1999) reports that ROE shows to which extent the bank’s management is successful in 
generating profits from shareholders’ investment.   
Although ROE has been criticised by Flamini et al., (2009) for disregarding financial 
leverage and the risks associated with it, remains a widely used performance measure in 
literature. Reasons behind using ROE as performance measure are reported by 
Athanasoglou, et al., (2005b) who state that ROE reflects how efficient a bank is in 
generating profit on shareholders’ funds. Furthermore, it is more comprehensive than 
other measures, such as return on capital, as it covers wider sources of funds.  
5.3. Profitability Determinants 
The following variables are used as determinants of banks' profitability: 
5.3.1. Liquidity 
Liquidity is one of the major determinants that influence a commercial bank performance. 
Samad (2004), Samad and Hassan (2002) and Ramadan (2011) define liquidity as cash 
availability. In other words, it means how fast a bank can trade its assets for cash at face 
value to meet the cash demands of depositors and borrowers. The higher the total of liquid 
asset for a bank, the better is the liquidity of the bank. Samad and Hassan (2002) note that 
banks can experience liquidity problem when current and savings accounts are withdrawn 
at an extensive rate at any point time; that is, if current and savings accounts are 
withdrawn extensively more than new deposits in a period of time, banks will often face 
liquidity difficulty because they may lack enough cash to satisfy demands of depositors.  
The impact of liquidity on the financial performance of firms has extensively being 
discussed in the literature. For example, Ramadan (2011) reports that liquidity is 
generally related to lower rates of return and consequently profitability. This view has 
also been supported by Al Mmar and Mutairi (2008); they agree that negative relationship 
between liquidity and profitability is likely because keeping higher liquid assets lessens 
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the ability of banks to produce a profit. In this case, liquidity holding can possibly be seen 
as an expense to the bank and will normally be associated with lower rates of profitability: 
the study of Molyneux and Thorton (1992) show a negative relationship between liquidity 
and profitability. On the contrary, however, Bourke, (1989) and Al-Tamimi (2005) note 
that liquidity has a positive impact on banks’ performance. In this context, Al Mmar and 
Mutairi (2008) justify this possible positive relationship by reporting that high level of 
liquidity will lessen transaction costs and convince commitments and obligations without 
facing any undesirable losses. Meanwhile, Qudah and Jaradat (2013) establish an 
insignificant relation between liquidity and profitability, when they measured profitability 
using ROA and a negative and significant relation between the two variables when 
profitability was measured by ROE. Guru et al., (2002) report that the nature of the 
relation between liquidity and profitability largely relies on the differences in the 
elasticity of demand for a loan of the studied bank. 
In the Islamic banking context, Haron (1996a) reports that as a profit-seeking 
organisation, Islamic banks hope to maximise their profitability to satisfy both 
shareholders and investors who placed their deposits under different profit-sharing 
schemes. At the same time, they need to maintain a sufficient degree of liquidity to meet 
their ongoing obligations. Therefore, similar to conventional banks, Islamic banks need 
to balance between their profitability maximisation and meeting their obligation 
whenever it is requested so as not to be exposed to liquidity problems.  
5.3.2. Capitalization 
Aburime (2008) reports that the nature of capital can be defined in two ways: narrowly, 
it can be seen as the amount provided by the owners of a bank (paid-up share capital) that 
grants them the privilege to enjoy all the expected income of a financial firm. He also 
reports that in more depth, it can be seen as the amount of the owners’ funds that is 
available to support a bank’s business. The last definition considers firm’s reserves, which 
can also be termed as total shareholders’ funds.  
Overall, capitalization is seen as an important factor in explaining the performance of 
financial institutions. Sufian and Parman (2009) argue that firm’s capital acts as a cushion 
that protects depositors in case of loss or liquidation. Similarly, Sangmi and Nazir (2010) 
note that high capitalisation can aid firms to lend in high risk but profitable areas as well 
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as in opening new branches. This has also been agreed to by Bashir (1999) who remark 
that capitalization, in general, represents financial collateral and hence reduces the 
consequences of unfavourable selection. In sum, it is clear that bank’s capital is 
extensively used to analyse the grade of its internal financial strength and the general 
strength of a bank. 
According to conventional banking theory, a higher equity-to-total assets ratio is linked 
with a lower profitability (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2009). This theory is been justified 
by the view that a higher equity ratio normally reduces the equity’s risk (Berger and 
Ofekb, 1995; Bashir, 2003 and Karim et al., 2010). As such, the estimated return on equity 
required by investors is expected to be lessened (since high risk is generally correlated 
with high profitability). The nature of the negative relationship between capitalisation and 
profitability in banks was further discussed by Berger (1995) and Lee (2012). They note 
that lower capital ratio is correlated with higher risk exposure, and when the higher risk 
is effective, that it leads to higher profitability. In essence, this study shows that there is 
a negative relationship between capital ratio and banks’ profitability.  
On the contrary, however, Berger and Ofekb (1995), Hassan and Bashir (2003) and Karim 
et al., (2010) suggest that the higher the equity ratio, the higher the profitability of the 
bank. They argue that the ratio of equity to total assets is one of the fundamental ratios 
for measuring capital strength as it comes with the percentage of total assets financed by 
the equity capital. For this reason, the higher capital ratio has a reflection on the banks’ 
ability to absorb losses and control financial risk exposure. Similarly, since well-
capitalized banks have access to lower costs of funding, it is thus argued that they can as 
a result cope with financial distress, which then enhances their ability to gain higher 
profits. In this context, Flamini et al., (2009) report that profit may also lead to higher 
capital if it is fully or partially reinvested. Empirical evidence from Bourke (1989), 
Naceur and Goaied (2001) and Goddard et al., (2004) indicate that the best performing 
banks are those who keep a high level of equity comparative to their assets.  
Studies investigating the association between capitalisation and profitability such as 
Bourke (1989), Molynuex and Thorton (1992), Berger (1995), Kunt and Huizingua 
(1998) and Athanasoglou, et al., (2005b) establish the presence of a positive impact of 
capital adequacy on profitability. Nevertheless, Guru et al., (2002) find evidence of a 
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negative relationship between profitability and capitalisation of commercial banks in 
Malaysia.  
In the context of Islamic banking Haron (1996a) suggests that there is a strong chance 
that the amount of capital issued by an Islamic bank does not affect its profitability. He 
argues that the main pillar of the traditional theory is the assumption that higher bank 
capital reduces both returns to the owners and the risk for the bank's depositors and the 
entire banking system. 
 He reports two reasons which can make this theory irrelevant to the nature of Islamic 
banking system. Firstly, there is no predetermined rate of returns given to the depositors 
or investors as is the case for the traditional banks. It is well known that Islamic banks 
offer savings and investment account facilities on the basis of Mudarabah, which implies 
that depositors share with the bank any profit or losses deriving from business operations. 
Consequently, in the case of a loss, depositors will also have to tolerate losses as their 
money will not be repaid by the bank. This means that there is a mechanical correction 
effect during periods of financial depression.  
Secondly, Islamic banks use two methods to set up their investments with depositors’ 
funds. The first method is that the bank pool depositors' and shareholders' funds to invest 
in a specific business. Profits or losses should be distributed between depositors and 
shareholders between the bank and the investor according to the business contract.  
The second method applies when the bank uses depositors’ fund solely to finance a 
particular business. In this case, returns from a project will go directly into a depositor's 
account and the bank gains profit from the fee which it applied as an equivalent to the 
project management costs. Bearing in mind that conventional banks normally merge both 
shareholders' capital and depositors' funds, one could recognise the irrelevant of the 
capital and profitability relation to the Islamic banking system. This argument is 
supported by the finding of Ali et al., (2011) who provide evidence of an insignificant 
relationship between capitalisation and profitability of Islamic banks in Pakistan. 
However, it is contradicted with the finding of Hassan and Bashir (2003) who suggests a 
negative relationship between profitability and capitalisation of some Islamic Banks 
worldwide. 
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5.3.3. Leverage  
Leverage or gearing is closely related to capital. It can be defined according to Grue et 
al., (2002) as an external source of business finance that a firm can use to improve its 
financial position and performance. Lai and Li (2014) report that leverage, as measured 
by debt to equity ratio, indicates whether a firm has the capital structure that is capable of 
withstanding any unexpected financial shock by holding a sufficient capital. 
Though various literature suggests the importance of leverage in explaining firms’ 
performance, they have often provided contradictory views and evidence on its actual 
impact (see Guru, 2002; Athanasoglou et al., 2005 and Aburime, 2008, for instance). For 
example, while Guru (2002) suggest that banks with low leverage ratio are often 
comparatively protected and preferable in many cases, Aburime (2008) and Qudah and 
Jaradat (2013) contend that profitability often depends on the skills of banks’ 
management to forecast, avoid, monitor and manage risks. In essence, they argue that the 
profitability of banks are most often determined by the policy of bank’s management 
toward leverage. Furthermore, while Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Goddard et al., 
(2004) and Al-Tamimi (2005) suggest positive relationship between leverage and 
profitability in traditional banks, Ali et al., (2011) and Javaid et al., (2011) remark that 
there is no significant relationship between leverage and profitability. In sum, findings of 
practical studies which examine the relationship between leverage and profitability are 
ambiguous.  
With regards Islamic banking, Qudah and Jaradat (2013) show a negative and 
insignificant relationship between profitability and leverage in Islamic banks while using 
data from the Jordanian Islamic Banks. Izhar and Asutaya (2007) also established a 
negative and significant relationship between leverage and profitability in one Indonesian 
Islamic bank.  
5.3.4. Credit Risk  
Athanasoglou et al., (2008) and Ramadan (2011) and define credit risk as the chance of 
losing all or part of the interest, loan asset or both. In other words, it occurs when the 
expected cash flow of the principal and rate of returns on the principal assets (loans) held 
by banks are not paid, either completely or on their maturity date. Ramadan (2011) also 
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reports that it often originates from poorness of assets quality and possibly could lead to 
insolvency of financial institutions. Consequently, the need for adequate assets quality is 
natural in the banking sector as poorness of this quality is a major cause of capital grinding 
down and credit and capital risks rising. Therefore, monitoring asset quality indicators 
are important. Bashir, (1999) reports that studies on the reasons for bank failures showed 
that prior to failure the failing banks usually practise risk-taking behaviour. He also 
reports that the asset quality is a statistically significant forecaster of credit insolvency.  
Hassan and Bashir (2003) report that asset quality depends largely on the quality of credit 
assessment, monitoring and collection within each bank, they also added that improving 
assets quality could be attained by collateralizing the loans, having sufficient provisions 
against potential losses, and avoiding asset concentration on one cretin geographical or 
economic sector as this make the bank more vulnerable to risk.   
Athanasoglou et al., (2006) and Ramadan (2011), among others, report that, theoretically, 
the increase in Company's exposure to credit risk is an indication of lower credit quality 
and consequently lower profitability. This has been discussed by Athanasoglou et al., 
(2005) who prove the negative and significant impact of credit risk on profitability. Ali 
et al., (2011) explain that banks, who are involved in borrowing and lending activities, 
need to create a loan loss provisions to lessen the risk. This risk adverse policy, they note, 
applies creation of loan loss provisions from retained earnings of banks on a yearly base. 
Therefore, they conclude that banks need to have effective credit risk management so as 
improve their profitability,  
On the contrary, AL Manaseer (2009) reports that investors normally prefer less risky 
outcomes. Yet they agree to invest in it when risky assets have higher returns than those 
available from non-risky assets. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009) and Albar and Anbar 
(2011) prove that increase in credit risk indicators is positively associated with 
profitability, so far the bank does not operate on an unacceptable level of financial risk.  
Credit risk can be measured by many indicators, including non-performing loans to total 
gross loans, the ratio of loan-loss provision to total loans, the ratio of net loans to total 
assets and total loan to total deposit. 
5.3.5. Management Efficiency or Operational efficiency  
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One of the key determinants of banks’ profitability is the operating expenses, which are 
incurred to attain profit. This expenses could be used to assess how efficient a 
management is in generating profits (Al Omar and Mutairi, 2008).  
The literature argues that reduced expenses enhance the profitability of a financial 
institution, leading to a negative association between the operating expenses and 
profitability (Bourke, 1989). In this context, Srairi (2010) argue that inefficiency related 
to this aspect could be related to the bank size, as smaller size assets make the bank unable 
to benefit from economies of scale.  
On the contrary, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) prove that operating expense are 
positively impacting the profitability of European banking sector. Ramadan (2011) 
explains that the positive relationship between expenses and profitability arises from the 
fact that banks are able to transfer such expenses to the customers.  
In the context of Islamic banks, Srairi (2010) reports an inverse relationship between 
profitability and cost, within Gulf countries’ Islamic banks. He argues that this negative 
association could either be related to the lower amount of risk carried by Islamic bank or 
because Islamic banks operate in an unsupportive regulatory environment. 
5.3.6. Overhead Expenses  
For the most part, the literature claims a negative relationship between overhead expenses 
and profitability, because efficient banks are expected to operate at lower costs. This 
implies that the lower overhead expenses improved the efficiency, and therefore, the 
better profitability of the financial institution (Bourke, 1989). Similarly, Hassan and 
Bashir (2003) report that as efficient banks are likely to operate at lower costs, high 
overhead expenses is expected to have a negative impact on profitability. On the other 
hand, however, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) findings support a positive association 
between overhead expenses and profitability: their study implies that employees’ 
productivity improve with the wage rate. Another positive relationship between 
profitability and overhead expense has been established in the Tunisian study by Naceur 
(2003) and Malaysian study Guru et al., (2002). The supporters of this view claim that 
these banks are able to transfer their overheads to users’ of their financial services.  
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In the same context, Al Omar and Mutairi (2008) argue that staff cost may positively 
relate to profitability as banks with higher paid staff expenses may benefit from superior 
quality. Further opinion on this determinant has been given by Hassan and Bashir (2003) 
who report that the utilisation of new electronic technology, such as ATMs and other 
automated method of services delivery, have caused overhead expenses to fall. 
Consequently, lower overhead expenses may impact performance positively. In any 
instance, it should be appealing to identify the dominant effect in a completely Islamic 
banking environment such as Sudan.  
5.3.7. Assets Utilisation 
Assets utilisation measures how capable and optimal a firm’s management uses its 
resources (Ramadan, 2011). It is well known in the business world that the success of any 
organisation is associated with its ability to manage and utilise its assets. Vijayakumar 
(2012) reports that asset utilization ratios are particularly important for serving two 
related objectives. Firstly, it reflects an overview of internal monitoring, concerning 
performance over multiple periods. Secondly, it gives an early warning or acts as a 
yardstick for the sensibility of the conclusions that may be reached on operational results. 
Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003) reports two reasons through which management can enhance 
its assets utilisation and consequently raise the bank’s average yield on its assets. Firstly, 
management can enhance its assets utilisation by carefully allocating banks’ assets to 
appropriate alternative of yielding investment. Secondly, improving assets utilisation 
could also be attained by avoiding unnecessary and excessive risks.  
Concerning the nature of the relationship between assets utilisation and profitability, it is 
commonly agreed that it is positive (see Atemnkenf and Joseph, 2006 and Bourke, 1989). 
This is due to the reason that good level of assets utilisation enables financial institutions 
to improve and expand their investment. On the other hand, Lai and Li (2014) find that 
there are negative insignificant relationship between assets utilisation and profitability, 
which imply that high profits earned by the banks do not represent higher assets 
utilisation.  
In the context of Islamic banking, Ramadan (2011) proves a positive and significant 
relationship exists between assets utilisation and profitability of the Jordanian Islamic 
banks. He also proves that the effects of this determinant varied among these banks.  
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5.3.8 Bank Size   
One of the essential questions related to bank policy is regarding which size is optimal 
for bank profitability. The results of the studies on the relation between bank’s size and 
profitability are conflicting. On one hand, the effect of an increasing size on profitability 
has commonly been confirmed to be positive to a certain extent. The study of Short 
(1979), Alkassim (2005) and Flamini et al., (2009) establish a positive and significant 
relationship between bank size and profitability. They also report that bank size is closely 
related to capital efficiency: this, they note, is because large banks are more able to have 
cheaper sources of financing with low costs, which will positively be reflected in the 
profitability of the bank. 
On the contrary, evidence from practical studies such as Naceur (2003) and Athanasoglou 
et al., (2008) stands for negative relation between bank size and profitability. They prove 
that big banks have very limited economies of scale advantage1, as enlarging the bank 
size usually leads to limited cost reduction. Athanasoglou (2005) and Athanasoglou et al., 
(2006) propose that the influence of a growing bank’s size on profitability may be positive 
up to a certain limit. Then the effect of size could be negative due to bureaucratic and 
other reasons. Bashir (1999) discuss the argument on the effect of size on banks 
performance. He reports three advantages associated with bigger size. Firstly, he reports 
that bigger size raises efficiency by taking the advantage of economies of scale and 
decreases the costs of information gathering and processing.   Secondly, banks with bigger 
size also have more chances to finance a bigger number of profitable investments than 
smaller banks. Thirdly, they are proved to enable the bank to have more activity 
diversification which is associated with higher returns to depositors and equity holders. 
On the other hand, Bashir (1999) argue that banks with greater activity diversification are 
more exposed to financial and operating risks. He adds that large banks could face 
financial risk due to low capitalization. Meanwhile, the operational risk that faces larger 
banks is rooted to how risky the bank’s asset portfolio is. Nevertheless, he concludes that 
                                                          
1 Economies of scale are commonly defined as reductions in the cost per unit of a product being manufactured and 
sold (Haron, 1996). 
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as larger banks’ size is commonly well capitalised and more diversified, it is expected 
that both financial and operating risks are usually weakened.  
In some literature, it is contended that small profitable banks exist (see Heffernan and Fu, 
2010, for instance). The excel of small size banks has also been justified by  Beck and 
Kunt (2006), who argue that  in the lack of well-developed financial markets and legal 
systems, it becomes more difficult for financial organizations to expand to their optimal 
size. Another explanation which makes smaller banks more profitable is given by 
Atemnkenf and Joseph (2006), who report that smaller banks are easy to manage in terms 
of control and coordination.  
In the context of Islamic banks, the large size is expected to make the Islamic banks more 
able to offer a large set of financial services. Although this diversification could make the 
Islamic banks more vulnerable to both financial and the operational risks, larger banks 
are expected to challenge both types of risks, as size is expanded and profitability is 
increased (Bashir, 1999). In the same context, Haron (1996a) establish that when the 
relationship between Islamic banks and size exist, it proved to have an inverse 
relationship with profitability measures. 
5.3.9. Bank Type  
The effect of bank type on performance is viewed from two perspectives: ownership and 
specialisation. Studies that focus on the relationship between bank ownership and 
profitability are conducted either with focus on state, private or foreign ownership. An 
example of such studies includes Short (1979), Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992) and Haron (2004), Matthew and Esther (2012), Al-Tamimi and Jellali (2013) and 
Hassan et al., (2013).  
Given that foreign banks operating in Sudan do not publish their statements on their 
websites and often do not divulge their financial report to the public, this study focuses 
on the relationship between profitability and local private/state bank ownership.  
On the other hand, studies that focus on the impact of bank specialisation on bank 
profitability are rare, but they can still be seen in Maudos et al., (2002), Naceur and 
Goaied (2008) and Heffernan and Fu (2010). 
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According to studies on the relationship between ownership and profitability, two firms 
may differ in their financial performance depending on whether the majority of the stake 
in a firm is held by the government, private individuals or mutual funds. Reasons behind 
the relationship between performance efficiency level and ownership have also been 
broadly explored. Altunbas et al., (2001) and Flamini et al., (2009) report that 
justifications for these different performance level lie in imperfectly designed incentives. 
Altunbas et al., (2001) explain that the lack of capital market regulation, which weakens 
owners' control over management and consequently gives the management more chance 
to practise its own agenda, lessens the incentives to be efficient. Goddard et al., (2004) 
explain these conflicts of interest between owners and managers by an example of their 
difference in opinions on profitability and risk. They report that while owners aim to 
maximize profit, managers will try to sacrifice profit to reduce risk by investing in more 
secure investment.  
In the traditional banking context, Flamini et al., (2009) report that due to government 
commitment, public banks may have objectives other than profit maximization. This has 
also been supported by Athanasoglou et al., (2005) who argue that public banks’ low level 
of profitability is because of the banks’ social mandate, which differs from profit 
maximizing. Therefore, privately owned banks may excel over state-owned, with regards 
profitability.  
In the same context, extensive empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that state-
owned banks perform less efficiently than private banks. Iannotta et al., (2006) establish 
that in spite of their lower cost, government-owned banks achieve a lower profitability 
than privately-owned banks. They also prove that government-owned banks experience 
poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than privately-owned. In his cross-country 
study, Short, (1979) suggests state-owned banks are less profitable than their privately 
owned counterparts on the ground that government banks are non-profit oriented banks.  
On the other hand, Micco et al., (2007) finding shows it is not an established fact that 
state-owned banks are less profitable than private banks. Their findings are in line with 
Altunbas et al., (2001) who prove that, in the case of Germany, there is no evidence that 
privately owned banks are more efficient than public and mutual banks. Meanwhile, 
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Molyneux and Thornton (1992) suggest that state-owned European banks generate 
significantly higher profitability than their private counterpart.  
Turning to the second strand of literature on bank type, which focuses on the impact of 
specialisation on bank performance, Maudos et al., (2002) believe that specialised banks 
have the requirement to excel in the industry in which they operate. They justify their 
opinion based on the fact that specialised banks are able to benefit from their financial 
production or from their better market power of pricing resulting from its productive 
specialisation. They report that revenues resulting from such prices are able to 
compensate for any higher costs incurred. In contrast, Heffernan and Fu (2010) report 
that specialised banks may lose profit opportunity because of their limited areas of 
investment.  
Findings on practical studies on the impact of specialisation on bank performance are also 
different. Maudos et al., (2002) prove that the type of banking specialisation is not 
significant in explaining the profitability of European banks. Meanwhile, findings of 
Heffernan and Fu (2010) prove a positive and significant impact of specialisation on ROE 
and insignificant impact on ROA in Chinese Rural Banks. Further to the researcher 
knowledge, there is no study on the relationship between Islamic bank profitability and 
specialisation, yet, in the context of Arab countries referencing can only be linked to 
Naceur and Goaied (2008) who study the impact of specialised banks (agriculture and 
real estate) within Tunisian Banking Industry. They prove no relationship between 
specialisation and profitability of these banks.   
5.3.10. Bank Age 
Findings on the impact of bank age on the financial performance of banks are 
contradicting. Aburime (2008) reports that newly founded banks are not operationally 
profitable in the first few years after their establishment. He justified these low 
profitability by mentioning that these banks have been placing greater focus on raising 
their market share, than on increasing their profitability. Beck et al., (2005) and Beck and 
Kunt (2006) report another reason for the excellence of old age banks over the 
newcomers. They report that due to their experience, longer established bank seems to be 
more able to enjoy higher performance and good reputation advantages over the 
comparatively newly established bank. Yet, their results for the Nigerian market prove 
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that older banks are financially less profitable as newcomers prove their ability to engage 
in new profit opportunities. This contradicted with later findings of Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2009) who established that bank age does not have a significant impact on 
the profitability of banks located in Switzerland. They prove that higher reputation of old 
banks does not have an effect on the banks’ profitability. Newly founded banks, if well 
established, are able to effectively create new profit opportunities. 
5.3.11. Commitment to PLS versus non-PLS  
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Islamic modes of finance can be divided 
into PLS and/or non-PLS modes of finance. Previous literature on this determinant can 
be found in studies such as Haron (1996a), Samad and Hassan (2000) and Bashir (2003). 
Samad and Hassan (2000) establish that PLS modes of finance are less profitable and not 
popular in Malaysian Islamic banking when compared with the alternative modes of 
financing which are found to be more profitable and less risky than Mudharabah and 
Musharakah. Additionally, Haron (1996a) and Haron (2004) prove that funds invested in 
PLS modes of finance have an inverse relationship with profitability. He suggests that 
increase in these modes of finance will not generate immediate returns to the bank as the 
calculation of profit usually takes place either upon completion of a project or after a one-
year period from the start point. Consequently, any increase in the PLS investments is 
instantly followed by a reduction in profitability. 
Turning to non-PLS, present in Morabahah, Haron (2004) prove a positive but 
insignificant relationship between Morabahah and Islamic banks profitability. He reports 
that Islamic banks normally concentrate their financing activities in Morabahah. He 
argues that as this mode of financing is short-term in nature, it produce less profit 
compared to long term investment. Consequently, any increasing amount of Morabahah 
investment will not increase Islamic banks profitability. 
5.3.12. Commitment to the agricultural sector (Salam) 
It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that Salam is an advance contract of 
purchasing agricultural production.  
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Islamic banks need to take extraordinary care when dealing in Salam operations as they 
may face a number of risks. Firstly, Counterparty Risk is a common risk in this type of 
finance as the client may possibly default after taking the payment in advance. Secondly, 
at the time the goods are received by the bank, the price may become lower than the 
expected price, creating commodity price risk. Thirdly, sometimes the quality of 
delivered commodity is not of desired quality, which makes it inadmissible for the 
prospective buyer. Fourth, the bank may not be able to sell the goods at the right time, 
leading to locking funds in the goods until they are sold, entailing possible extra storage 
expenses.  
In order to avoid or manage the above-mentioned risks, banks need to be extra cautious 
when signing any contract of Salam. Such caution mean entering in Salam only when 
goods have decent market potential. Also, the policy of penalty charges to the supplier 
could be applied in the case of delayed delivery, to protect the bank from a late delivery 
cost. 
Using the case of the Pakistan banking sector, Kaleem and Wajid (2009) explore the 
possible application of Salam as an alternative source of agriculture financing under 
Islamic banking in Pakistan. Interestingly, they find that none of the financial institutions 
in Pakistan offer Salam mode of finance to their customers in spite of the fact that about 
70 percent of farmers need money for purchasing crops inputs, paying for labour and 
renting machinery. 
The last two (PLS vs non-PLS) and Salam contract variables examine part of the impact 
of asset structure of Sudanese Islamic banks on their profitability.  
The next chapter will introduce previous practical findings of studies on profitability 
determinants of both conventional and Islamic banking industries.  
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Chapter Six 
Research Methodology  
6.1. Introduction 
There are three approaches that have been used in previous literature to measure and 
evaluate bank performance. These are – the survey approach, parametric and non-
parametric approaches. The survey approach is usually used when studies aim to find 
perceptions of individuals on the financial performance of their banks. This type of 
approach has been used by Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Williams and Gardiner 
(2003).  
An explanation of the parametric and nonparametric approaches was given by Tanya 
(2014), who note that they represent two broad classifications of statistical techniques. 
He also reports that the difference between the parametric and nonparametric approach is 
that parametric tests are based on the assumption that the parameters or the shape of the 
examined data set are approximately normally distributed. This approach uses either the 
linear regression model or other statistical tools such as algorithm statistical analysis and 
Beta distribution analysis. Linear regression analysis, in this aspect, remains the most 
frequently used starting point for any analysis. Short (1979), Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992), Naceur (2003), and Athanasoglou et al., (2005) are all examples of studies that 
utilise linear parametric methods, with a focus on performance determinants.   
On the other hand, nonparametric tests, as explained by Tanya (2014), do not rely on 
assumptions about the distribution of the parameters or the shape of the examined dataset. 
Therefore, it is usually used when the data has an indefinite or non-normal distribution. 
The non-parametric approach, according to Pettitt (1979), can be subdivided into two 
methods: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH). Within this 
technique, DEA is the most applicable method in studies which focuses on the banking 
sector. Examples of studies that have used non-parametric methods include Fu and 
Heffernan (2007) and Yao et al., (2007). Overall, choosing between these types of 
methodology depends on one’s study objectives.  
 
91 
 
The general consensus in the area of performance determinants reveals that the widely 
used linear parametric econometric approach form is the relevant functional form for 
examining the determinants of bank performance. Studies such as Short (1979), Bourke 
(1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Bashir (2000), Naceur (2003), Hassan and Bashir 
(2003), Goddard et al., (2004) and Athanasoglou et al., (2005) prove that the linear 
regression form is widely used in the literature to estimate the impact of various factors 
that may be important in explaining bank profits. These studies also provide evidence that 
the linear regression estimation produces reliable findings that are equal to any other 
functional form.  
Following previous studies’ methodology, the study uses linear regression to assess the 
financial performance of Sudanese Islamic banks. As the main focus of this study is 
evaluating the main performance determinants of Sudanese Islamic bank, the researcher 
uses a linear regression model to investigate the relationship between the performance 
determinants and performance measures. This chapter aims to explain the methodology 
of the study, including the sample size, the econometrics techniques employed, and a brief 
explanation of the variables. 
To achieve the study objectives, the researcher builds three models of performance 
measures and determinants. These models have been extensively used in to examine the 
interrelation between financial performance measures, presented in profitability measures 
as dependent variables, and profitability determinants, which are the independent 
variables. Through this process, the researcher becomes able to identify which variables 
are important in shaping banks' profitability and risk in the Sudanese banking industry.  
6.2. Data and Sample 
The study uses secondary data sourced from twenty-seven Sudanese Islamic banks’ 
financial statements, particularly the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement, 
during the period from 2005 to 2013. The sample represents the major Sudanese banks 
that have consistently published their financial statements over the study period. This data 
were collected either from the bank websites or as hard copies directly from the banks’ 
headquarters and branches.  
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The financial statements are used because the banks' balance sheet items are viewed to 
typically reflect the bank's management behaviour in terms of policies and decisions that 
relate to the bank’s funds sources, composition and utilisation. Additionally, a bank's 
profit and loss statements are seen to reflect the management's effectiveness in creating 
revenues and managing costs. Data from the income statement are relevant for identifying 
the interrelationship between performance measures and determinants. 
The study uses the panel estimate approach, which is used in financial modelling when 
the data has both time series and cross-sectional elements: such data are often referred to 
as longitudinal data. Using panel data has the great advantage of enabling researchers to 
capture dynamic changes and help investigate behavioural model over a specific period 
of time for different units. Baltagi (2003), Gujarati (2004), Hsiao (2005) and Brooks 
(2008) support this advantage by arguing the effectiveness of panel data in detecting 
interrelationship between variables. They note that using panel data enables researchers 
to study a more complex, as well as a wider, range of factors than would be possible with 
pure cross-sectional data or time-series data. Secondly, the assumptions of panel data, 
they assert, allows for individual specific variables, thus taking the unit’s heterogeneity 
into account. Thirdly, panel data, they claim, examines the dynamic change of the 
relationships between variables of large numbers of entities over the same time: such 
findings, they contend, usually requires data over a longer period of time so as to have an 
adequate number of observations, if a pure time series data are used. Fourthly, when using 
a broad aggregation of panel data, they note that the panel approach can still be effective 
as it minimises the bias that may appear due to such broad aggregation.  Fifthly, they 
explain that panel data can spot and measure the influence of variables that cannot be 
detected in pure time series data or pure cross section. Finally, they conclude that panel 
data provides more data variability, more degrees of freedom, less collinearity of 
variables, more informative data, and extra efficiency and increases the ability to 
effectively study more complicated behavioural models. 
Therefore, the use of panel data, as grounds for data analyses, provides a rich environment 
for the researcher to more closely examine the evaluation of the impact of profitability 
determinants on the performance of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
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Finally, the study used EViews software for running the data analysis and yielding 
regression findings. Brooks (2008) reports that EViews provides an effective tool most 
frequently used in practical econometric studies such as cross-section, time series, panel 
data analysis and general statistical analyses and estimation. He also reports that, 
importantly, EViews software is able to discover any model misspecification and, 
therefore, it can consider a wealth of diagnostic tests to automatically identify whether 
the model is econometrically valid or not. Therefore, the researcher considers this 
software as an ideal package to estimate the interrelationship between performance 
measures and determinants. 
6.3. Econometric Techniques 
Following Short (1979), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Bourke, (1989), Naceur and 
Goaied (2008) and others, the study uses the linear functional form which is widely used 
in the literature and well-known for producing good results. The study utilises different 
econometric techniques of linear functional form to achieve its aims. This section 
provides a brief explanation of each econometric technique.  
6.3.1. The Pooled Estimation Method 
The estimation of pooled data became one of the most popular econometric methods in 
literature because of the fact that pooled data affords such a rich environment for the 
development of estimation techniques (Greene, 2003 and Brooks, 2008). The pooled 
regression, according to Brooks (2008), entails estimating a single equation on different 
cross-sectional data.  
The pooled estimation model can be expressed in the following regression equation:  
Yit = α + βXit + uit            (1) 
Where: 
Yit: is the dependent variable. 
α: is the intercept term. 
β: is the vector of coefficients. 
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Xit: is the vector of explanatory variables. 
uit: is the error term (the disturbance term). 
t = time period 1, …..,T 
i = vector coefficient of X regressors 1, . . . , N 
 
The main assumption on which the pooled method is based is that the average value of 
explanatory variables (Xit) are not stochastic (fixed). Further, the method assumes that 
the intercept term and the coefficients of all the explanatory variables have constant 
values over time and across the entities. Guru et al., (2002) report that this is an important 
assumption as, if the slopes were to differ over time as well as cross-sectionally, then each 
separate cross-sectional regression would involve a distinct model and pooling would be 
inappropriate.  
The equation will be estimated using the usual Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). OLS is a 
well-known method for forecasting approximate estimates for the unknown parameters 
in a linear regression model. In other words, it estimates the sum of the vertical distances 
between each data point of the study’s dataset and the parallel point on the regression 
line. The smaller the differences between the estimated point and the parallel point, the 
better the model fits the data.  
The use of pooled data has a number of advantages that makes it central to quantitative 
studies that focus on identifying the relationship between variables. These advantages, as 
Podestà (2002) puts, are as follows: 
 Pooling data allows testing of the influence of a wider range of factors as well as 
offering more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.  
 Pooling data provides higher variability of data compared to a time series or cross-
section design research. 
 Instead of only testing the impact of a cross-section of all variables at a point in 
time, or only testing a time series model for several entities using only time series 
95 
 
data, a pooling data allows the combination of these methods to achieve more 
informed and wider understanding. 
In contrast, Gujarati (2004) and Brooks (2008), highlight that the limitations of pooled 
data analysis lay in its implicit assumption that the average values of the variables and 
the relationships between them are regular over time and over all of the cross-sectional 
units in the sample. Gujarati (2004) report that these assumptions are restrictive. 
Therefore, despite its simplicity and the advantages of this method, pooling data may 
affect the relationship between variables. Brooks (2008) argue that this can be dealt with 
by estimating separate time-series regressions for each institution, yet this would not take 
into consideration any regular structure which could be of interest to the researchers. 
Alternatively, estimates may be made of separate cross-sectional regressions for each of 
the time series, but again this is likely to be a sub-optimal way to proceed because it will 
not consider the common distinction in the series over time. Accordingly, Pooling data 
remains one of the most widely used methods to estimate the interrelationship between 
performance measures and determinants. 
To find out whether pooling data is the appropriate method for investigating the 
interrelationship between the performance measures and determinates of Sudanese 
Islamic banks, the researcher uses panel regression to estimate the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables.  
6.3.2 The Panel Estimation Method 
The panel model is stated below: 
Yit = α + βXit + uit          (2) 
Where: 
Yit: is the dependent variable. 
α: is the intercept term. 
β: is the vector of coefficients. 
Xit: is the vector of k explanatory variables. 
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uit: is the error term (the disturbance). 
t = time period 1, …..,T 
i = vector coefficient of X regressors 1. . . N 
In the literature, there are two kinds of panel estimator approaches used in financial 
research: fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM). In this study, 
the researcher employed at least one of these models to test their efficiency in estimating 
the interrelationship between the profitability measures and determinants. A brief 
explanation of the two estimators is the major focus of the following two sections. 
6.3.2.1. Fixed Effects Model (FEM) 
This model assumes that there are different average intercept terms for each company and 
that these intercepts are constant over time. In other words, the intercept can have a 
different value across sectors, but, for each sector, the intercept does not vary over time 
(time invariant). In addition, the relationships between the explanatory and explained 
variables are assumed to be the same both cross-sectionally and over time. Furthermore, 
the model proposes that the slope coefficient is constant across companies.  With regards 
to the error term μit, the model assumes that it varies over time and across entities, 
encapsulating everything that remains unexplained yit. μt is assumed to capture any 
unexplained differences over time while μi captures variations over companies (Brooks, 
2008). 
The fixed effect model can be explained by the following equation 
Yit = α + βit + μit    (3) 
Where: 
Yit: is the dependent variable. 
α: is the intercept term. 
β: is the vector of coefficients. 
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Xit: is the vector of k explanatory variables. 
μit : individual specific effect. 
t = time period 1, …..,T 
i = vector coefficient of X regressors 1, . . . , N 
When testing for FEM, we test the following hypothesis: 
H0: μ1 = μ2 = · · · = μN 
H1: μ1 ≠ μ2 ≠ · · · ≠ μN 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, it implies that the data can be pooled together and the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method employed to estimate the pooled regression. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, however, then it is not convincing to accept the assumption 
that the intercepts are the same across the cross-sectional units, which means H1 will be 
accepted and consequently the panel approach must be employed. 
At this point, it would be worth noting that the assumptions of fixed effects models are 
the same as for pooled models, except for the intercept which may differ across the banks, 
according to the fixed effects models, whilst remaining constant in the pooled models.  
The FEM model has the advantage of its ability to capture all time-invariant effects that 
are explicit to an individual sector or company. It is also effective when the study 
considers factors such as ownership and size since such factors do vary between 
individual entities but not over time. Finally, it allows for using a large number of dummy 
variables, which have been widely and reliably used in econometric research to measure 
the attributes of temporal effects, qualitative variables, and quantitative variables. 
In spite of the great advantages of the FEM, it can still be criticized for some drawbacks. 
Gujarati (2003) asserts that the main disadvantage of this model appears when it is applied 
to too many variables: this, he note, results in weakening the degree of freedom and 
increasing the probability of multicollinearity. He further reports that the fixed effect 
approach may not be able to detect the influence of time-invariant variables such as 
ethnicity, sex, and colour.  
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To overcome the FEM problems, the random effects model can be used. At this stage it 
may be worth mentioning that to choose between pooled and FEM, the likelihood test 
should be used to test the null hypothesis. If the null hypothesis accepted, this means that 
FEM is not suitable and, in that case, we accept the pooled estimation method. In contrast, 
if the null hypothesis is rejected, this means that FEM is suitable for estimating the model 
variables, and is thus accepted. 
6.3.2.2 Random Effects Model (REM) 
Random Effects model (REM), or error components model, is a substitute alternative to 
the FEM. Brooks (2008) reports that, as with fixed effects, the REM suggests different 
intercept terms for each company and that these intercepts are constant over time. Again, 
the relationship between the explanatory and explained variables is assumed to be the 
same both cross-sectionally and over time.  Unlike FEM, under REM, the error element 
is a random disturbance that is constant for every observation in a specified sample (for a 
given bank) but is random across samples. The individual particular disturbance is only 
one component of the total disturbance term. 
Brooks (2008) explains this model by reporting that the error term (disturbance term uit) 
can be divided into individual specific effects μi, and the ‘remainder disturbance’ vit. The 
‘remainder disturbance’ varies over time and encapsulates all remaining unexplained 
errors about (yit ). Therefore, the error term can be written as  
uit = μi + vit    
Brook (2008) also explains the implications of this assumption by stating that instead of 
dealing with α as fixed, the model assumes that the intercepts for each single cross- 
sectional unit are raised from a common intercept α (which is equal for all cross-sectional 
units and over time) plus a random variable vi that varies across cross-sectional entities 
but is still constant over time. Therefore, vi quantifies the random deviation of each cross 
section’s intercept term from the overall intercept term α for all the individuals. Gujarati 
(2004) reports that individual error components are assumed not to be correlated together 
and are not auto-correlated through neither time series nor cross-sectional entities. 
REM can be explained by the following equation 
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yit = α + βxit + μi + vit      (4) 
Where: 
Yit: is the dependent variable. 
α: is the intercept term. 
β: is the vector of coefficients. 
Xit: is the vector of k explanatory variables. 
μi: the random error term presented in individual specific effect or, 
vit: the ‘remainder disturbance’ presented as an unobserved bank-specific factor. 
t: time period 1, …..,T 
i: vector coefficient of X regressors 1, . . . , N 
Gujarati (2003) also states that the Generalised Least Square (GLS) is applied to estimate 
the REM, as it takes into account the different correlation structure of the error term in 
the REM. If this correlation is not taken into consideration and REM is estimated by OLS, 
the findings will be inefficient. 
As with all approaches to analysis, the REM has a major drawback due to its nature to 
only be suitably applied when the disturbance term uit (both μi and vit) is uncorrelated 
with all of the explanatory variables. Therefore, REM is suitable to use only if the 
composite error terms are uncorrelated. Otherwise, FEM model is preferable (Brooks 
2008). 
To get the final answer on the nature of the relationship between the variables, in other 
words, to validate either the FEM or the REM, Hausman’s test is used to identify the 
hypothesis that needs to be applied. If the null hypothesis is rejected, this means that the 
REM is not suitable and, in this case, we accept the FEM. In contrast, if the null 
hypothesis is accepted, this means that the REM is suitable for estimating the model 
variables and should be accepted. 
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In addition, when applying the panel data technique, we have two alternatives: balanced 
panel or unbalanced panel techniques. According to Gujarati (2004), if each cross-
sectional entity has the same number of time series observations, then this type of panel 
data is called a balanced panel. On the other hand, if the number of observations varies 
among panel entities, this type of panel data, Gujarati explain, is called an unbalanced 
panel. As the number of observations among Sudanese Islamic banks is varied, this 
research uses unbalanced panel data. 
It may be worth mentioning that, as with any other type of methodology, panel data 
techniques have some limitation. Brooks (2008) states that the limitation of panel data is 
due to the average values of the variables and that the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables is assumed to be constant both over time and over all of the 
cross-sectional units in the sample. This is the case even if the varying value of the 
intercepts allow the average values to be different. However, he reports that using panel 
data technique remains a better option than estimating separate time-series regressions 
for each entity or estimating separate cross-sectional regressions for each period of time. 
Accordingly, the efficiency gains from using panel data compensate for any bias that may 
occur from the estimated parameter. 
6.4 Model Specification  
Based on the previously mentioned explanation of pooling and panel estimation 
approaches, the researcher create the following three models which she uses to investigate 
the impact of profitability determinants on ROA and ROE of Sudanese Islamic banks. 
The first model applies the pooled regression method on the examined dataset. This model 
implies that the average value of the independent variables, the intercept term and the 
coefficients of all the explanatory variables are constant over the study period (2005-
2013) and across the 27 Sudanese Islamic banks. This model is represented as follows:  
Eq. 1.1. ROA as the dependent variable –  
 ROAit = α +  βTypeit + βAgeit+  βSpecialisedit+ βTotassit+ βCapad1it+ βLiq2it+ 
βCredr1it+ βLever2it+ βOver2it+ Mgt1+ βAssut1it+ βPLSit + βMurabit+ βSLMit+ uit 
Eq.1.2. ROE as the dependent variable –  
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Bank ROEit = α +  βTypeit + βAgeit+ βSpecialisedit+ βTotassit+ βCapad1it+ βLiq2it+ 
βCredr1it+ βLever2it+ βOver2it+ Mgt1+ βAssut1it+ βPLSit + βMurabit+ βSLMit + uit 
Where  
t = time period 1, …..,T, (2005-2013) 
i = vector coefficient of 1, 2, 3 . . . , N, where N= 27 banks 
The second model applies the Fixed Effect Model. It assumes that there are different 
average intercept terms for each Sudanese Islamic banks and that these intercepts are 
constant over time. Furthermore, the FEM proposes that the slope coefficient is constant 
across the 27 banks. It also assumes that the error term μit is varied over the study period 
and across the 27 banks, encapsulating everything that remains unexplained and affects 
ROA and ROE. Accordingly, the equation can be written as follows: 
Eq.2.1. ROA as the dependent variable –  
Bank ROAit = βCredr1it+ βLever2it+ βOver2it+ Mgt1+ βAssut1it+ βPLSit + 
βMurabit+ βSLMit+μit   
Eq. 2.2. ROE as the dependent variable –  
Bank ROEit = βCredr1it+ βLever2it+ βOver2it+ Mgt1+ βAssut1it+ βPLSit + 
βMurabit+ βSLMit+μit 
Where: 
t = time period 1, …..,T, (2005-2013) 
i = vector coefficient of 1, 2, 3 . . . , N, where N= 27 banks 
When testing for FEM, we test the following hypothesis: 
H0: μ1 = μ2 = · · · = μN 
H1: μ1 ≠ μ2 ≠ · · · ≠ μN 
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The third model applies the Random Effects Model. It assumes that there are different 
intercept terms for each Sudanese bank and that these intercepts are constant over time. 
Again, the relationship between the explanatory and explained variables is assumed to be 
the same both cross the 27 Sudanese banks and during 2005-2007. It also assumes that 
the error element is a random disturbance that is constant for every observation in each 
bank but is random across the Sudanese banks. The individual particular disturbance is 
only one component of the total disturbance term. In other words, the disturbance term 
uit is divided into individual specific effects μi, and the ‘remainder disturbance’ vit. The 
‘remainder disturbance’ for Sudanese banks is assumed to be varied during the study 
period and encapsulates all remaining unexplained errors about ROA and ROE. The 
equation can be written as follows: 
Eq. 3.1. ROA as the dependent variable –  
Bank ROAit = βCredr1it+ βLever2it+ βOver2it+ Mgt1+ βAssut1it+ βPLSit + 
βMurabit+βSLMit+μi+vit  
Eq. 3.2 ROE as the dependent variable –  
 Bank ROEit = βCredr1it+ βLever2it+ βOver2it+ Mgt1+ βAssut1it+ βPLSit + 
βMurabit+ βSLMit+μi+vit    
Where: 
μi : the random error term presented in individual specific effect or, 
vit : the ‘remainder disturbance’ presented as an unobserved bank-specific factor. 
Table 6.1 provides a full set of variables and their notions, as used in the models. 
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Table 6.1: Variables and Notions 
Variable name Notion  
Return on Assets ROA 
Return on Equity ROE 
Bank Type Type 
Bank Age Age 
Specialisation Specialised 
Size Totass 
Capitalisation  Capad1 
Liquidity  Liq2 
Credit Risk Credr1 
Leverage  Lever2 
Operational efficiency  Mgt1 
Staff expenses Over2 
Assets Utilisation Assut1 
Profit and Loss Sharing PLS 
Non-Profit and Loss Sharing Murab 
Salam  SLM 
 
6.5. Operational Definitions of the Variables: 
This section specifies the operational definition of each variable included in the analyses.  
6.5.1. The Dependent Variables 
Dependent variables presented, ROA and ROE, are used to measure bank profitability. 
Although there are other profitability measures, such as net interest margin and return on 
capital, such measures are not used in this study, either because they are insignificant for 
the study objective, which aims to gain a comprehensive insight view of general 
performance measures, or because they are not applicable to Islamic banking industry. 
The following are operational definitions and justification for each profitability measure. 
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6.5.1.1 Return on Assets (ROA):  
As mentioned, ROA is measured by dividing net after taxes income over total assets. It 
has been chosen as a profitability measure because it represents a general and 
comprehensive measure of bank profitability and overall performance. In addition, it 
echoes bank capability to achieve a return from its total operations on its sources of funds. 
Therefore, it reflects the management's ability to utilise the banks' financial resources to 
create profits.  
6.5.1.2. Return on Equity (ROE) 
Return on Equity is measured by dividing the banks' net after taxes income by its total 
equity. It represents a measure of how much profit a bank has generated on funds supplied 
by shareholders. In other words, it expresses the profit earned per unit of currency of 
equity.  
Bashir (1999) and Alkassim (2005) report that ROE reflects the efficiency of bank 
management in using shareholders’ investment. Samad and Hassan (2000) report that the 
higher the ROE, the more competent is the managerial performance and consequently 
bank's performance.  
It may be worth mentioning that using ROA and ROE as profitability measures gives 
deeper integrated measures covering both management efficiency and shareholders’ and 
regulators’ interest. This will certainly create a comprehensive picture of the performance 
of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
6.5.2. The Independent Variables  
Literature divides explanatory variables into three different categories, namely bank-
specific determinants, industry specific determinants and macroeconomic determinants 
of commercial bank profitability (see Guru et al., 2002 and Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2009). As this study focuses on a single country, the researcher excludes the 
macroeconomic variables. This is due to the fact that such variables gain more importance 
when undertaking multi countries study where the macroeconomic determinants and 
consequently the economic conditions are varied. Accordingly, this study focuses on 
bank-specific and industry-specific determinants. Bank specific determinants are 
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capitalisation, liquidity, credit risk, leverage, operational efficiency, staff expenses, assets 
utilisation, profit and loss sharing, non-profit and loss sharing and Salam mode of finance. 
The last three determinants are related to Islamic banking industry only, as traditional 
banks do not invest their money in such modes of finance. In contrast, industry specific 
determinants are bank size, bank age and bank type. As has been mentioned in the 
literature review, bank type examines the impact of ownership and specialisation on the 
performance of Sudanese Islamic banks. The following is the operational definition of 
each variable: 
6.5.2.1. Capitalisation  
Following Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Guru et al., (2002), Flamini et al., (2009), Karim 
et al., (2010) and Qudah and Jaradat (2013), the researcher uses total equity to total assets 
as main capitalisation measure. This measure is chosen because it gives broader meaning 
for capitalisation than capital to assets ratio. This is because total equity to total assets 
takes into consideration total reserve. However, following Chirwa (2003) and Goddard et 
al., (2004), capital to assets ratio is used for robustness test so as to assert the finding from 
total equity to total assets.  
6.5.2.2. Liquidity  
Following Samad and Hassan (2000), the study uses the most popular liquidity ratio, 
current assets to current liability, as a proxy for liquidity measure. By choosing this 
measure the researcher focuses on the relationship between the ability of banks to pay 
their current liability from current assets on the one hand, and banks' profitability on the 
other hand. Current assets are defined by this study as cash, cash equivalents, marketable 
securities, receivables and inventory. Meanwhile, current liabilities cover notes payable, 
current portion of term debt, payables and accrued expenses. Additionally, following the 
same study of Samad and Hassan (2000), the study uses current assets to total assets for 
robustness test to ascertain findings from current assets to current liability ratio. 
6.5.2.3. Credit Risk 
Following Ali et al., (2011), loan loss provision to total loan is used as a proxy for credit 
risk in the main model. For robustness check, the study follows Hassan and Bashir (2003), 
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who use loan loss provision to total assets. It may be worth mentioning that although a 
non-performing loan is a better measure of credit risk, Sudanese Islamic Banks do not 
disclose data on this item, which makes it impossible for the researcher to use it. 
Nevertheless, loan loss provision based measures are still a good indicator for credit risk 
as they represent the amount created by banks to meet non-performing loans. Creation 
and any adjustment of loan loss provision are based on the amount of non-performing 
loans. Accordingly, measures based on loan loss provision are reliable, as well as widely 
used, in literature.  
6.5.2.4. Leverage  
To measure leverage of Sudanese Islamic Banks the study follows Bashir (2003) who 
uses total liability to total assets. This ratio is chosen because it is a more comprehensive 
measure of leverage than the long-term liability to total equity ratio. Nevertheless, the 
study also follows Samad and Hassan (2000) by using long-term liability to total equity 
for robustness check.  
6.5.2.5. Operational Efficiency  
Total cost to total income is used to measure management efficiency, because of the 
relevant relationship between the numerator and denominator. For robustness check, the 
total cost to total assets is used, as have been widely used in the literature (see Haron, 
1996; Guru et al., 2002; Athanasoglou et al., 2006; Srairi, 2009; Ben-Khedhiri, 2009 and 
Heffernan and Fu, 2010).  
6.5.2.6. Staff Expenses 
Following Naceur (2003), Bashir (2003), Alkassim (2005) and Izhar and Asutaya (2007), 
this study uses the ratio of salaries to total expenses to measure and assess the impact of 
overheads expenses on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic banks. Overheads expenses 
consist of staff expenses, which comprise salaries and other employee benefits including 
staff training and expenses related to pension. Overheads to total expenses are used in the 
main model because of the relevant relationship between the two expenses. However, as 
human resources are considered an asset, the study also follows Bashir (2003), Izhar and 
Asutaya (2007) and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2008) who all use overheads to total assets, 
which this study will use for robustness check. 
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6.5.2.7. Assets Utilisation 
The study uses total income to total assets to measure assets utilisation. Although 
operating income to total assets, which is used by Hassan and Bashir (2003) and Ali et 
al., (2011), is a better measure for assets utilisation, the researcher was unable to use it. 
This is due to the reason that Sudanese banks are neither disclose the value of their 
operating income nor follow a consistent way in presenting their financial data, which 
limits the researcher’s ability to calculate this figure. However, total income to total assets 
is still able to reflect how effective a bank management is in the use of their assets. 
6.5.2.8. Profit and Loss Sharing vs Non-PLS 
To identify a suitable ratio for measuring the contribution of each type of finance, the 
researcher follows Samad and Hassan (2000) who use the ratio of Mudaraba-
Musharaka/Total Investment to measure Malaysian Islamic banks’ commitment to the 
economy. Yet the denominator of this ratio seems to need some adjustments for two 
reasons. Firstly, total investment is so large when comparing it with the numerator. 
Therefore, calculating the ratio following Samad and Hassan (2000) will lead to ultrafine 
(very small) values. Secondly, the total investment seems to be so general with the study 
aim, which is the comparison between the two types of finance in the context of the total 
modes of finance, not the total investment that the banks deal with.  
Therefore, the researcher uses the ratio of PLS modes of finance (Modarabah and 
Mosharakah) to total modes of finance, and the ratio of Morabahah to total modes of 
finance, to measure the impact of each type of finance on the profitability of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks. Calculating the ratio this way makes the measure more specific as well as 
helping in realising the research aims.   
6.5.2.9. Commitment to the Agricultural Sector (Salam) 
It has been mentioned previously that Salam is an advance contract of purchasing certain 
agricultural production. As it is well known that Sudan has extended fertile lands and 
climatic environment suitable for cultivation, the study aims to discover to which extent 
the Sundanese banking industry benefits from, and serves, the agricultural sector. 
Following the same above argument on choosing the total mode of finance as the 
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denominator, the researcher uses the ratio of Salam to total modes of finance to measure 
and assess the impact of this mode of finance to the profitability of the studied banks. 
6.5.2.10. Bank Size 
To measure the impact of bank size, the researcher relies mostly on the finance literature 
that uses total assets of the banks as a proxy for bank size (see Chirwa, 2003; Holden and 
EL-Bannany, 2004 and Dietrich and Wanzenried 2009).  
6.5.2.11. Bank Age 
Following Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009) the researcher classifies banks into three 
different groups according to their age. The first group consists of oldest banks group, 
which consists of seven banks, all founded before 1983. The second group is the middle 
age banks group and contains fourteen banks, which are those found between 1984 and 
1999. The third group is composed of newly established banks and consists of six banks 
which have been established after 2000.  
6.5.2.12. Bank Type   
The model of this study investigates the relationship between bank type in terms of 
ownership and specialisation. 
In terms of ownership, the model investigates the relevance of bank ownership, whether 
private or state-owned, to the profitability of the Islamic banks studied. Banks are 
classified as state or private banks according to the percentage of shares acquired by the 
owner. 50% has been used as the border percentage in this classification. Accordingly, a 
bank is considered as a state bank when the public sector owns 50%, and above, of their 
shares, and vice versa. Table 6.1 shows the number of each type of banks according to 
this classification. In all, there are 10 state banks and 17 private banks. 
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Table 6:2 Classification of Banks Under-Study, 2005-2013 
Bank type Number of banks  % 
State banks 10 37% 
Private banks 17 63% 
Total 27 100% 
 
To measure the impact of ownership on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks, the 
study uses a dummy for ownership variable. Accordingly, a dummy value of zero is used 
when a bank is a state bank, whilst dummy of one is used when a bank is private. 
To find out whether specialised or non-specialised banks are more profitable, the 
researcher also follows Heffernan and Fu (2010), who use dummy value of 2 when the 
bank is not specialised and dummy value of three when the bank is specialised. 
To sum up, Table 6.3 provides a full set of variables, with their measures and notions, as 
used in the model estimation. 
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Table 6.2: Variables, Measures and Notions  
Variable name Measure  Notion  
Return on Assets Net profit to Total Assets ROA 
Return on Equity Net profit to Total Equity ROE 
Bank Type Dummy Variable Type 
Bank Age Dummy Variable Age 
Specialisation Specialised  Specialised 
Size Dummy Variable totass 
Capitalisation  Total Equity to Total Assets Capad1 
Liquidity  Current Assets to Current Liability Liq2 
Credit Risk Loan Loss Provision to Total Loan Credr1 
Leverage  Total Liability to Total assets Lever2 
Operational efficiency  Total Cost to Total Income Mgt1 
Staff expenses Overhead to Total expenses  Over2 
Assets Utilisation Operating Income to Total Assets Assut1 
Profit and Loss Sharing Musharakah and Modarabah to Total 
modes of finance 
PLS 
Non-Profit and Loss Sharing Morabahah to Total Modes of 
Finance 
Murab 
Salam  Salam to Total Modes of Finance SLM 
 
Finally, it may be worth mentioning that sometimes there is no fairly conclusive 
separation between the variables used. Athanasoglou et al., (2005) state that sometimes 
there are multicollinearity issues between the variables, which makes some of them 
principally proxy to the same profitability determinant. They also report that studies on 
banks’ profitability need to reasonably consider these issues so as to gain a better insight 
into the factors influencing banks' profitability. To reduce such overlapping between 
variables and create better insight into the impact of each determinant on the performance 
of the banks, the study uses different measures for robustness check so as to be more able 
to assert and ascertain the impact of each variable on the performance of these banks.   
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6.6. Summary 
This chapter reviews the methodological approaches that are used to estimate the key 
determinants of the banking industry in Sudan from 2005 until 2013. It also outlines the 
three steps and alternatives of parametric linear functional form employed by the 
researcher to measure the impact of each profitability factor.  
Furthermore, this chapter describes the dataset and variables used for the empirical 
analysis, including the dependent variables presented in profitability measures and the 
independent variables presented in profitability determinants. The next chapter provides 
the results of the empirical part of the first model of this study. 
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Chapter Seven 
Empirical Research Findings on Profitability determinants 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the determinants of banks' profitability in 
the Sudanese Islamic Banking industry. The empirical evidence shows the relationship 
between profitability, as measured by ROA and ROE, and the targeted profitability 
determinants. First, the tests are undertaken for the entire sample of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks. Second, the tests are undertaken for both types of banks: state and private banks. 
The analyses establish which determinant, amongst the all potential determinants of 
performance, are important. 
7.2. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics provide insights into the characteristics of a studied sample. In Table 
7.1, the descriptive statistics for the variables of the entire studied sample are presented. 
Table 7.2 contains the mean values and standard deviation of all studied variables for 
state and private banks.  
The mean value describes the mathematical average of the variables, while the standard 
deviation shows the variability in a data set. A smaller standard deviation indicates that 
the variables in a dataset are much closer to the mean of the dataset; while higher values 
of standard deviation indicate that the variables in the dataset are more dispersed from the 
mean value. Table 7.1 also reports the minimum and the maximum values for each 
dataset.   
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables for all 
Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Max  Min  No of Obs. 
ROA 0.0267 0.0346 0.3141 -0.0896 186 
ROE 0.8745 5.5230 57.1907 -0.6215 185 
Type 0.6720  0.4707 1.0000  0.0000 186 
Age 6.9624  0.6687 8.0000 6.0000 186 
Specialised 4.1901 1.1254 5.0000 2.0000 424 
Size 1.3400 1.6621 9.17E+09 46978 186 
Capad1 0.2262 0.1880 1.0000 0.0000 186 
Liq2 1.9632 1.3653  15.250 1.0033 185 
Credr1 0.0621 0.0741 0.4072 0.0000 186 
Lever2 0.5723 0.1915 0.9799 0.0000 186 
Mgt1 0.6877 0.2966 2.7849  0.0983 186 
Over2 0.4253 0.1565 1.0738 0.0000 186 
Assut1 0.0804 0.0339 0.3619 0.0252 186 
PLS 0.3728 0.3242 1.0000 0.0000 172 
Murab 0.4525  0.2866  1.0000 0.0000 172 
SLM 0.0165         0.0402  0.3074 0.0000 172 
Source: calculated by the author from banks’ annual reports. 
Table 7.1 shows that ROE has remarkably higher mean and standard deviation than ROA. 
The higher mean of ROE implies that Sudanese Islamic banks, on average, were able to 
generate higher returns on funds supplied by shareholders than on bank's financial 
resources. This could be an indication of the impact of leverage on the profitability of 
these banks.  
Furthermore, bank size and liquidity appear to have the highest mean and standard 
deviation, whilst credit risk, assets utilisation and Salam have the lowest mean and 
standard deviation. In addition, the table shows that there is a big difference in terms of 
ROE, bank size, liquidity, operational efficiency and overhead expenses ratio comparing 
with other variables (as seen from the Min and Max values).  
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Table 7.2, on the other hand, shows that the mean values of ROA and ROE for Sudanese 
private banks are higher compared to the mean values of Sudanese State banks: the 
difference in average is more remarkable when performance is measured by ROE. In 
addition, the standard deviation for the two sets of banks could be said to be almost 
identical, especially when profitability is measured by ROA. Furthermore, state-owned 
banks are characterised by higher standard deviation, when profitability is measured by 
ROE. Higher profitability of private banks, in contrast to state banks, can be justified by 
the higher average measures, as presented in Table 7.2. These figures show that Sudanese 
private banks are characterised by better average performance indicators in almost all 
determinants.  
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Table 7.2: Mean Values of all Studied Variables for State and Private Banks 
Variable Name State Banks Private Banks 
 
ROA 0.0119 
(0.0208) 
 0.0342 
(0.0375) 
ROE 0.0066 
(0.5325) 
 0.1624 
(0.1135) 
AGE 6.7119 
(0.6446) 
 7.0800 
(0.6551) 
Specialised 3.0164 
(0.9915) 
 4.8800 
  (0.3935) 
Size 1.72E+09 
(2.15E+09) 
 1.17E+09 
(1.36E+09) 
Capad1  0.2053 
(0.1890) 
 0.2378 
(0.1883) 
Liq2  1.7173 
(0.6746) 
                     2.0904  
                     (1.5880) 
Credr1 0.0858 
(0.0935) 
 0.0540 
 (0.0643) 
Lever2 0.6226 
(0.1817) 
 0.5472 
(0.1930) 
Mgt1 0.8379 
(0.3443) 
 0.6091 
(0.2335) 
Over 0.4187 
(0.1959) 
 0.4264 
(0.1353) 
Assut 0.0688 
(0.0235) 
0.0864 
(0.0366) 
PLS  0.2571 
(0.2362) 
 0.4024 
(0.3383) 
Murabh 0.5472 
(0.2309) 
0.4254 
(0.2970) 
SLM  0.0111 
(0.0162) 
0.0189 
(0.0462) 
* Numbers without brackets are the mean values of the variables, whereas numbers in 
brackets are standard deviations.  
From the Table above, it could be interpreted that, since the mean value of the 
capitalisation ratio is slightly higher for private banks than state-owned banks, private 
banks are more superior to state-owned banks with regards capital adequacy. This could 
be seen as reflecting the ability of private banks diversify their business as well as 
representing a better general financial collateral for private banks. Secondly, the mean 
value of liquidity ratio of private banks, as presented above, could be seen to be higher 
than the mean value of the equivalent ratio for state banks. This may be interpreted as 
indicating that private banks maintain a sufficient amount of liquidity to meet their 
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ongoing commitments compared to state banks. Thirdly, the mean value of the leverage 
ratio of private banks is lower than the mean value of state banks. This could also be 
interpreted to mean that in the case of loss or liquidation, the shareholders of private banks 
are comparatively more protected than the owners (the state in this instance) of state 
banks. Fourthly, the mean value of the operational efficiency ratio of private banks is by 
far less than the corresponding ratio for state banks. This ratio could possibly represent 
one of the key determinants of the superiority of the performance of private banks over 
their equivalent counterpart. This is a clear indicator that the management of private banks 
are able to manage their operational expenses than the management of state banks. Lastly, 
the mean value of assets utilisation of private banks is higher than the mean value of the 
equivalent ratio of state banks. This indicates that private banks are more efficient in using 
their resources than state banks. 
The mean values of all studied variables for state and private banks in Table 7.2 also show 
that the mean values of credit risk are notably higher for state banks than the private one. 
Although this could indicate that state banks, in average, have a sufficient loan loss 
provisions against potential losses than their private counterpart, it could also indicate 
that doubtful debt of state banks often turn into bad debt. 
Additionally, the Table shows that the mean value of staff expenses and total assets are 
almost equal for the two sets of banks.  Equality in the mean values of staff expenses may 
indicate that both types of banks could have the same opportunity to employ a similar 
level of professionals and expertise (staff). Furthermore, the mean values of PLS, non-
PLS and Salam modes of finance show that private banks are more committed to the main 
principle of Islamic finance (profit and loss sharing) as well as to aiding the agricultural 
sector. Though the difference in the mean value of Salam mode of finance across both 
banks could be viewed as insignificant, the mean value of non-PLS mode of finance, as 
measured by Murabaha, on the other hand, is higher for state banks. This could be 
interpreted to mean that state banks are more committed to non-PLS modes of finance 
than private banks.  
Finally, the standard deviations for most of the private banks’ variables are lower than 
those for state banks, reflecting that variations among the individual banks are smaller for 
private banks than those for state banks. 
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7.3. Estimated Results Using the Pooled Estimation Method for the Entire Sample  
In this section of the study, the researcher examines the impact of the set of profitability 
determinants on the entire sample of Sudanese Islamic Banks, using pooled estimation 
method. The FEM is proved to be unsuitable for the analysis as the likelihood ratio test 
shows that the Fixed Effect variable is redundant (insignificant) for the equations (0.5813 
for ROA and 0.5251 for ROE). The alternative hypothesis (H1: μ1 ≠ μ2 ≠ · · · ≠ μn) is 
rejected at 10% and the null hypothesis (H0: μ1 = μ2 = ··· = μn) and the OLS are 
consequently accepted for the full sample.  
Table 7.3 shows the regression results for the two dependent variables (ROA and ROE) 
using the Poled Estimation Method.  
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Table 7.3: Estimated Coefficient and their signs for the entire sample  
Independent 
Variables 
ROA                 ROE 
Constant 
 
0.1416*** 
(0.0282) 
-8.1045 
(10.246) 
Age 
 
-0.0087 *** 
(0.0027) 
0.2158 
(0.9742) 
Type 
 
0.0250*** 
(0.0078) 
-1.8078 
(2.8324) 
Specialised 
 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0033) 
1.1569 
(1.2056) 
 Size 
 
-1.21E-12 
(1.14E-12) 
4.95E-11 
(4.14E-10) 
Capitalisation 
 
0.0191* 
(0.0116) 
0.9854 
(4.1986) 
 Liquidity 
 
-0.0021 
(0.0014) 
0.0256 
(0.4978) 
 Credit risk 
 
0.0015 
(0.0209) 
-4.1016 
(7.6219) 
 Leverage 
 
-0.0364*** 
(0.0125) 
1.7983 
(4.5465) 
 Opera effici 
 
-0.0454*** 
(0.0068) 
0.6504 
(2.4514) 
 Overhead 
 
-0.0111 
(0.0115) 
0.8852 
(4.1725) 
Assuts 
 
0.3158*** 
(0.0693) 
5.1231 
(25.1601) 
 PLS 
 
0.0146* 
(0.0080) 
5.0408* 
(2.9067) 
 Salam 
 
-0.0143 
(0.0334) 
-0.9601 
(12.1191) 
Murabahah 
 
0.0017 
(0.0085) 
-0.3363 
(3.1017) 
R2 0.6466 0.0087 
No of Obs 162 162 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. *, **and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. 
According to Table 7.3, the estimated value of adjusted R2 for ROA is 64.66, showing 
that if 1% change occurred in all independent variables, ROA will consequently change 
by 64.66% approximately. The estimated value of R2   for ROE is 0.0087, which means 
that if 1% change occurred in all independent variables, ROA will consequently change 
by only 0.87%.  
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A Higher value of adjusted R2 resulting from the application of the pooled estimation 
method on the first equation, when profitability is measured by ROA, reveal that the 
variability in ROA of Sudanese Islamic Banks is highly explained by the linear correlation 
between this profitability measure and the set of profitability determinants employed in 
this study. On the other hand, the small value of adjusted R2 resulting from the application 
of the pooled estimation method, when the profitability is measured by ROE, as well as 
the insignificant relationship between ROE and the independent variables, can be justified 
by the reason that the impact of these determinants on ROE of Sudanese state and private 
banks are different. This could be the reason of the insignificant impact when the 
regression is applied on the aggregated data of the two types of banks. This can also be 
seen from the variation in the mean value of the ROE of the two types of banks in Table 
7.2. 
Furthermore, Table 7.3 indicate that assets utilisation, as measured by total income to 
total assets, has highly positive and significant impact, at 1% level of significance, on 
ROA. If assets utilisation of Sudanese Islamic Banks improved by 1%, ROA of these 
banks will increase by 31.58%. This finding indicates that this determinant plays a highly 
influential role in improving the profits of Sudanese Islamic Banks. This means that any 
improvement in the internal monitoring and future planning concerning optimal use of 
assets will increase the profitability of Sudanese Islamic banks. This finding is in line 
with earlier findings of Bourke (1989) and those of Lai and Li (2014), who both prove 
positive impact of assets utilisation on banks’ profitability. 
In the Islamic Banking context, this result is consistent with the empirical result of Srairi 
(2010) and Ali et al., (2011), which establishes the existence of a positive and significant 
impact of assets utilisation on Islamic Banks’ profitability. 
On the other hand, assets utilisation is shown to have an insignificant impact on ROE. In 
the Islamic Banking context, this result is consistent with the empirical result of Akhtar 
et al., (2011), which establishes the existence of an insignificant impact of assets 
utilisation on Islamic Banks’ profitability. 
In line with Bourke (1989), the researcher proves a negative and highly significant 
relationship between the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks, when measured by 
ROA, and the operational efficiency of these banks. If the ratio of Total Cost to Total 
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Income increased by 1%, ROA of Sudanese Banks will decrease by 04.54%. This finding 
could be justified, based on the finding of Ramadan (2011), who report that inverse 
relationship between profitability and operational efficiency of banks happens when these 
institutions are unable to transfer their expenses to their customers. This finding is also 
contradicted with the finding of Molyneux and Thornton (1992), who prove a positive 
association between this variable and the profitability of European Banking Sector.  
In the context of the Islamic Banking industry, this finding is in line with the finding of 
Srairi (2010), who proves an inverse relationship between profitability and operational 
efficiency within Gulf Countries’ Islamic Banks. At the same time, it is contradicted with 
the finding of Noor and Ahmad (2011), who prove a positive and significant relation 
between this determinant and the profitability of the world Islamic Banks from 1992 to 
2009. 
Contradiction in the findings on assets utilisation and operational efficiency could be 
related to the measure used for operational efficiency (total income). It may be possible 
that operating income would give a more consistent result. However, given that it is 
difficult to obtain this figure from the annual reports of Sudanese Islamic banks, who 
neither disclose their operating income nor provide enough consistent data that could 
enable one calculate the indicator, the researcher based her analysis on total income.  
Findings on the impact of bank age on ROA shows high and significant adverse 
relationship between the two variables. This means that the newly established group of 
banks are more profitable than both old and middle aged banks, showing that newly 
established banks are able to invest in high-profit opportunities. This is in line with the 
earlier findings of Beck et al., (2005) and Beck and Kunt (2006) who both prove that 
newly established Nigerian banks are financially more profitable the old one, reflecting 
their ability to engage in new profit opportunities. On the other hand, the middle-aged 
group of banks are more profitable than old Sudanese Islamic Banks. This finding 
contradicts with those of Aburime (2008), who reports that during their first years, newly 
founded banks are not operationally profitable as they put their efforts into raising their 
market share rather than on increasing their profitability.  
In contrast, the finding of the impact of bank age on ROE of Sudanese banking Industry 
shows a positive but insignificant correlation between the two variables. This finding is 
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in line with that of Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009), who establish that bank age does not 
significantly impact the profitability of banks in Switzerland.  
The impact of leverage, as measured by the ratio of debt to equity ratio, is found to be 
negative and highly significant at less than 1%, when profitability is measured by ROA. 
According to Table 7.3, if leverage of Sudanese Islamic banks increases by 1%, their 
profitability will decrease by 3.64%. This could be interpreted according to Aburime 
(2008) and Qudah and Jaradat (2013), who suggest that negative association between 
leverage and profitability is related to the managements’ capacity in forecasting, avoiding, 
monitoring and managing the risks associated with leverage. Accordingly, this may 
indicate that the management of Sudanese Islamic banks lack the capability to predict and 
avoid the risks associated with leverage. Referring to Guru (2002), Athanasoglou et al., 
(2005) and Aburime (2008), this could have great negative impact on Sudanese Islamic 
Banks’ security and capability to resist unexpected financial shock. This finding is 
contradicted by the earlier findings of Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and the later 
findings of Goddard et al., (2004) and Al-Tamimi (2005), which prove the positive and 
statistically significant relationship between profitability and leverage.  
In the Islamic Banking context, this is consistent with the findings of Izhar and Asutaya 
(2007), who establish a negative and significant relationship between leverage and 
profitability of Muamalat Islamic bank in Indonesia.  
On the other hand, the impact of leverage on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks, 
as measured by ROE, is found to be insignificant. This is in line with the findings of 
Qudah and Jaradat (2013), who prove the negative and insignificant relationship between 
profitability and leverage of Jordanian Islamic banks. 
Findings on the impact of ownership reveal a positive and highly significant relationship 
between this factor and the profitability of Sudanese banks. It also shows that private 
banks are more profitable than state banks. This superiority in the performance of private 
banks can be explained by the excellence of private banks in operational efficiency ratio, 
leverage, liquidity, capitalisation, and assets utilisation, as shown from the comparison of 
their descriptive statistic in Table 7.2. Furthermore, it can be justified by the argument of 
Flamini et al., (2009) and Athanasoglou et al., (2005), who report that as state banks are 
in charge of public and social commitments, they may have objectives other than profit 
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maximisation. This finding is in line with the earlier findings of Short (1979) and the later 
findings of Iannotta et al., (2006) who prove that state-owned banks are less profitable 
than private banks.  
Additionally, the result shows a high significant adverse relationship between 
specialisation and profitability of banks, implying that specialised banks are less 
profitable than non-specialised ones. This finding may possibly, according to Heffernan 
and Fu (2010), mean that specialised banks lose profit opportunities due to their limited 
areas of investment. This finding is contradicted by the findings of Heffernan and Fu 
(2010) with regards the Chinese banking system, which proves that specialised banks are 
more profitable than other Chinese banks. 
Finding on the impact of overhead to total expenses is proved to be negatively and 
significantly related to profitability when measured by ROA. This finding could indicate 
that Sudanese Islamic Banks are to some extent unable to transfer their overheads to users 
of their financial services. This finding is supported by most literature which confirms the 
negative relationship between this determinant and profitability, assuming that efficient 
banks are supposed to reduce expenses for better profitability (see Bourke, 1989 and 
Hassan and Bashir, 2003). On the other hand, this is opposed to the findings of Haslem 
(1968), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Naceur (2003) and Bourke (1989) who prove 
positive and significant correlations between these two determinants.  
Findings on the impact of overhead expenses on ROE proves a positive and insignificant 
relationship exists between these indicators, implying that increasing staff expense of 
Sudanese Islamic banks will increase the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
However, the increase is limited. In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is consistent 
with findings of Hassan and Bashir (2003) and Izhar and Asutaya (2007), who establish 
a positive insignificant relationship between the indicators.  
Table 7.3 also indicates that capitalisation, as measured by total equity to total assets, has 
a positive and significant impact on ROA at 10% level of significance. Each 1% increase 
in capital will increase ROA by 1.9%. This relationship reflects the banks’ ability to 
control financial risk exposure and to absorb losses. It also reflects that these banks are 
characterised by high financial collateral (security) which, according to Bashir (1999) and 
Sangmi and Nazir (2010), will allow them to enjoy investing in high risk but profitable 
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areas, diversifying their investment (business) through opening of new branches and 
reducing the consequences of unfavourable selection of investments. Additionally, it 
means that depositors, creditors, and investors of these banks will be protected in the case 
of loss or liquidation. This finding is consistent with those by Bourke (1989), Molynuex 
and Thorton (1992), Athanasoglou et al., (2005) and Flamini et al., (2009), who all prove 
the positive and significant impact of capitalisation on banks’ profitability. On the other 
hand, it is contradicted by the earlier literature of Short (1979), Berger (1995) and the 
later findings of Lee (2012), who suggest that lower capital ratio is linked to higher risk 
exposure, which will consequently lead to higher profit.  
On the other end, the result shows the insignificant impact of capitalisation on ROE, 
indicating that capitalisation has no impact on ROE for these banks. This is consistent 
with the findings of Alper and Anbar (2011), who studied the banking sector in Turkey. 
In the context of Islamic Banking, positive association between capitalisation and ROA 
is in line with the finding by Hassan and Bashir (2003), who establish a positive impact 
of capitalisation on the profitability of the worldwide Islamic Banks during 1994-2001. 
In contrast, the insignificant impact of capitalisation on ROE of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
is in line with Idris et al., (2011), who prove an insignificant association between 
capitalisation and the profitability of Malaysia Islamic banks. It is also in line with the 
argument of Haron (1996a), who suggests that the profitability of an Islamic Bank is not 
affected by the amount of issued capital. 
The impact of bank size is found insignificant on both ROA and ROE, meaning that the 
size of a Sudanese Islamic Bank does not affect the amount of profit gained by these 
banks. The insignificant relationship between bank size and profitability could be related 
to the effect of the high inflation rate in the Sudanese economy. Such rate minimises the 
actual value of Sudanese pound and makes the profitability of these banks more related 
to the quality of investment than the quantity of their assets.  
No significant relationship between bank size and profitability has been found in the 
previous studies (see Goddard et al., 2004, Athanasoglou et al., 2005, Atemnkenf and 
Joseph, 2006 and Lee, 2012, for instance). They all prove an insignificant association 
between profitability and bank size. On the other hand, it is contradicted by the earlier 
finding of Short (1979) and the later findings of Alkassim (2005) and Flamini et al., 
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(2009), who establish a positive and significant relationship between bank size and 
profitability. It is also contradicted by the finding of Naceur (2003), who prove a negative 
relationship exists between bank size and profitability.  
In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is consistent with the findings of Ali et al., 
(2011) and Ramadan (2011). They prove insignificant association exists between bank 
size and profitability. It is also contradicted by the findings of Karim et al., (2010), Idris 
et al., (2011), Noor and Ahmad (2011) and Qudah and Jaradat (2013). They establish a 
positive and significant relationship between this determinant and profitability. A further 
contradiction is shown by the empirical results of Javaid et al., (2011) and Akhtar (2011). 
They prove a negative correlation between bank size and profitability exists. 
Furthermore, credit risk is found to have no impact on the two measures of profitability. 
This finding could be interpreted, following the argument of Hassan and Bashir (2003), 
to imply that credit risk of Islamic banks contribute modestly to banks profits because 
their investments are heavily biased towards short-term trade finance. In addition, this 
finding could also be related to the nature of Islamic banks, which base their activity on 
risk sharing with their customers. Accordingly, any increase their investment, and 
consequently profitability, is unlikely to be connected to credit risk.  
The result is also in line with the findings by AL Omar and AL-Mutairi (2008) and 
Flamini et al., (2009), who prove the insignificant relationship between profitability and 
credit risk exist. It also contradicts the findings by Athanasoglou et al., (2005), who 
suggest a negative and significant impact of credit risk on profitability. Srairi (2010) 
assert that credit risk is significantly and positively related to the profitability of 
Conventional and Islamic banks in GCC countries.  
The final internal determinant of banks' profitability in relation to both Conventional and 
Islamic banking is liquidity. The result shows the insignificant impact on profitability, 
whether it is measured by ROA or ROE. This finding could be related to the nature of 
some of the Islamic banks modes of finance, which requires no cash to proceed the 
transaction (Morabahah and Modarabah).  
In the context of Conventional banks, this finding is supported by Guru et al., (2002) and 
later by Alper and Anbar (2011), who show no significant impact of liquidity on banks’ 
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profitability. In contrast, it is inconsistent with the earlier finding of Bourke (1989) and 
the latest findings of Al-Tamimi (2005) that prove a positive and significant association 
between liquidity and profitability. In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is in 
harmony with the finding of Idris et al., (2011), who assert insignificant association exist 
between liquidity and profitability of Islamic Banks located in Malaysia. In contrast, 
Haron (1996a), Haron and Azmi (2004), Ramadan (2011) and Noor and Ahmad (2011), 
conclude a positive and significant relationship between liquidity and the profitability of 
Islamic banks. 
Turning to the profitability determinants in relation to Islamic Banking Industry, the 
regression results show that PLS modes of finance have a positive and significant 
association with both ROA and ROE. Positive correlation between profitability and PLS 
modes of finance is doubted by Haron (1996a), who claims an inverse relationship 
between profitability and PLS modes of finance, given that profit usually takes place after 
a one year of starting the project or upon its completion. However, this contradiction can 
be justified by the policy of Central Bank of Sudan, which encourages banks to use the 
Musharaka mode in financing all economic activities, as well as giving each bank the 
right to determine the Mudarib’s percentage share in the profit (Central Bank of Sudan 
Policies 2010). Such policies make Sudanese Islamic Banks able to benefit from the 
nature of PLS modes of finance, which gives banks the right to group the money provided 
by customers in one pool with equity at the pre-agreed proportion of profit or loss sharing. 
In contrast, the result also proves the insignificant relationship between non-PLS, as 
measured by Morabahah, and the two measures of profitability exist. This may possibly 
be justified by the argument advanced by Haron (2004). Haron reports that this mode of 
financing is short-term in nature and therefore less able to produce profit compared to 
long term investment. Consequently, any increasing amount of Morabah investment will 
not increase Islamic banks profitability. This finding is supported by Haron (1996a) and 
Haron (2004), who establish no significant relationship between Morabahah and the 
profitability measures.  
Findings on the impact of PLS and non-PLS modes of finance suggest that Sudanese 
Islamic Banks are more committed to PLS modes of finance than non-PLS. This 
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superiority of PLS over non-PLS is likely, according to Samad and Hassan (2000), in an 
economy where informational asymmetries, resulting from moral hazard, are smaller. 
Finally, the impact of Salam mode of finance is proved to be insignificant on both the 
ROA and ROE of Sudanese Islamic Banks. Such findings may possibly relate to the 
nature of Salam Contract, which is characterised by counter-party default risk. This 
justification is supported by the fact that the Sudanese economy is characterised by a high 
inflation rate, which may cause differences between Salam contract price and market 
price. Such price difference may encourage default risk among simple farmers. In 
addition to that, the it could be interpreted by the nature of Salam contract which is in 
some cases make it difficult for the bank to specify an accurate suitable future price as, at 
the time the goods are received by the bank the price may become lower than the expected 
price, leading to commodity price risk.  
7.4. Robustness Check 
The researcher also applies 10 robustness checks, to test the validity of the regression 
findings. To this effect, she uses different measures and omits some of the insignificant 
determinants.   
Table 7.4 and 7.5 show findings of robustness checks, which provide strong evidence to 
confirm almost all the findings of the regression result on the entire sample of Sudanese 
Islamic banks.
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Table 7.4: Robustness on the Impact of Independent Variables on ROA of the Entire Sample of Sudanese Islamic Banks   
Variables Measures 
Substitute 
Original 
Equ 
Equ1 
 
Equ2 
 
Equ3  Equ4 
 
Equ5 
 
Equ6 Equ7 Equ8 Equ9 Equ10 
Constant  0.1416*** 
(0.0282) 
0.1430*** 
(0.0027) 
0.1434*** 
(0.0270) 
0.1321*** 
(0.0262) 
 
0.1237*** 
(0.0210) 
0.1134*** 
(0.0229) 
0.1094*** 
(0.0227) 
0.1358 
(0.0311) 
0.098361 
(0.0287) 
0.1062 
(0.0260) 
0.1419 
(0.0249) 
Age   -0.0088*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0087*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0088***   
(0.0026) 
 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0025)  
-0.0079*** 
(0.0029)  
-0.0069*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.006*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0096*** 
(0.0026) 
Type  0.0250*** 
(0.0077) 
0.0248*** 
(0.0077) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0076) 
0.02467*** 
(0.0074) 
0.0265*** 
(0.0074) 
0.0207*** 
(0.0077) 
0.0216*** 
(0.0077) 
0.0227*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0253*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0285*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0232*** 
(0.0075) 
Specialised  -0.0105*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0104*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0104*** 
(0.0032) 
 
-0.0110*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0086*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.009*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0099*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0121*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0100*** 
(0.0032) 
 
TOTASS 
 
 -1.21E-12 
(1.14E-2) 
-1.28E-2 
(1.09E-2) 
-1.25E-12 
(1.09E-12) 
-1.11E-12 
(1.06E-2) 
X X X -1.35E-12 
(1.20E-12)  
 
 
6.84E-13 
(1.16E-12) 
-8.87E-14 
(1.10E-12) 
-1.85E-12 
(1.14E-12) 
 
Capad1  0.0191* 
(0.0115) 
0.0187* 
(0.0113) 
 
0.01808* 
(0.0112) 
 
0.0285*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0214** 
(0.0108) 
0.0198* 
(0.0106) 
0.0168* 
(0.0105) 
0.0153* 
(0.0124) 
0.0265*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0280*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0174 
(0.0113) 
 
LIQ2 
 
Current Ass: 
current liab 
-0.0021 
(0.0013) 
-0.0022 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.0021 
(0.0013) 
 
 0.0020 
(0.0013) 
-0.0020 
(0.0014) 
X -0.003 
(0.0026) 
 
-0.0015 
(0.0014) 
0.0001 
(0.0011) 
-0.0019 
(0.0013) 
 Total dep: tot 
Assets 
   -0.0041*** 
(0.0013) 
 
  X     
CREDR1 
 
LLP: :total 
loan 
0.0015 
(0.0209) 
0.0018 
(0.0208) 
0.0018 
(0.0207) 
 
-0.0076 
(0.0206) 
0.0033 
(0.0207) 
X X   0.0123 
(0.0215) 
0.0065 
(0.0206) 
 
 LLP: :total 
Assets 
      X -0.0869 
(0.0828) 
   
 loan :total 
Assets 
        -0.0271*** 
(0.0090) 
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Lever2 Long term 
liab: total 
equity 
-0.0364*** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0365*** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0368*** 
(0.0124)  
-0.0295*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0317*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0476*** 
(0.0122) 
 
-0.0375*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0407*** 
(0.0160) 
-0.0452*** 
(0.0131) 
 -0.0339*** 
(0.0123) 
 Total deb: 
total Assets 
         -0.0008 
(0.0014) 
 
Mgt1  -0.0454*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0455*** 
(0.0067) 
 
-0.0455*** 
(0.0066) 
 
-0.0431*** 
(0.0065) 
 
-
0.0433*** 
(0.0064) 
 
-0.0336*** 
(0.00629) 
 
-0.0356*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0401*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.032*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0510*** 
(0.0066) 
 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0069) 
Overh2 Overheads: 
total exp 
-0.0112 
(0.0114) 
-0.01142 
(0.0113) 
-0.0112    
(0.0112) 
 
-0.0107 
(0.0110) 
 
-0.0084 
(0.0110) 
-0.0087 
(0.0115) 
 
-0.0097 
(0.0115) 
-0.0088 
(0.0120) 
-0.0002 
(0.01181) 
-0.0109 
(0.0118) 
 
 
 Overheads: 
total Assets   
          -0.4370*** 
(0.1663) 
Assut1  0.3158*** 
(0.0692) 
0.3131*** 
(0.0678) 
0.3130*** 
(0.0675) 
 
0.3263*** 
(0.0662) 
 
0.3485*** 
(0.0602) 
0.5897*** 
(0.0501) 
 
0.5900*** 
(0.0502) 
0.3293*** 
(0.0733) 
0.6218*** 
(0.0534) 
0.2938*** 
(0.0707) 
0.3703*** 
(0.0670) 
PLS  0.0145* 
(0.0080) 
0.0133*** 
(0.00518) 
 
0.0138*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0133*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0050) 
0.0132*** 
(0.0046) 
 
0.0139*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0154 
(0.0100) 
0.0148* 
(0.0082) 
0.0156** 
(0.0082) 
0.0145* 
(0.0078) 
Salam  -0.0143 
(0.0333) 
-0.0151 
(0.0330) 
X X X X X -0.0168 
(0.0353) 
-0.0186 
(0.0358) 
-0.0177 
(0.0343) 
-0.0126 
(0.0326) 
MURBH  0.0016 
(0.0085) 
X X X X X X -0.0018 
(0.0101) 
0.0039 
(0.009) 
0.0027 
(0.0087) 
0.0005 
(0.0083) 
R 2  0.6466 0.6489 0.6508 0.6651 0.6500 0.7502 0.7489 0.6533 0.0039 0.6270 0.6603 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. *, **and *** indicate significance 
levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively 
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Table 7.4 shows that one of the differences between the original findings and the results 
of the robustness checks is the impact of credit risk, which remains insignificant when it 
is measured by loan loss provision to total loan and loan loss provision to total assets. 
However, the impact of this determinant turns to negative and highly significant when 
credit risk is measured by total investment (loan) to total assets. According to 
Athanasoglou et al., (2006) and Ramadan (2011), this indicates lower quality of credit 
assessment and monitoring and collection policy within Sudanese Islamic Bank. 
However, this contradiction may possibly be justified by the ambiguity of total investment 
to total assets as a credit risk measure. 
The impact of leverage on ROA also changed from negative and highly significant, when 
leverage is measured by total liability to total assets, to insignificant when leverage is 
measured by long-term liability to total equity. The difference between the two findings 
is more likely to be related to the leverage measure, which reduces the value of total 
liability to only long term liability. 
Finally, the impact of staff expenses also changed from having no impact on ROA, when 
it is measured by overhead to total expenses, to having an adverse and highly significant 
impact, when it is measured by overhead to total assets. This could possibly be due to the 
nature of the relationship between assets and profitability, on one hand, and expenses and 
profitability, on the other hand. 
In contrast, findings of the robustness check on ROE provides strong evidence to confirm 
the regression findings on the original equation, as can be seen from Table 7.5. The only 
difference in the robustness checks appears when credit risk is measured by loan loss 
provision to total assets, which changes the insignificant impact of bank age, 
capitalisation, leverage, operational efficiency to negative and significant impact. This 
contradiction in the finding could again be justified by the ambiguity of total investment 
(loan) to total assets as credit risk measure. 
130 
 
 
Table 7.5: Robustness on the Impact of Independent Variables on ROE of the Entire Sample of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables  Variables 
measures 
Original 
Equ 
Equ1 
 
Equ2 
 
Equ3 
 
Equ4 
 
Equ5 
 
Equ6 Equ7 Equ8 Equ9 Equ10 
Constant  -8.1045 
(10.2463) 
 
-8.3951 
(9.8565) 
-8.3768 
(9.8197) 
-8.3783 
(9.7414) 
-7.3858 
(7.6111) 
-8.7330 
(7.4111) 
-8.5503 
(7.3269) 
1.5626 
(0.3130) 
-9.7139 
(0.3146) 
-6.4434 
(9.2274) 
-9.2634 
(0.0249) 
Age
  
 0.2158 
(0.974203) 
0.2089 
(0.9688) 
0.4393 
(0.962628) 
0.21843 
(0.9662) 
0.13584 
(0.8617) 
0.3864 
(0.820357) 
0.3943 
(0.8168) 
-0.1010*** 
(0.0292) 
0.5579 
(0.5554) 
0.1099 
(0.9340) 
0.4393 
(0.0025) 
Type  -1.8078 
(2.8324) 
-1.7636 
(2.7934) 
-1.7756 
(2.7783) 
-1.8172 
(2.7672) 
-1.8742 
(2.7006) 
-0.6986 
(2.5135) 
-0.7408 
(2.4962) 
0.1190 
(0.0817) 
-0.5869 
(0.8259) 
-1.9440 
(2.7986) 
-1.36961 
(0.0075) 
Specia  1.1569 
(1.2055) 
1.1391 
(1.1903) 
1.1407 
(1.1861) 
1.1577 
(1.1724) 
1.1688 
(1.169294) 
0.6888 
(1.0914) 
0.7198 
(1.0760) 
-0.0286 
(0.0352) 
0.6722 
(0.5542) 
1.2334 
(1.1892) 
1.0401 
(0.0032) 
TOTASS 
 
 4.95E-11 
(4.14E-10) 
6.22E-11 
(3.96E-10) 
6.33E-11 
(3.95E-10) 
6.27E-11 
(3.94E-10) 
X X X -5.81E-12 
(1.20E-11) 
7.82E-11 
(0.8404) 
-1.52E-12 
(3.89E-10) 
1.79E-10 
(1.14E-12) 
Capad1  0.9852 
(4.1985) 
1.0653 
(4.1195) 
1.0332 
(4.0777) 
1.3286 
(4.3410) 
 
0.8635 
(3.9254) 
-0.1493 
(3.4553) 
-0.0160 
(3.3739) 
-0.3053*** 
(0.1247) 
0.0357 
(0.9924) 
0.6739 
(4.0551) 
 
1.2015 
(0.0113) 
LIQ2 
 
Current 
Ass: 
current liab 
0.0256 
(0.4978) 
0.0326 
(0.4920) 
0.0358 
(0.4879) 
 0.0315 
(0.4856) 
0.0910 
(0.4759) 
X -0.0387 
(0.0270) 
0.0860 
(0.8610) 
-0.0849 
(0.4118) 
-0.0100 
(0.0013) 
Total dep: 
tot Assets 
   -0.0796 
(0.5025) 
 
       
CREDR1 
 
LLP: :total 
loan 
-4.1016 
(7.6218) 
-4.1694 
(7.5707) 
-4.1731 
(7.5452) 
 
-4.4805 
(7.6693) 
 
-4.2497 
(7.5056) 
X X   -4.8955 
(7.6131) 
-4.9568 
(0.0206) 
LLP: :total 
Assets 
       -0.3353 
(0.8328) 
   
loan :total 
Assets 
        -0.6221 
(0.8374) 
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Lever2 Long term 
liab: total 
equity 
1.7983 
(4.5464) 
1.8148 
(4.5287) 
1.7983 
(4.5068) 
1.5360 
(3.7255) 
1.5411 
(4.1986) 
 
2.4059 
(3.9735) 
1.9479 
(3.1611) 
-0.3545 ** 
(0.1612) 
 
2.8007 
(0.5249) 
 1.3888 
(0.0123) 
Total deb: 
total Assets 
         0.1638 
(0.5139) 
 
Mgt1  0.6504 
(2.4513) 
0.6708 
(2.4359) 
0.6712 
(2.42783) 
0.7988 
(2.4403) 
0.5581 
(2.3157)  
0.4330 
(2.0370) 
0.5243 
(1.9741) 
-0.5102*** 
(0.0786) 
0.5836 
(0.7841) 
0.8873 
(2.3459) 
-0.6468 
(0.0069) 
Overh2 Overhea-
ds: total 
exp 
0.8852 
(4.1724) 
 
0.9534 
(4.1109) 
0.9663 
(4.0926) 
0.9981 
(4.0921) 
0.8243 
(3.9829)  
2.5106 
(3.7434) 
2.5567 
(3.7243) 
-0.0723 
(0.1214) 
2.6833 
(0.4984) 
0.8375 
(4.1761) 
 
Overhe-
ads: total 
Assets   
          72.4618 
(0.1663) 
Assut1  5.1231 
(25.160) 
 
5.6417 
(24.618) 
5.6346 
(24.535) 
5.8289 
(24.571) 
3.8449 
(21.784) 
-0.9168 
(16.2233) 
-0.9277 
(16.173) 
0.3951 
(0.7372) 
0.8674 
(0.9614) 
5.9269 
(25.016) 
-2.3986 
(0.0670) 
PLS  5.0408*  
(2.9067) 
5.2804*** 
(1.8811) 
5.3070*** 
(1.8324) 
5.2693*** 
(1.8300) 
5.3207*** 
(1.8249) 
4.5817*** 
(1.5105) 
4.5530**
* 
(1.4984) 
0.2194**  
(0.1011) 
 
3.9130 
(0.1570) 
4.9842* 
(2.9041) 
5.0391  
(0.0078) 
       
Salam  -0.9601 
(12.119) 
 
-0.8005 
(11.9891) 
X X X X X -0.2900 
(0.3551) 
-0.8114 
(0.9461) 
-1.0075 
(12.139) 
-1.0705 
(0.0326) 
MURBH  -0.3363 
(3.101733) 
 
X X X X X X 0.1233 
(0.101884) 
-0.8746 
(0.7772) 
-0.4264 
(3.1043) 
-0.0474 
(0.0083) 
R 2  0.0087 
 
0.0153 0.0219 0.0221 0.0283 0.020204 0.0262 0.5319 -0.0041  0.0177 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. *, **and *** indicate significance 
levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively 
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7.5. Estimated Regression Results for the State and Private Sudanese Islamic Banks  
The Likelihood test estimated for the Pooled regression indicates that Pooled least square 
for the ROA model, for the two types of banks and ROE for private banks, should be 
accepted, since FEM has been rejected because of the insignificance of the Likelihood 
test (0.5075 for ROA of state banks, 0.6909 for ROA of private banks and 0.7850 for 
ROE of private banks). On the other hand, the FEM has been accepted for ROE of state 
banks, as both Panel Least Square and RAM are rejected. The key findings of the 
regression analysis for the two types of banks are compared in Tables 7.6 and 7. 7. 
Table 7.6 reports comparisons of the key empirical results of the profitability of Sudanese 
State and Private Banks when measured by ROA. According to the Table, the regression 
result shows that R2 of the profitability of state and private banks, when measured by 
ROA, are 0.9399 and 0.6440 respectively, showing that 93% and 64% of the ROA of 
these banks are determined by the explanatory variables. It also means that if 1% change 
occurred in all independent variables, ROA of state and private banks will consequently 
be changed by 93% and 64% respectively.  
On the other hand, Table 7.7 shows comparisons of the empirical findings of the 
profitability of Sudanese State and Private Banks when measured by ROE. According to 
the Table, the regression result shows that R2 of the ROE of state and private banks are 
0.9428 and 0.5632 respectively, showing that 94% and 56% of the variation in ROE of 
these banks are explained by the explanatory variables. It also means that if 1% change 
occurred in all independent variables, ROE of state and private banks would consequently 
be changed by 94% and 56% respectively.  
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Table 7.6: Coefficient Estimates on ROA of State and Private Sudanese Islamic 
Banks 
Independent 
variables 
State Banks Private Banks 
Constant 
 
0.0683* 
(0.0399) 
0.1955*** 
(0.0347) 
Age 
 
-0.0018 
(0.0029) 
-0.0022 
(0.0039) 
 Specialised 
 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0270*** 
(0.0057) 
 Size 
 
-1.03E-12 
(9.13E-13) 
5.99E-13 
(1.90E-12) 
Capitalisation 
 
 -0.0314***  
(0.012635) 
0.0153 
(0.0139) 
 Liquidity 
 
0.0026 
(0.0035) 
-0.0020 
(0.0015) 
 Credit risk 
 
-0.0565*** 
(0.0141) 
-0.0061 
(0.0284) 
 Leverage 
 
-0.0130 
(0.0153) 
-0.0361** 
(0.0163) 
   Opera effici 
 
-0.0461*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0398*** 
(0.0101) 
 Overhead 
 
-0.0259* 
(0.0148) 
-0.0188 
(0.0129) 
   Assut 
 
0.4701*** 
(0.0884) 
0.2863*** 
(0.0813) 
 PLS 
 
0.0108 
(0.0069) 
0.0236** 
(0.0102) 
 Salam 
 
-0.2860*** 
(0.0791) 
-0.0087 
(0.0355) 
 Murabahah 
 
0.0002 
(0.0080) 
0.0074 
(0.0107) 
R2 0.9399 0.6440 
obs 44 118 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 7.7: Coefficient Estimates on ROE of State and Private Sudanese Islamic 
Banks 
Independent 
variables 
State Banks 
 
Private Banks 
 
Constant 
 
6.4735*** 
(1.1612) 
0.9467*** 
(0.1575) 
Age 
 
-0.2282*** 
(0.0760) 
-0.0605*** 
(0.0178) 
 Specialised 
 
-0.1692*** 
(0.0356) 
-0.0236 
(0.0259) 
 Size 
 
-1.21E-10*** 
(2.31E-11) 
-2.07E-12 
(8.65E-12) 
Capitalisation 
 
-0.1246 
(0.2406) 
-0.2266*** 
(0.0634) 
 Liquidity 
 
-0.2769* 
(0.1474) 
0.0056 
(0.0069) 
 Credit risk 
 
2.6253*** 
(0.3264) 
-0.2887** 
(0.1293) 
 Leverage 
 
-1.3676*** 
 (0.5159) 
-0.0803 
(0.0740) 
Opera effici 
 
-2.2554*** 
(0.1176) 
-0.3101*** 
(0.0460) 
 Overhead 
 
-1.3735*** 
(0.3952) 
-0.1158** 
(0.0588) 
Assut 
 
-10.573*** 
(1.8581) 
0.1644 
(0.3695) 
PLS 
 
0.1911 
(0.1367) 
0.1234*** 
(0.0466) 
 Salam 
 
1.4102 
(2.0541) 
-0.0289 
(0.1614) 
Murabahah 
 
0.1469 
(0.1867) 
0.1002** 
(0.0486) 
R2 0.9428 0.5632 
obs 44 118 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and* indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
 
7.5. Estimated Regression Results for the State and Private Sudanese Islamic Banks  
The Likelihood test estimated for the Pooled regression indicates that Pooled least square 
for the ROA model, for the two types of banks and ROE for private banks, should be 
accepted, since FEM has been rejected because of the insignificance of the Likelihood 
test (0.5075 for ROA of state banks, 0.6909 for ROA of private banks and 0.7850 for 
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ROE of private banks). On the other hand, the FEM has been accepted for ROE of state 
banks, as both Panel Least Square and RAM are rejected.  
The key findings of the regression analysis for the two types of banks are compared in 
Tables 7.6 and 7. 7. 
Table 7.6 reports comparisons of the key empirical results of the profitability of Sudanese 
State and Private Banks when measured by ROA. According to the Table, the regression 
result shows that R2 of the profitability of state and private banks, when measured by 
ROA, are 0.9399 and 0.6440 respectively, showing that 93% and 64% of the ROA of 
these banks are determined by the explanatory variables. It also means that if 1% change 
occurred in all independent variables, ROA of state and private banks will consequently 
be changed by 93% and 64% respectively.  
On the other hand, Table 7.7 shows comparisons of the empirical findings of the 
profitability of Sudanese state and private banks when measured by ROE. According to 
the Table, the regression result shows that R2 of the ROE of state and private banks are 
0.9428 and 0.5632 respectively, showing that 94% and 56% of the variation in ROE of 
these banks are explained by the explanatory variables. It also means that if 1% change 
occurred in all independent variables, ROE of state and private banks would consequently 
be changed by 94% and 56% respectively.  
The following is an explanation of the impact of bank-specific and industry specific 
indicators on ROA and ROE of state and private banks. The impact of factors that are of 
relation to only Islamic banking industry is also provided. 
7.5.1 The Impact of Bank Specific determinants on ROA and ROE of State and 
Private Banks 
7.5.1.1 Capitalisation 
Table 7.6 indicates that capitalisation has a negative and highly significant impact on 
ROA of state banks and ROE of private banks. According to Berger (1995), Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2009) and Lee (2012), this negative correlation may reflect the advantages 
of higher leverage. On the other hand, according to Bashir (1999), it may still reflect that 
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both state and private banks may face some consequence of unfavourable selection, which 
may result from this negative correlation between profitability and capitalisation. 
Although most literature contradicts this finding (see AL-Omar and AL-Mutairi, 2008 
and Athanasoglou et al., 2005), it is in line with Alkassim (2005) who proves a negative 
and highly significant relationship between capitalisation and profitability of the banking 
sector in GCC Countries. In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is contradicted by 
Ramadan (2011), who reveals positive impact between capitalisation and the profitability 
of Jordanian Islamic Banks.  
On the other hand, capitalisation is found to have an insignificant impact on ROE of state 
banks and the ROA of private banks. Hassan and Bashir (2003) also find that 
capitalisation has an insignificant impact on the profitability of worldwide Islamic Banks 
during 1994-2001.  
7.5.1.2 Credit Risk 
With regards the impact of credit risk on the profitability of state and private Sudanese 
Islamic banks, the regression results suggest negative and highly significant relationship 
at 1% level of significance for ROA of state banks and negative at 5% level of significance 
for ROE of private banks. According to Hassan and Bashir (2003), this may indicate poor 
quality of credit assessment and monitoring and collection policy, which could make 
these banks more vulnerable to risk, thus impacting their ability to have sufficient 
provisions for potential losses and avoiding asset concentration on cretin geographical or 
economic sector. This finding is supported by Athanasoglou et al., (2005), who prove the 
negative and significant impact of credit risk on banks’ profitability. 
Additionally, the findings on the impact of credit risk on profitability, when measured by 
ROE, proves positive and highly significant relationship exist between this determinant 
and ROE of state banks, which, according to Hassan and Bashir (2003), could possibly 
indicate that state banks are characterised by good quality of credit assessment and 
monitoring and collection policy. Any contradiction in the findings on the impact of credit 
risk on state banks could possibly be related to the nature of ROE, which excludes banks’ 
leverage.  
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In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is in line with Ramadan (2011), who finds a 
positive and significant relationship between this determinant and Islamic banks’ 
profitability.  
The insignificant impact is found between credit risk and ROA of private banks, which is 
in harmony with the finding of AL-Omar and AL-Mutairi (2008), who prove the 
insignificant relationship between credit risk and profitability of banks. In the Islamic 
Banking context this is in line with Ali et al., (2011). 
7.5.1.3 Operational Efficiency 
The coefficient of operational efficiency entered the regression model with a negative 
sign and is showing as having statistically significant impact on both ROA and ROE of 
state and private banks alike. This is according to Ramadan (2011), who shows evidence 
that both types of Sudanese banks are unable to transfer their operational expenses to their 
customers. Bourke (1989)’s early argument supports this finding with claims that a 
reduced expense is likely to enhance the profitability of a financial institution. However, 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) contradict this with the finding of a positive and 
significant impact of operational efficiency on the profitability of European Banking 
sector. In the Islamic Banking context, it is in line with the findings of Srairi (2010), who 
shows an inverse relationship between profitability and operational efficiency exists 
within Gulf Countries’ Islamic banks. 
7.5.1.4 Assets Utilisation 
The impact of assets utilisation is shown to be positive and highly significant on ROA of 
state and private banks alike. This shows the efficiency of the management of these banks 
in utilising their resources and indicates their potential ability to improve and expand 
investment. Most literature agrees to this positive correlation between assets utilisation 
and profitability (see Bourke, 1989 and Atemnkenf and Joseph, 2006). 
In the Islamic Banking context, this finding has the support of Ali et al., (2011) and 
Ramadan (2011), who note positive and significant relation between assets utilisation and 
the profitability of Islamic Banks. 
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In contrast, findings on the impact of assets utilisation, when profitability is measured by 
ROE, shows a negative and highly significant relationship with the ROE of state banks. 
Furthermore, the insignificant impact from this indicator on the ROE of private banks 
was also found, implying that high profits earned by the banks do not represent the good 
level of assets utilisation. Contradiction in the findings in relation to ROA and ROE could 
be justified by the nature of assets utilisation measure (total income to total assets) used. 
In other words, the likely positive relationship might be expected when total assets are 
used in both measures. 
7.5.1.5 Overhead Expenses  
Empirical findings of the estimation of the relationship between overhead expenses and 
profitability prove the negative and significant relationship with ROA and ROE of state 
banks and ROE of private banks. This finding is in harmony with most literature, which 
claims a negative relationship between overhead expenses ratio and profitability exists 
(see Bourke, 1989 and Hassan and Bashir, 2003). In contrast, it is not supported by earlier 
findings of Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and the later findings of Guru et al., (2002) 
and Naceur (2003): both support the idea that better employees’ productivity is linked 
with high wage rate.  
In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is contradicted by Hassan and Bashir (2003), 
who suggest a positive and significant association between overhead expenses and the 
profitability of the Islamic banks’ worldwide, during 1994-2001. 
Findings on the relationship between ROA and overhead expenses of private banks 
proves negative but insignificant relationship exists, which is in line with Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) and Flamini et al., (2009). 
7.5.1.6 Leverage 
The result also shows a negative and highly significant correlation between leverage and 
ROE of state banks and a negative relationship, at 5% level of significance with ROA of 
private banks. This, according to Aburime (2008), indicates that the two types of banks 
lack the skills of forecasting, monitoring, avoiding and managing leverage risks.  
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Nevertheless, this finding is not supported by Al-Tamimi (2005), who suggest positive 
and statistically significant relationship exist between profitability and leverage of UAE 
Commercial Banks. In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is agreed by Izhar and 
Asutaya (2007) and Qudah and Jaradat (2013), who note a negative and significant 
relationship between leverage and the profitability of Islamic Banks. 
In addition, the result proves insignificant correlation exists between leverage and ROA 
of state banks and ROE of private banks. The insignificant relationship between leverage 
and profitability is in harmony with the findings of Short (1979) that proves the 
insignificant impact of leverage on the profitability of banks. In the Islamic Banking 
context, it is in line with the finding of Javaid et al., (2011), who prove the insignificant 
impact of leverage on the Pakistani Islamic banks. 
7.5.1.7 Liquidity 
Liquidity is also proven to be significant, with a negative sign on only ROE of state banks. 
This finding can be justified by the argument advanced by Al Omar and Mutairi (2008), 
who report that negative relationship between liquidity and profitability is likely, as 
keeping higher liquid assets reduces the banks’ capability to generate profit. This finding 
is also supported by Molyneux and Thorton (1992), who proves the negative relationship 
between liquidity and profitability exists.  However, the finding is contradicted by Bourke 
(1989) and Al-Tamimi (2005), who show evidence of a positive impact of liquidity on 
banks’ profitability.  
In the Islamic Banking context, this finding contradicts Haron (1996), who suggests the 
positive and significant impact of liquidity on the profitability of Islamic Banks.  
Liquidity is also found to be insignificant with ROA of both state and private banks and 
ROE of private banks, which, in the Islamic Banking context, is in agreement with the 
findings of Qudah and Jaradat (2013), who also establish an insignificant relationship 
between liquidity and profitability of Islamic Banks. 
 
140 
 
7.5.2 The Impact of Industry Specific determinants on ROA and ROE of State and 
Private Banks  
7.5.2.1 Bank Age 
The result on bank age suggests a negative and highly significant association between 
bank age and ROE of the two types of banks. This finding implies that the newly 
established Sudanese Islamic Banks are more profitable than the middle-aged and old 
Sudanese banks. It also implies that middle aged Sudanese banks are more profitable than 
old Sudanese banks. This finding indicates that newly founded banks are effectively able 
to create new profit opportunities. On the contrary, Aburime (2008) argues that newly 
founded banks are not operationally profitable in the first few years after their 
establishment, as they need to place greater focus on raising their market share than on 
increasing their profitability.  Beck and Kunt (2006) support this argument by suggesting 
that, owing to their experience, older established banks are able to enjoy the performance 
and good reputation advantages over the newly established.  
On the other hand, the insignificant relationship is proved to exist between bank age and 
ROA for both state and private banks. This finding is in accordance with the results of 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009), who note the insignificant impact of bank age on 
Switzerland commercial banks. The differences in the impact of bank age on ROA and 
ROE could be justified by the nature of ROE. 
7.5.2.2 Bank Size 
The impact of bank size on the profitability of state and private Sudanese Islamic Banks 
is found to be significant only on state banks when profitability is measured by ROE. This 
finding is in accordance with the finding of Athanasoglou et al., (2008) and Naceur 
(2003), who suggest that negative relationship between bank size and profitability is 
expected, as expanding the bank size usually leads to limited cost reduction and limited 
economies of scale advantage. Furthermore, this finding is supported by the argument by 
Beck and Kunt (2006), which suggest that it is more difficult for financial organisations 
to develop to their optimal size when there is a lack of well-developed financial markets 
and legal systems.  
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In the Islamic Banking context, this finding is in line with the earlier finding of Haron 
(1996a), who establish an inverse relationship between bank size and profitability 
measures. 
On the other hand, the result proves a negative insignificant association between bank 
size and ROA of state and private banks and ROE of private banks, which is in line with 
the finding of Atemnkenf and Joseph (2006) and Lee (2012). 
7.5.2.3 Specialisation 
Specialisation is shown to have a negative and highly significant impact on ROA of 
private banks and ROE of state banks. Otherwise, it is found to have a negative but 
insignificant impact on ROA of state banks and ROE of private banks. The negative 
relationship between specialisation and profitability could possibly mean that specialised 
banks are losing profit opportunity because of their limited areas of investment. This 
finding is contradicted by Heffernan and Fu (2010). They show a positive and significant 
impact of specialisation on ROE and insignificant impact on ROA. 
7.5.3 The Impact of Islamic Banking determinants on ROA and ROE of State and 
Private Banks 
7.5.3.1 Salam 
Salam has a negative and highly significant correlation with the ROA of state banks. 
Furthermore, it is found to have an insignificant impact on ROA of private banks and 
ROE of state and private banks. This may imply that state banks are committed to playing 
their roles of supporting the country’s economy by assisting the agricultural sector.  
At the same time, it should be pointed out that there are problems with the 
application/practice of this mode of finance, which may impact profitability. First is the 
counterparty risk. This is a common risk in this type of finance as the client may possibly 
default after taking the payment in advance. Secondly, it is possible that at the time the 
goods are received by the bank, the price may become lower than the expected price, thus 
creating commodity price risk. This result is supported by the earlier finding on the impact 
of Salam on the profitability of the entire sample.  
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7.5.3.2 PLS verse Non-PLS 
PLS, as measured by the ratio of Mudarabah and Musharaka to total modes of finance, is 
found to be positive and highly significant, at 1% level of significance, with ROE of 
private banks and positive (with at 5% level of significance) with ROA of private banks. 
In addition, non-PLS, as measured by the ratio of Murabaha to total modes of finance, is 
shown to be positive, with 5% level of significance, for ROE of private banks and 
insignificantly positive for ROA of private banks. This result indicates that private banks 
are more committed to the PLS modes of finance than to non-PLS modes of finance. On 
the other hand, findings of state banks show an insignificant correlation of PLS modes 
finance with ROA and ROE. In contrast, non-PLS proves to have a positive and 
insignificant correlation with both ROA and ROE of state banks, indicating that state 
banks are less committed to PLS and non-PLS modes of finance than private banks.  
Findings on the positive impact of both PLS and non-PLS on the profitability of private 
banks and findings of the insignificant impact of PLS and non-PLS on the profitability of 
state banks could be justified by the strategies used by state and private banks. According 
to the 2010 Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sudan, although Central Bank’s policy 
does not differentiate between the two types of banks (as it specifies the same minimum 
and maximum rate for the potential profit of both PLS and non-PLS modes of finance), 
for competition purposes, the state banks prefer to use the minimum profit rate, because 
they are satisfied with the profits generated from their privilege on large government 
projects. On the other hand, the private banks choose the maximum rate of potential 
profits in their quest for profit maximisation. 
 
7.6. Summary 
This chapter identifies the profitability determinants of Islamic Banks operating in Sudan, 
the country with full adherence to Islamic Financial System, over the period 2005-2013. 
The chapter also provides evidence on the impact of these determinants on state-owned 
banks and private banks operating in the country. The sample covers 27 Banks (10 state 
banks and 17 private banks). This sample covers around 75% of the total number of banks 
operating in Sudan.  
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The empirical results suggest that the main performance determinants on ROA of the 
entire sample are bank type, capitalisation and assets utilisation, which have a positive 
and significant impact. Additionally, ROA is significantly adversely affected by operation 
efficiency, bank age, leverage and specialisation. With regards the profitability 
determinants, in relation to the Islamic Banking industry, only PLS is found to have a 
significant impact, with positive signs on both ROA and ROE. Furthermore, all other 
determinants are established to have no impact on ROE of the entire sample of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks. 
In relation to the impact of the examined profitability determinants on state banks and 
private banks, the empirical results show that assets utilisation is the only factor that has 
significant positive impact on ROA of state banks. Capitalisation, credit risk, operation 
efficiency, overhead and Salam modes of finance all prove to have a negative and 
significant impact on ROA of state banks. No significant impact was found for bank age, 
specialisation, size, liquidity, leverage, PLS and Morabahah on ROA of state banks. 
In contrast, ROE of state banks is seen to be determined by the positive and significant 
effect of credit risk and the negative and significant effect of bank age, specialisation, 
bank size, liquidity, leverage, operational efficiency, assets utilisation and overhead. 
Meanwhile, capitalisation, PLS, Salam and Morabahah have been found to have no 
impact on ROE of state banks. 
Conversely, assets utilisation and PLS are the only factors that have a positive and 
significant impact on ROA of private banks. Specialisation, leverage, operational 
efficiency and PLS have an adverse significant relationship with ROA of private banks. 
No significant impact was found for bank age, size, capitalisation, liquidity, credit risk, 
overhead, Salam and Morabahah on ROA of private banks. 
Interestingly, the impact of PLS and Morabahah is shown to be positive and significant 
on ROE of private banks, whereas bank age, capitalisation, operational efficiency, 
overhead and credit risk all have a negative and significant impact on ROE of private 
banks. Furthermore, specialisation, size,  liquidity, leverage, assets  utilisation and Salam 
are all found insignificant.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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Chapter Eight 
Corporate Governance and Bank Profitability 
8.1. Introduction   
The literature on corporate governance emphasises the vital importance of the structure 
of corporate governance. They highlight the essential role it plays in providing 
information for monitoring, advising, promoting and advancing decision-making 
effectiveness. In this respect, Gillan (2006) and Bøhren and Strøm (2007) argue that 
constructing an effective, informed and decisive structure of corporate governance can 
have a great impact on firms’ performance.  However, a mission of constructing such 
corporate governance, these authors argue, involves a number of difficulties. They note 
that this mission encompasses a wide-ranging set of board mechanisms, but that we lack 
both theories and evidence on the impact of these mechanisms on firms' performance. 
Bøhren and Strøm (2007) use this point to argue that when regulators introduce a range 
of top management mechanisms, such as diversity, independence and 
increasing/decreasing number of top managers, they do so without knowing how their 
actions influence firms' performance. Bøhren and Strøm (2007) also argue that there is 
limited empirical evidence investigating the validity of current regulatory practice.  
The literature on the impact of the structure of corporate governance on firms’ 
performance mainly focusses on four factors that significantly impact the effectiveness 
of any decision-making process (and consequently financial performance) within the 
corporate governance context. These factors are diversity (such as gender), board size, 
board compensation and board composition with emphasis on outside directors, (see 
Raheja, 2005; Coles et al., 2008 and Harris and Raviv 2008). Within the Sudanese 
banking system, almost all the banks rely on internal members of the board. Additionally, 
data on the boards’ compensation for these banks are limited, as not all Sudanese Banks’ 
annual reports disclose this type of data. Therefore, this study, in light of these factors, 
focusses on the impact of gender diversity and board size on the financial performance of 
the studied banks. 
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8.2. Study Background and Theoretical Framework 
There is a renewed and growing focus, within academic research, public discussion, 
government concerns and firms’ strategy, on gender diversity in boardrooms and in top 
executive management positions, as a means of improving the performance of corporate 
governance. In western countries, some European countries have already taken steps to 
encourage gender diversification (Marinova et al., 2010 and Cabo et al., 2012). Cabo et 
al., (2012) also report that to encourage diversification many European countries have 
approved a regulation of minimum quotas for female representation on boards in public 
companies (e.g. Norway, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium). They also 
report that other European Union countries (such as UK, Sweden and Finland) have also 
adopted voluntary standards to encourage gender balance on boards. However, several 
studies show that, worldwide, female presence in both types of top management is still 
limited.  
On the contrary, Carter et al., (2003) report that participants at a forum sponsored by the 
Conference Board instantly vetoed the idea that board diversity, for its own sake and 
without consideration for a business case, is a satisfactory reason to act on or implement 
gender diversity policy.  
Catalyst (2004) and Carter et al., (2007) report that the core of the economic case for 
board diversity can possibly be explained as follows: 
Board diversity increases the effectiveness of board actions, which encourages the 
productivity and enhances the performance of the corporation, which will lead to 
improved profitability and shareholder value. 
Carter et al., (2007) also argue that the economic case for diversity does not accept the 
diversity of directors as an ideal alternative to other effective board mechanism; however, 
such diversity of individuals with distinctive characters should add more value for 
shareholders. They also report that the economic case for board diversity is not a single 
construct stemming from a single theory, but more of an intuitive and pragmatic plan 
which originates from the business practice, opinions, anecdotal evidence, and empirical 
evidence.  
146 
 
Concerning gender representation in the banking sector, Berger et al., (2012) report that 
such arranged governance in banking has deep consequences for their performance and 
the societies in which they are located. However, according to Cabo et al., (2012) banking 
sector is more or less excluded from these studies and, therefore, very little is known 
about that governance structure and its impact on the banking industry.  
Turning to the impact of board of directors’ size on firm performance, the starting point 
for this research is the earlier studies of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), who 
document the performance of smaller boards is more efficient compared to that of larger 
boards. They argue small boards are better monitors of management than large ones. They 
also argue that within large boards it is more likely to encounter coordination problems.  
This chapter provides a comprehensive picture of the theoretical framework as well as 
findings of empirical studies on the impact of gender diversity in top management 
positions and size of the board of directors on firms’ profitability. It also supplies the 
operational definitions of dependent and the independent variables 
8.2.1. Corporate Governance and Gender Diversity  
8.2.1.1 Corporate Governance 
Francoeur et al., (2007) and Dezső and Ross (2011) report that, as firms’ top management 
make most of a firm’s important decisions and strategies, a firm’s performance and 
regular routine are the results of its top management characteristics and attitudes. 
Francoeur et al., (2007) also report that, therefore, factors which would possibly enhance 
the performance of the corporate governance team should consequently advance firm 
performance.  
Ntim (2009) reports that the term governance originates from the Latin word gubernare 
‘, which means to steer, suggesting corporate governance entails the function of direction 
rather than control. Further definition of corporate governance is given by Campbell and 
Vera (2007, p. 436) who define corporate governance as ‘‘the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled’’.  
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More comprehensive definitions are given by Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Ansari 
and Siddique (2013). Ansari and Siddique (2013, p. 493) define corporate governance by 
the most cited definition, which is given by finance committee on corporate governance 
in Malaysia: “Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct and 
manage the business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity 
and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long-term 
shareholder value, whilst taking account the interests of other stakeholders”. 
Andres and Vallelado (2008, p.2571) define corporate governance as “a group of 
mechanisms used by stakeholders to ensure that directors efficiently manage corporate 
resources, a task that includes the manner in which quasi-rents are developed and 
distributed”. They also report that, according to the definition, the issue of bank 
governance does not impressively differ from the governance problem of any business 
which involves a trade in goods. Yet, they report corporate governance in banks plays a 
more specific role because of the distinctiveness of these organisations.  
According to all definitions, the corporate governance role takes account of successful 
running of the business, supervising executive actions and satisfying the legitimate 
expectations of responsibility encompassing a sequence of instruments through which the 
requirements of management, the board of directors and all types of shareholders are 
assisted. Therefore, according to Campbell and Vera (2007), corporate governance plays 
an essential role in bringing together all different interests within the banking 
environment. 
Further explanation showing the key functions of corporate governance, with emphasis 
on board of directors and how it can ultimately influence firms’ performance, is given by 
Al-Musalli and Ismail (2012) who report that board of directors is an essential instrument 
to create, improve, leverage, and manage intellectual capital of a firm and influence its 
performance. Its function is to formulate relevant strategies and policies on how to acquire 
and optimally operate the required resources. Therefore, according to Robb and Watson 
(2012), decent corporate governance should enhance the attainment of developed 
financial performance of both private and public institutions.  
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Focusing on the role of corporate governance in developing countries, Robb and Watson 
(2012) argue this role is particularly essential as it assists in setting foundations for 
sustainable economic growth. 
Turning to the role of corporate governance in a banking environment, Alexandrina 
(2011) reports that, due to the particular nature of banking industry, its corporate 
governance is documented to perform a different role from the one played by firms’ 
governance. He attributes this difference to the particularities relating to the banking 
industry, which demands consideration of liquidity requirement, a complication of 
activities (interest-based operations, and non-interest based operations) and stakeholders’ 
variety. All these special characteristics create, and increase, researcher’s interest in 
examining the impact of corporate governance on banks’ value. In the same context, Cabo 
et al., (2012) report that considering banks are generally less transparent than firms, with 
potential systemic risks related to the nature of banking industry, corporate governance 
issues become even more important. In the same vein, Alexandrina (2011) comments on 
the need for more studies on corporate governance and bank performance, reporting that 
corporate governance within the banking industry is a little-explored topic, which 
supplies academics with an opportunity to develop the empirical literature through which 
they can examine the impact of such factor on banks’ performance. However, Rose (2007) 
argues that due to the lack of data availability, studies on corporate governance in the 
banking industry are emerging at a slow pace.  
8.2.1.2 Barriers for Women to Reach Top Management Positions 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that the poor representation of females in top 
management positions is generally linked to a phenomenon known as 'glass ceiling'. This 
phenomenon is defined by Prete and Stefani (2013) as an unreachable barrier that keeps 
women and minorities from rising to the upper step of the corporate ladder, regardless of 
their qualifications or achievements. Another explanation of glass ceiling is given by 
Oakley (2000), Francoeur et al., (2007) and Cabo et al., (2012) as a set of transparent 
hindrances creates an obstructed barrier of procedures, structures, traditions, relations and 
beliefs which prevent a woman from accessing a management position past a certain 
point. Vieito (2012) comments that these glass ceiling obstacles do still exist and are 
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proven to have prevented women from reaching their full potential in top management 
positions. 
According to Shrader et al., (1997), the glass ceiling is an indication of the major obstacles 
created by men’s beliefs that career women can easily be distracted from accessing top 
management positions due to family issues.  In addition, Shrader et al., (1997) suggest 
women are not considered to have strong enough character, and that men are simply 
uncomfortable with women in these positions. As a result, women are intentionally 
stopped from being given top management positions instrumental in influencing firm 
performance. Further explanation of the reason behind these low numbers of women in 
top levels of management is given by Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) who suggest females’ 
lack of ambition, commitment and experience are all main reasons for the limited 
representation of women at top management levels. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) also 
report that these obstacles include informal and unseen top promotion processes 
stemming from the business culture that believes in old boys’ networks and social 
exclusion. Informal barriers also include elements of tokenism and lower pay for women. 
Concerning existence of glass ceiling in banking industry, Cabo et al., (2012) report that, 
as the manager level increases in banking sector, the percentage of women among 
managers decreases, revealing a sizable gap between the percentage of women among 
bank employees and their existence among bank top level managers, indicating existence 
of glass ceiling theory at bank’s level. However, Prete and Stefani (2013) discuss the glass 
ceiling theory in banking industry with optimism, reporting that, during and after the 
recent financial crisis, there has been a greater focus on gender diversity of banks’ top 
management, as scarcity of gender diversity at this level of management is viewed as 
being among the reasons behind governance failure in financial institutions. This point 
could possibly be used to persuade supporters of this glass ceiling theory to change their 
minds and allow females to work side by side with males in top management positions, 
in the banking industry in particular, and firms in general.  
In Sudanese banking industry, although there is no literature to support the existence of 
glass ceiling theory, which is often UK and US based, evidence on the existence of this 
theory in Sudanese Islamic Banking and society could be taken from the reality that some 
old established Sudanese banks refuse any employment of women.  
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8.2.1.3 Gender Diversity 
Carter et al., (2003) define management diversity as the proportion of females and 
minorities on the board of directors. More specific and broader definition, focusing on 
gender diversity, is given by Smith et al., (2006) in page 569 as “the proportion of women 
among the highest-ranking CEOs in firms and on boards of directors”.  
Turning to the debate on the impact of gender diversity on top management positions, 
Rovers (2010) reports that, whether the existence of women on the board enhances the 
governance of a company or not, is related to the question of what good quality corporate 
governance should attain. He also argues that if good corporate governance does not lead 
to better performance, then the question of who is positioned on the board of the firm has 
no practical value. Consequently, employing women on the board will simply have a 
symbolic value which adds no advantage to performance.  
The impact of gender diversity on a firm’s performance has been subject to much 
theoretical and empirical research. Some of these studies suggest that the impact of gender 
representation on the corporate board of directors and CEO levels should improve firms’ 
performance, providing the steady growth of female representation in these positions as 
evidence (see Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira 2008 and Pathan et al., 2012). On 
the other hand, another literature supports a negative association between gender diversity 
and firms’ performance (see Shrader et al., 1997 and Smith2005). The argument on this 
aspect follows below. 
8.2.1.4. The Link between Board Diversity and Firm Performance 
Dezső and Ross (2011) report a number of different, but related, reasons to support the 
idea that diversity is connected to improved firms’ performance. Rose (2007) Brammer 
et al., (2007), Kang et al., (2007), Campbell and Vera (2007), Rovers (2010), Pathan et 
al., (2012) and Vieito (2012) propose different reasons to justify the existence of positive 
association between the greater representation of women in top management positions 
and increased firm performance. Firstly, Vieito (2012) reports many studies have 
described females and males as being dissimilar in several qualities and characteristics. 
According to Brammer et al., (2007), by excluding women from decision-making 
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positions, the company is structurally ignoring the qualities that are, by nature, 
distinctively, and only, found in women.  
In the same context, Rovers (2010) argues a homogeneous group of directors does not 
represent the society in which it operates, which means weak corporate governance and 
a missed opportunity are more probable when women are not represented at these levels 
of management. In the same context, he reports that females behave differently than men 
in a variety of situations. Rovers (2010) further supports his argument by reporting the 
existence of women in the decision-making process may improve team performance, as 
the diversity in top management will lead to a wider range of perspectives and exchange 
of ideas. Accordingly, this will enhance better decision making and will consequently 
improve business performance. He also reports the absence of women in top management 
is suboptimal for the decision-making process and firm performance.  
A further argument in this aspect is given by the critical mass theory, which is initially 
associated with earlier work of Rosabeth Kanter. This theory is explained by Rovers 
(2010) as being based on the idea that, only when a certain threshold is reached (a critical 
mass), the influence of a subgroup (such as the representation of females on the board) 
becomes more definite. Kramer et al., (2006) argue that ‘a board with three or more 
females is more likely to achieve positive effects and enhance good governance than a 
board with fewer females’.  
According to Rovers (2010), being the single female can lead to tokenism as men will 
remain the dominant group. In the same context, Joecks et al., (2013) argue that skewed 
groups have a lower performance than balanced groups. They report that a sizeable 
effective minority should range between 20–40 % and will provide a critical mass that 
does bring change. They report this percentage will create balanced groups which 
advantageously enhance disparity of group members. 
The argument of Rovers (2010) is also documented by Brammer et al., (2007), who report 
that some valuable qualities and characteristics are not distributed equally among males 
and females, causing behavioural differences between the two genders. An example of 
behaviour differences is given by Vieito (2012), who prove that females are more risk 
averse than males. In the same context, Prete and Stefani (2013) report that, due to their 
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higher risk aversion, credit policies are tougher when women are in top management 
positions.  
Furthermore, Campbell and Vera (2007) suggest homogeneous groups are more 
cooperative and tend to more easily communicate, as they are more likely to share the 
same feelings and opinions. Additionally, Carter (2003) Pathan et al., (2012) report that 
the representation of female directors is becoming more favourable because there is a 
perception that females are hard-working and able to enhance innovation and problem-
solving through their distinctive communication skills. Pathan et al., (2012) also argue 
that female directors are highly proficient and diligent, have better anticipations about 
their duties as directors and are better organised and prepared for board meetings. In the 
same context, Shrader et al., (1997) report that females are more oriented and stronger in 
the areas of maintaining relationships, and generating and innovating ideas, than men. 
That aside, Carter et al., (2003) also report corporate diversity helps better understanding 
of the marketplace. They report that when the marketplace becomes more diverse that 
such greater corporate diversity increases the ability to reach potential markets.  
A further advantage of females’ representation in top management positions is discussed 
by Rovers (2010), who reports that companies with a higher degree of diversity on the 
board also send an essential positive signal to their existing and potential employees about 
the fair competition through which top positions are filled. Accordingly, free competition 
among staff will improve firm performance. In addition, Dezső and Ross (2011) argue 
female representation in top management is the main cause of informational and social 
diversity, which benefits the top management team and enriches the behaviour of different 
levels of management throughout the firm.   As well as this, it inspires women in middle 
management, resulting in improved managerial performance and, consequently, better 
firm performance.  
Rose (2007) also argues that, as firms are important institutions, they no doubt influence 
a wide range of stakeholders and wider society, so they should be sufficiently diversified 
to reflect society and the market as a whole. Finally, Rovers (2010) reports that society 
normally views any higher degree of diversity in management as positive, which will 
develop that firm's reputation and consequently its performance.  
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According to all different previously mentioned arguments, the inclusion of distinctive 
characteristics and behaviour of females is argued will enable top management to access 
their potential talent, and use it to make improved and valued decisions, which 
consequently leads to better financial performance. 
On the other hand, Rose (2007), Vera (2007), Campbell and Vera (2007), Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), Rovers (2010) and Dezső and Ross (2011) discuss the disadvantages of 
gender diversity in top management. Firstly, they argue that a wider range of different 
perspectives can also delay decision-making process and make the board more divided, 
which results in more conflict and time consumption problems.  
In the same vein, Smith (2005), Campbell and Vera (2007) and Rovers (2010) report that 
if greater gender diversity among top management positions generates wider range of 
opinions and critical questions leading to greater conflict, consequently the decision-
making process becomes more time consuming, as well as less effective, which may lead 
to more conflict than within a less heterogeneous group.  
Smith (2005) argues that, although this conflict may end with better quality decisions, 
this may not balance the negative impact of a slow decision-making process, especially 
when the market requires quick reaction to changes of market issues. He reports that, 
although a heterogeneous board yields a wider range of different opinions and critical 
questions, this may not be as effective as a homogenous group of directors. Rovers (2010) 
also reports that coordination problems and reduced cost efficiency resulting from top 
management diversification can counterbalance the increase in financial performance.  
Further reasoning on the possible negative relationship between gender diversity and 
firms’ performance is given by Adams and Ferreira (2009) who suggest that although 
gender diversity on boards leads to tougher monitoring, normally considered a beneficial 
and distinctive characteristic, intensive monitoring may possibly be considered as a 
disadvantage as it leads to counter-productivity. An example of such counter-productivity 
is given by Dezső and Ross (2011) who report that gender diversity may possibly impact 
social cohesion and, consequently employee satisfaction. However, he argues that any 
dissatisfaction in this respect does not necessarily lead to sub-standard performance.    
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In the same context, Vera (2007) also reports that if women are involved in the top 
management decision-making process for the sake of social pressure for greater equality 
of the sexes, without consideration of their skills and experience, women’s representation 
results in a negative impact on the decision-making process and consequently firms’ 
financial performance. Furthermore, Campbell and Vera (2007) argue that, in some 
societies, investors penalise firms which increase their female board membership, should 
this negatively impact the economic gains of these firms.  
Further opinion on the impact of gender diversity on firm performance is given by Cabo 
et al., (2012) who report such impact on a firm’s financial performance can, to some 
extent, depend on different internal and external conditions of the firm. They report that 
the value and the effectiveness of corporate governance practices (e.g. increased board 
diversity) could depend on firm’s size, age and the regulatory constraints on business 
performance. They also report that for newly established firms, the resourcing and 
behaviour of board members is comparatively more vital than the monitoring roles of the 
board. Conversely, when a firm is grown in size it needs more external resources, which 
consequently makes board gender diversity more important.  
That aside, Rovers (2010) reports that, even though studies have already proved a 
relationship between the existence of females in top management positions and firm 
performance, it is difficult to provide evidence on the causal relationship between these 
two factors, due to the number of factors affecting the performance of a firm, making 
single factor research problematic. 
Overall, Francoeur et al., (2007) report that whatever the debate on the impact of gender 
diversity on firms’ performance, the promotion of women to top management positions 
must remain a good policy and sensible objective, even if it does not essentially lead to 
better financial performance. To be precise, important social issues, such as family life 
and flexible work arrangements, are taken into consideration by firms which implement 
policies to attract women executives and board members. According to them, the impact 
of some issues relating to family life requirements and flexible work arrangements must 
be taken into consideration, as shown by the experience of companies that had already 
implemented policies to attract female executives and board members. 
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8.2.1.5. Corporate Board Size 
The Theoretical link between board size and firms’ financial performance has been 
subjected to studies since the pioneering research of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen 
(1993). The extended literature on this topic has sought to give a theoretical and empirical 
argument on the relationship between corporate board size and firm financial 
performance. The empirical evidence on this is shown to be inconclusive.  
The theoretical argument, which encourages employing a smaller number on the board of 
directors, has been discussed extensively in the literature. Lipton and Lorsch (1992), 
Eisenberg et al., (1998), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Harris and Raviv, 2008), Saravia 
(2010) and Robb and Watson (2012) are all examples of literature focussing on and 
providing a variety of arguments on this issue. Eisenberg et al., (1998) and Saravia (2010) 
provide a comparison between larger and smaller board sizes. They report that large 
boards are more likely to suffer from coordination, communication, and other decision-
making process problems than boards of a smaller size. According to them, small boards 
are better monitors of management than large ones. Accordingly, they argue that the 
performance of larger boards should be less efficient compared to that of smaller boards. 
This argument is supported by Robb and Watson (2012) and Bøhren and Strøm (2007) as 
they report that the larger board will challenge the interactive discussion during board 
meetings.   This is due to board members taking longer to come to a decision, as well as 
preferring to make more conventional decisions than smaller boards. Bøhren and Strøm 
(2007) also argue that larger boards lessen board’s creativity and decisiveness. In the 
same context, Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Eisenberg et al., (1998), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) and Harris and Raviv (2008) provide arguments for a positive association between 
smaller board size and firm performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Harris and Raviv, 
2008) report that within smaller board size all directors are more capable to comfortably 
contribute to the discussion during their meeting, therefore, smaller boards are more likely 
to be characterised by cohesion, and to enter into more effective discussions than bigger 
boards. Further reasoning supporting the employment of smaller boards is given by 
Eisenberg et al., (1998) who report that enlarging the board increases CEO control and 
lessens the board’s ability to resist CEO’s undesirable decisions which will consequently, 
according to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), make the board more symbolic than effective in 
the management process. Consequently, they suggest, this leads to agency problems 
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emerging from the separation of management and control. The argument on the negative 
impact of large board size is also supported by Robb and Watson (2012) who claim larger 
boards undermine cost minimisation, as it is correlated with higher expenses, in terms of 
directors’ salaries and remuneration, than smaller size boards.  
On the other hand, Coles et al., (2008) cast doubt on the idea that smaller boards are 
necessarily ideal for all firms, as larger boards could possibly offer better advice to the 
CEO. By mentioning this, Coles et al., (2008) link the number of board directors 
proportionately to firm size. In this context, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) report that due to 
cost issues, general board size should range between eight and nine directors. They claim 
that board size beyond this range will be linked to lower managerial gain for the incurred 
cost. Additionally, Eisenberg et al., (1998), who document negative correlation between 
board size and profitability of small firms, and small boards in Finland, report that, in 
small firms, there is sometimes a tendency to employ relatives to the board, despite the 
fact that such employment may not increase the board value.  
Further discussion on the impact of board size on financial performance is given by 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Yawson, (2006) Abeysekera (2010) and Al-Musalli and 
Ismail (2012), who provide opinions that stand for positive relationship between a large 
corporate board and financial firm performance.  
Al-Musalli and Ismail (2012) support a positive relationship between the larger size of a 
board and performance, arguing that there is a greater expectation for larger boards to 
consist of a greater number of experts, with varied business and educational backgrounds, 
talents and skills which improve board’s tasks. These characteristics will consequently 
improve the quality of policy, strategy, decisions and actions taken by any board. 
Abeysekera (2010) argues that when a larger board is employed, it is more probable it 
will increase firms' ability to acquire and protect critical resources. He also reports that a 
larger board is more likely to contribute to providing better interrelationships between a 
firm and its external stakeholder groups, and providing a better image for the firm in 
society. Furthermore, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) suggest larger boards are possibly more 
productive. They justify this positive relationship by reasoning that larger boards are more 
capable of providing a diversity of experience and skills, which aid companies’ ability to 
wisely utilise their critical resources and lessen environmental uncertainties. This opinion 
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is supported by Yawson, (2006) who argues that larger size of the corporate board is more 
likely to supply the company with a wider range of knowledge backgrounds, on which 
important decisions and advice can be based.  
Further opinion is given by Robb and Watson (2012) to the effect that the size of the 
board should not be too large, as this will challenge an interactive discussion during board 
meetings and undermine deliberations and cost minimisation. It should also not be too 
small, as the presence of a small number of skilled expertise will negatively impact board 
decisions and performance. They report that the impact of board size could possibly 
influence the financial performance of banks, either positively or negatively. 
The additional argument on optimal board size is given by Xie and Fukumoto (2013) who 
assert that the relationship between a firm’s performance and the board size is not as 
simple as earlier thought. They report that empirical evidence on the association between 
firm performance and board size is strongly influenced by the characteristics of the 
studied firms. This has been explained by Larmou and Vafeas (2010) as the relationship 
between board size and firm performance not being a monotonous relationship. Their 
opinion supports the existence of an optimal range of board size, meaning that increasing 
the number of board directors only enhances firm performance when the board size is 
very small, although it will negatively impact the performance if board’s size increases 
beyond a certain point.  
A further argument is given by Coles et al., (2008) who believe that for certain types of 
firms, larger boards increase firm value. They report that generally, there are two types 
of firms, simple and complex, each type having distinctive optimal board size. They argue 
that complex firms, such as those that are diversified, large or those that largely depend 
on debt financing, are normally characterised by having greater advising needs. For this 
reason, a larger board provides more experience, knowledge and, consequently, better 
advice. According to Coles et al., (2008) complex firms should employ larger boards of 
directors to ensure diverse advice and expertise are provided to the CEO, which should 
improve firm’s performance.  
Coles et al (2008) report that, depending on the differences between complex and simple 
firms, the relationship between firm value and board size is U-shaped, meaning that either 
158 
 
very small or very large boards can be optimal for companies' performance. In contrast, 
Xie and Fukumoto (2013) document that the relationship between board size and firms’ 
performance can be illustrated by a hump-shape, suggesting a bigger board size may only 
be worthy for companies under certain conditions. They report that companies with 
smaller board size enjoy a good quality of the board's monitoring and advising. However, 
as the number of board member’s increases above a certain number, the competence and 
capability of the board decreases, and firm performance deteriorates. This means the 
advantage of extending the board continues to apply up to a certain limit as the board size 
increases, then the descending hump shape begins to form. 
Coles et al (2008) also discuss the difficulties of adjusting the board size to the optimal 
size. They report that if a firm need to adjust its board size, for the benefits of its 
performance and value, it must consider the transaction costs of shifting to the new board 
structure, and specify some appropriate control variables, through which they can manage 
the advantages of the targeted board size. They also report that if the transaction costs are 
significant, and could possibly impact the performance negatively, firms could deviate 
from their optimal board size and structure. In such a situation, complex firms are likely 
to have smaller boards than the optimal. Coles et al (2008) report as costs related to adding 
a board member are not modest, this could prevent companies from employing more 
board members. Therefore, companies may need to continue working with suboptimal 
board size for the sake of extending the period of time in which it needs to employ a new 
board member, and consequently, reduce the expenses of filling seats on the board of 
directors. They also report that, for a newly founded firm, it could take time before it is 
ascertained which members of the board have the necessary skills.  
Coles et al (2008) also discuss the argument on the optimal size of the board of directors 
and performance for newly established simple firms. They report that transaction and 
contracting costs could possibly obstruct board of directors downsizing. Firstly, the 
process of electing a new board member to restructure the board size could possibly 
hinder downsizing. Secondly, when a company employs a new board member, the 
company creates an embedded contract with that director, that he will not be fired unless 
he performs poorly. Therefore, shedding a director from his job for reasons of board 
downsizing may negatively impact the company’s reputation, making it more difficult for 
the firm to employ qualified directors in future. Thirdly, the company may bear legal costs 
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for removing a director before the completion of his or her contract. Accordingly, when 
a company decides to downsize its board of directors, it first needs to identify who needs 
to be fired, and then wait until his or her contract is over. Therefore, there will be an 
interim before the company can reach the optimal board size. In this context, Dahya et 
al., (2002) and Coles et al., (2008) report that companies prefer to employ outside 
directors, to lessen the possibility of firing inside directors and the ensuing consequences.  
Additional discussion on the optimisation of board size is given by Bhagat and Black 
(1999), reporting no consistent relationship between board size and the performance of 
American public companies, as measured by ROA and Tobin's Q. They conclude that 
board size is obviously determined by factors such as inside share ownership, firm size, 
type of industry and board independence, and such factors having the greatest influence 
in determining firm performance. Bhagat and Black (1999) also report that if the impact 
of board size on firm performance is not clearly identified, conventional wisdom calls for 
supermajority-independent (directors from outside) boards and, therefore, managers and 
directors may easily decide to meet investor demand to satisfy them.  
Overall, the above mentioned discussion represents controversies related to the size of 
board of directors, which make it possible to appreciate the argument of Alexandrina 
(2011), who states there is an optimal board size which differs across firms and over time 
and, therefore, a particular size of board can have a positive or negative influence on any 
firm’s performance. 
Within Islamic Banking Industry, the impact of board size on performance has been 
neglected and this calls for investigation into the impact of this on the Sudanese banking 
industry, the Islamic banking industry in particular. It should be mentioned that the 
number of board directors of in the examined banks ranges from a minimum of 5 to 
maximum of 16, which gives an opportunity to investigate and find the impact of board 
size on the performance of these banks 
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8.2.2. Empirical Studies on the Impact of Top Management Gender Diversity and 
size of Board of Directors on Financial Performance 
8.2.2.1. Empirical Studies on Gender Diversity, Board size and Firms’ Performance  
Turning to the empirical studies on the impact of gender on top levels of management and 
size of the board of directors, some studies focus on the influence of female diversity on 
firms’ boards of directors. Other types of studies focus on the impact of female 
representation within top departmental management. Some studies investigate the impact 
of a female CEO, whilst others are extended to include, and examine, the impact of (CEO) 
and vice-directors due to the limited number of female top CEOs. Further studies 
highlight the impact gender diversity has on top management, covering both boards of 
directors and CEOs of firms in general.  
It should be noted that the impact of board size on business performance is a common 
factor in all these types of studies. Findings of all types of studies are inconclusive, as 
some of them prove a positive association between the studied factors and performance, 
whilst few provide evidence that shows a negative, or even no association, between these 
factors and performance. Following is a summary of all these types of studies. 
Among the first to investigate and support the argument for women in top management 
in the western countries, are Shrader et al., (1997), Carter et al., (2003) and Catalyst 
(2004) who investigate the association between gender diversity and US firms’ 
performance. Shrader et al., (1997) use ROA, ROE and profit margin to investigate the 
impact of gender diversity, of departmental managers and board of directors, on the 
performance of 200 large U.S. firms. Their findings prove either insignificant or, in some 
cases, a negative and significant impact of gender diversity at top management level. They 
justify the insignificant impact by reasoning the limited representation of females at top 
management levels weakens their impact on firm performance. They also report that 
another possible reason for this relationship could be because females have not been 
employed as departmental managers, or on boards of directors’, for enough time to enable 
measurable impact.  
Using Tobin’s Q as a performance measure, Carter et al., (2003) focus on Fortune 1000 
firms for the year 1997 and find significant positive relationships between the fraction of 
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women on the board of directors, and firm financial value. They also prove that the 
percentage of women on boards increases with firm size and board size, but decreases as 
the number of insider directors increases. Their findings also propose that firms making 
a commitment to raising the number of women on boards are also those firms with more 
ethnic minorities on their boards, and vice versa. 
Catalyst (2004) also finds evidence that companies with greater diversity attain better 
financial results. Later, Catalyst (2007) also utilises various financial ratios of a sample 
of 520 US firms’ data, to investigate the performance of their board directors, with or 
without female representation. He uses ROE, ROC and returns on sales (ROS) between 
2001 and 2003. He classifies the sample according to the average percentage of women 
on those companies’ boards and divides the companies into four groups of 130 companies 
for each group. He compares the financial performance of companies in the top group, 
which are those with the higher percentage of females on their boards, with that of the 
performance of companies in the bottom group, which are the companies with the lowest 
percentage of women on their boards. His findings show the financial performance of the 
top group is at least 41 percent higher for return on sales, and 64 percent higher for return 
on capital, compared to that of the bottom group. Catalyst (2007) reports that the 
relationship between the existence of women on the board, and financial performance of 
these companies, does not essentially imply a causal relationship between these two 
variables. It may also be worth mentioning that he does not investigate the statistical 
significance of the performance differences.  
Smith (2005) focuses on gender diversity, at both boards of directors and departmental 
management levels, of the 2500 largest Danish firms, Denmark being considered as one 
of the countries with the highest proportion of women in the worldwide labour market. 
He uses data over the 1993-2001 period, and the ROA and the Gross value added/net 
turnover as performance measures, to investigate the impact of the proportion of female 
departmental managers and female directors on firm performance. He finds a negative 
association between the existence of females on the board of directors and performance 
measures, which he justifies by reasoning that a large proportion of women on boards 
have family ties to the owners. His findings also show that the impact of higher 
representation of women as departmental managers on the performance measures varies 
from nil to positive impact. Smith (2005) also finds that female members of boards of 
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directors who are elected by staff members appear to have positive effects on firm 
performance.   
Rose (2007) does not find any significant relationship between firm performance, 
measured by Tobin’s Q, and female representation on the board of directors of listed 
Danish firms during 1998–2001 period. With respect to board diversity, he finds that 
foreign managers mostly, and unconsciously, support the ideas of the majority of 
traditional board members, which makes it impossible for potential performance of 
female representation to become realised. He also found that in spite of the reality that 
the country's law has already established the liberalisation of women policy, Danish 
boards of directors and executive management are still, to a great extent, dominated by 
men.  
Campbell and Vera (2007) examine the relationship between gender diversity on the 
board of directors and firms’ financial performance in Spain. They also investigate the 
causal relationship between gender and firm performance. They find a positive impact of 
female representation on boards, as measured by the ratio of women to men, and ROA 
and Tobin's Q. However, they find an insignificant relationship between the two 
performance measures and the gender existence when measured by a dummy variable. 
Campbell and Vera (2007) also find that in firms of bigger size and larger boards, there 
is a greater probability of female representation.  
Francoeur et al., (2007) use a sample of US firms during 2001 to 2003 to investigate 
whether the participation of women in the firm’s top management enhances financial 
performance, as measured by ROA. They prove positive and significant impact on ROA 
exists for firms operating in complex environments when they have a high proportion of 
women officers in their management and governance systems. This indicates, they argue, 
that firms with a high percentage of females on the board of directors and CEOs levels 
create enough profit to keep up with average market returns. 
Bøhren and Strøm (2007) use Tobin's Q as a performance measure to estimate the impact 
of gender diversity on the performance of Norwegian listed non-financial firms. They 
prove significant adverse relationships between small boards and firm performance, as 
well as between gender diversity on boards of directors and firm performance.  
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They report that the negative relationship between gender diversity and performance 
measure is due to more diversified boards being less effective in decision making. They 
justify the negative relationship between board size and performance measure by the 
higher expense related to employing larger boards of directors. Bøhren and Strøm (2007) 
also find that boards with low gender diversity are smaller in size, and have less age 
diversity. 
Adams and Ferreira (2008) use ROA and Tobin's Q to investigate the impact of gender 
diversity on the board of Standard & Poor US firms for the period 1996-2003. They find 
that in years in which firms have women on their boards; firms are larger in size, have 
more business divisions, have better performance in terms of ROA, and have larger board 
size than firms without female directors. However, they find that firms with female 
representation have worse performance, in terms of Tobin's Q than firms without female 
directors. They also find an adverse relationship between gender diversity, of the board, 
and Tobin’s Q.  Adams and Ferreira (2008) also provide evidence that female directors 
behave differently than male directors, for instance, they are proven to have better 
attendance records. 
Larmou and Vafeas (2010) study a sample of smaller size western firms with a history of 
modest performance, from a database of Compustat active and research files for the 
period 1994-2000. They present evidence supporting a positive impact of enlarging board 
size when it is significantly smaller. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2011) investigate the impact of new legislation in Norway which, in 
2003, required 40 percent of Norwegian firms’ top management to be women. At the 
time, only nine percent of directors were women. They find that the change in the 
percentage of top managers with higher education degrees is larger for firms that faced a 
greater constraint from the quota. They also find that consideration of CEO duration of 
previous experience is considerably decreased as a result of the new gender quota. Ahern 
and Dittmar (2011) also prove that the personal characteristics of board members, such 
as education and previous experience, are clearly related to their advisory role. They also 
find that the new female directors are significantly less CEO experienced, more highly 
educated, and more likely to be employed as a non-executive manager, compared to 
retained male directors. Interestingly, their result shows no changes in the board size as a 
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result of the quota. This is interpreted as the quota may have been met by firms only 
adding new female directors as it was optimal for them to maintain the same size of the 
board of directors at the cost of replacing male directors. With respect to finding the 
impact of the application of the new gender legislation, Ahern and Dittmar (2011) 
document that firms have gained less accounting returns following application of the 
quota which, according to them, indicates those boards of directors are less efficient as 
monitors and advisors. 
Dezső and Ross (2011) use 15 years’ data, of a sample of 1,500 U.S. public companies, 
to investigate the impact of the existence of females in the middle management level on 
firms’ performance. They use ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q, as performance measures, and 
prove a positive and significant association between firms’ financial performance and 
female representation in top management, when firms’ strategy is focused on innovation. 
They also examine the impact of firm size, as measured by total assets, firm age, leverage 
and number of managers on the top management team. They also find that size and 
leverage are negatively and significantly related to firm performance. On the other hand, 
they prove a positive and significant association between firm age and performance.  
Navarro and Gallo (2014) utilise Enterprise Surveys Data from the World Bank to study 
the effect of employing female CEOs, and other employees’ characteristics, on ROA, 
ROE and Tobin's Q. Their study documents a positive effect of female CEOs on firm 
performance. They also prove those females are not less risk-taking than men, in 
administrating firms. Furthermore, Navarro and Gallo (2014) prove positive association 
between female CEO and other female job opportunities. Interestingly, an indication of 
some regional effects is found by their study, as female managers of companies located 
in the East Asia-Pacific region and Eastern Europe and Central Asia were found, on 
average, to perform better than men, whilst opposed relationship is found in companies 
located in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.  
Vieito (2012) examines whether ROA of largest US 1,500 public companies during 1992 
to 2004 is affected by the gender of CEO and vice-presidents. They find firms with a 
female CEO and vice-president, perform better than companies managed by a male CEO 
in these positions.  
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Campbell and Vera (2007) find a positive impact of female representation, as measured 
by the ratio of women to men on the board of directors and firm value, in Spain. However, 
they find an insignificant relationship between the two variables when gender diversity is 
measured by a dummy variable. Additionally, they find the insignificant impact of the 
causal association between performance and gender representation in top management. 
Campbell and Vera (2007) document that greater gender diversity in firms located in 
Spain creates economic gains for these firms. They also find that investors do not penalise 
firms which raise the number of female board membership. 
Rovers (2010) uses ROE, stock price growth and the dividends paid, to examine the 
performance of 99 listed Dutch companies, both with and without women on their boards 
of directors. He proves that higher ROE of companies with women on the board is more 
consistent than for companies without women on the board, meaning that firms with 
women board directors perform better than those without.  
Studies focusing on the relationship between the board of directors’ size and firm 
performance, starts with the earlier study of Yermack (1996) who examines the 
association between board size and financial performance in a sample of 452 large US 
industrial corporations for the period 1984-1991. He documents a negative association 
between corporate board size and performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. He also found 
that companies with small boards’ size are proven to have better values in terms of 
financial ratios. Findings of some recent studies on US based firms (see Cheng, 2008; 
Coles et al., 2008 and Cheng et al., 2008) and non-US evidence (see Xie and Fukumoto, 
2013; Guest, 2009 and Bozec, 2005) are all in line with those of Yermack (1996).  
Bhagat and Black (2002) investigate the relationship between board size and the 
performance of 934 US largest firms between 1985 and 1995. They use ROA and Tobin's 
Q as performance measures and find no regular association between the two factors. 
Coles et al., (2008) study a sample of 8,165 observations from US Execucomp Compact 
Disclosure and Investor Responsibility Research Centre over the period 1992–2001. They 
document that firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, is positively associated with board 
size in complex firms. They report that the main reason for the positive relationship is 
that bigger boards provide a valued recommendation to the CEO and management team. 
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Sanda et al., (2005) also provide evidence supporting a positive relationship between 
board size and ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q of 93 Nigerian listed firms during 1996-1999. 
They argue larger boards provide a wider range of advice as well as aiding securing firms’ 
critical resources. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) focus on the performance of eastern countries, by using ROA 
and Tobin’s Q as the performance measure, to examine the relationship between board 
size and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Their findings prove the positive 
relationship between ROA and larger boards, as it is thought to aid the firms' diversity in 
contacts and expertise needed to improve performance. However, it provides a negative 
relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q. They document that, according to 
investors’ perception, larger boards are less effective in monitoring performance, and may 
possibly cause a firm to incur more cost to meet directors’ compensation.   
Xie and Fukumoto (2013) use data on 798 Japanese companies during 1995 to 1998 to 
examine the relationship between firm performance and board size. They find a positive 
and significant association between ROA and small board size, and a negative and 
significant connection when the board size is large. Their findings suggest that board size 
may significantly depend on the individual characteristics of firms used in any given 
analysis. 
8.2.2.2. Empirical Studies on Gender Diversity, Board Size and Banks’ Performance 
Although the literature provides various surveys on the impact of gender on firms’ 
performance, Pathan et al., (2012) report that studies on the impact of board size on banks’ 
performance are worth doing as the existing literature on their impact is contradictory and 
inconclusive. 
Studies on bank performance in the western countries can be seen in Adams and Mehran 
(2005), Smith (2005); Gulamhussen and Santa (2010); Alexandrina (2011); Alexandrina 
(2011); Adams and Mehran (2011) and Prete and Stefani (2013). 
In the context of studies focusing on the relationship between banking industry 
performance and the size of the board of directors, Adams and Mehran (2005) use a 
sample of 35 US listed Banking firms for the period 1959-1995. Their results bring 
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evidence of a positive and significant association between board size and Tobin’s Q. They 
also suggest that minimising board size to improve firm performance may impact 
adversely. 
Gulamhussen and Santa (2010) use data from 461 large banks in Norway, Sweden, Spain 
and France to assess the role of women in bank boardrooms. They document that the 
presence and percentage of female presentation in boardrooms positively impacts ROE, 
ROA and operating income of these banks. However, they prove a negative association 
between females’ presence in boardrooms and risk-taking measures, namely loan loss 
reserves, loan loss provisions and impaired loans ratio. 
Alexandrina (2011) examines the impact of gender diversity in executive management 
and board of directors, and board size, on the ROE and ROA of Romanian banking 
system. He finds that board size has an insignificant impact on these banks. He also 
documents the positive and significant impact of gender representation on both ROA and 
ROE, and proves that gender representation on boards of directors has a positive and 
significant impact on ROE, but insignificant impact on ROA.  
In the context of U.S. banks, Pathan et al., (2012) use a panel of 212 large banks during 
1997-2004 to investigate the impact of board size and gender diversity in boards on the 
performance of US banks. They use ROA, ROE, NIM, Tobin’s Q, pre-tax operating 
income and stock return. After controlling for relevant sources of endogeneity, they prove 
a negative association between the board size and banks’ performance. Concerning 
empirical findings on the impact of gender diversity, they prove that gender diversity in 
the boardroom improves bank performance.  
Prete and Stefani (2013) provide evidence showing no impact of gender diversity on both 
boards of directors and executive committee level on Italian Banks’ performance. They 
also examine the influence of the gender gap in top management positions and prove the 
existence of a “second glass ceiling” within the Italian Banking industry. Their findings 
also show that the number of women at top management level is greater in banks 
belonging to the major banking groups, whether their board size is big or not. They also 
prove that female representation is greater in banks that are more cost efficient, and in 
those with a larger share of risky loans in the past.  
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Reinert et al., (2015) investigate the impact of the percentage of females among all 
managers, including senior executives as well as members of the board of directors, on 
Luxembourg Banks’ performance for the period 1999-2013. They prove a positive 
relationship between female representation on the banks’ top management and ROE of 
these Banks. They also prove that the nature of the positive relationship has even doubled 
during the global financial crisis. 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) use two performance measures, ROA and Tobin's Q to 
investigate the impact of board size on the performance of a sample of large international 
commercial banks. They document an inverted U-shaped association between bank 
performance and board size, also proving that board size of a bank is linked to directors’ 
ability to monitor and recommend advice for business management. 
Dutta and Bose (2006) explore the nature of the impact of the presence of women on the 
boards of directors on ROE and ROA of commercial banks in Bangladesh during 2002-
2005. They find that there is no significant difference between the performance of 
Bangladesh commercial banks with or without gender diversity. 
Robb and Watson (2012) examine the impact of gender diversity and number of board 
members on the financial performance of Kenyan Commercial Banks. They found that 
the gender composition of the boards is positively and significantly related to the financial 
performance of Kenyan commercial banks.  They further find that the number of board 
members is negatively and highly significantly related to the financial performance 
(returns on capital) of Kenyan commercial banks. 
Nyamongo and Temesgen (2013) use 37 commercial banks’ data from Kenya over the 
period 2005-2009 to examine the impact of board size on their ROA and ROE. They 
prove the inverse relationship between large board size and ROA, whilst no impact is 
proved with ROE. A similar result is obtained by Robb and Watson (2012), who examine 
the impact of board size on the financial performance of 16 Kenyan commercial banks 
during period 1990 to 2005, and find the number of board members is negatively and 
highly significantly related to the financial performance, as measured by returns on 
capital. Robb and Watson (2012) also find that the gender composition of the boards is 
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positively and significantly related to the financial performance of Kenyan commercial 
banks.  
In the context of Middle Eastern countries, Tai (2015) investigates the impact of board 
size on the ROA of 57 publicly listed national GCC banks for the period 2011 to 2013. 
The results document that board size has a positive impact on ROA. 
Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) use the OLS to investigate the influence of board size 
on the performance of a sample of nine listed Kuwaiti banks during 2006 to 2010. They 
find that board size negatively impacts bank ROA of Kuwaiti bank, suggesting smaller 
boards are probably easier to coordinate and enable better communication between 
members, which leads to better monitoring and reduced risks, consequently enhancing 
banks’ performance. Nevertheless, their findings show the insignificant relationship 
between board size and Tobin's Q, indicating that board size is not seen by the market as 
linked to better performance.   
Shorouq Tomar and Bino (2012) use ROA and ROE to examine the impact of board size 
on a sample of 14 listed Jordanian Banks during period 1997 to 2006, using a linear 
regression analysis.  They document that board size has no influence on the performance 
of the examined banks. 
In the Islamic banking context, some studies focus on the impact of board size on the 
performance of these banks, but further to the researcher’s knowledge, there is no 
previous study on the relationship between gender diversity and profitability performance 
of Islamic banks.  
Ansari and Siddique (2013) utilise regression analysis to examine the performance of 
Islamic and conventional banks, using 10 Pakistani banks during 2008 to 2012. Their 
findings indicate board size has no significant impact on ROA of these banks 
Bukhari et al., (2013) explore the impact of boards of directors on 17 Pakistani banks 
using questionnaire. Their findings prove that the most important factors impacting the 
corporate governance performance in Islamic banks in Pakistan are boards of directors 
and Shari’ah supervisory board. 
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On the contrary, Li et al., (2014) examine the influence of board size on Islamic Banks’ 
performance as measured by ROA, ROI and Tobin’s Q. Their findings prove that Islamic 
Banks are more likely to have better financial performance if board size is bigger. 
In conclusion, Bhagat and Black (1999) and Campbell and Vera (2007) suggest that 
contradiction in empirical evidence on the impact of gender diversity and board size on 
firm performance may possibly be explained as follows: 
Firstly, the studies are related to different periods of time and to different countries, 
therefore, the influence of gender diversity and board size may depend on the time period 
and on the institutional context. Secondly, the adopted methodology impacts studies’ 
findings. Smith (2005) and Campbell and Vera (2007) suggest that inconsistent findings 
may be due to the different estimation methods used by different researchers. Thirdly, 
according to Campbell and Vera (2007), some studies used no control variables (such as 
firm size industry, inside share ownership, firm size and leverage) as well as ignoring 
other unobserved factors impacting firm performance. Smith (2005) reports that such 
variables may correlate with corporate governance aspects, and may consequently bias 
the result if not controlled for.  
Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 summarise findings of previous studies on the impact of board 
size and gender diversity of corporate governance on financial performance. 
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Table 8.1: Studies on the Impact of Gender Diversity of Corporate Governance on 
Financial Performance. 
Study Factors and Findings  Sample  Performance 
Measure  
US: 
Shrader et al., 
(1997) 
 
 
 
Yermack (1996)  
 
 
Carter et al., 
(2003) 
 
Dezső and Ross 
(2011) 
 
 
Francoeur et al., 
(2007) 
 
Female board of 
directors (-) and 
senior managers 
(varied from negative 
to insignificant) 
 
board size (-) 
 
 
Female on board (+) 
 
 
Female on senior 
managers (+) 
 
 
gender in the firm’s 
board of directors (+) 
 
200 large U.S. 
firms 
 
 
 
452 large US 
industrial 
corporations for 
the period 1984-
1991 
Fortune 1000 
firms for the year 
1997 
 
1,500 U.S. public 
companies during 
1992-2006 
 
US firms during 
2001 to 2003 
 
ROA, ROE,  
ROS, return on and 
profit margin  
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
 
 
Tobin’s Q as 
 
 
 
ROA, ROE and 
Tobin's Q, 
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Vieito (2012)  
 
 
 
 
Pathan et al., 
(2012) 
 
 
Bhagat and Black 
(2002)  
 
 
Coles et al., 
(2008) 1992–
2001.  
 
and senior 
management (+) 
 
 
largest US 1,500 
public companies 
during 1992 to 2004 
 
 
 
board size (-) and 
gender diversity in 
boards (+)  
 
board size (no 
impact) 
 
 
Board size, U shape 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender of CEO 
and vice-
presidents, firms 
with female 
managers perform 
better.  
 
 
212 large banks 
during 1997-2004 
 
 
934 US largest 
firm during 1985 
and 1995. 
 
 
R and D firms 
during 1992–
2001 
 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
 
ROA, ROE, NIM, 
Tobin’s Q, pre-tax 
operating income 
and stock return.  
 
ROA and Tobin's Q  
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Adams and 
Mehran (2005) 
 
board size (+)   
35 The US listed 
Banks for the 
period 1959-
1995. 
 
Tobin’s Q  
 
 
Europe: 
Smith (2005)  
 
 
 
Rose (2007)  
 
 
Campbell and 
Vera (2007) 
 
Gulamhussen 
and Santa (2010) 
 
Alexandrina 
(2011)  
 
 
CEO and Vice 
president (+) and on 
Board (+) 
 
 
Females on Board 
 
 
Females on Board, 
varied from (+ to -) 
 
Females on Board (+) 
 
Female CEO (+), 
female on board of 
directors (+) and 
 
2500 largest 
Danish firms 
during 1993-2001  
 
 
Danish firms 
during 1998–
2001 
68 Spain firms 
during 1995 to 
2000 
461 large banks in 
Norway, Sweden, 
Spain and France  
 
Romanian banks 
during 2010 
 
 
ROA, ROE, NIM, 
Tobin’s Q, pre-tax 
operating income 
and stock return.  
 
 
Tobin’s Q  
 
Tobin’s Q and ROA 
 
 
ROE, ROA and 
operating income  
 
ROE and ROA 
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Prete and Stefani 
(2013) 
 
 
 
Reinert et al., 
(2015) 
 
board size 
(insignificant) 
 
gender diversity on 
both board of 
directors and 
executive committee 
(no impact) 
 
gender on top 
management position 
(+) 
 
Italian Banks 
during 1995-2010  
 
 
 
264 Luxembourg 
Banks during 
1999-2013 
 
 
ROA  
 
 
 
ROE 
Eastern 
countries: 
Dutta and Bose 
(2006) 
 
Sanda et al., 
(2005)  
 
Haniffa and the 
performance of 
Malaysian listed 
companies 
 
 
gender diversity on 
the board of directors 
of (no impact) 
 
board size (+) 
 
 
board size, (+) on 
ROA, (-) Tobin’s Q  
 
 
 
15 of Bangladesh 
commercial banks 
during 2002-2005 
 
93 Nigerian firms 
during 1996-1999 
 
347 Malaysian 
listed companies 
during 1996 and 
2000  
 
 
 
ROE and ROA  
 
 
ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
ROA and Tobin’s Q  
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Nyamongo and 
Temesgen (2013) 
 
 
Tai (2015) 
 
 
 
Al-Saidi and Al-
Shammari (2013) 
  
 
 
Shorouq Tomar 
and Bino (2012)   
board size, (-) on 
ROA, no impact on 
ROE 
 
board size (+) 
 
 
 
board size, (-) on 
ROA and (+) on 
Tobin's Q 
 
 
board size (no 
impact) 
37 commercial 
banks Kenyan 
during 2005-2009  
 
57 publicly listed 
national GCC 
banks for the 
period 2011 to 
2013. 
 
Nine listed 
Kuwait banks 
during 2006 to 
2010 
 
14 listed 
Jordanian Banks 
during 1997 to 
2006 
 
ROA and ROE  
 
 
 
ROA 
 
 
 
ROA and Tobin's Q 
 
 
 
 
ROA and ROE 
 
8.3. Operational Definitions of Variables  
8.3.1. Dependent Variables 
Marinova (2010) and Navarro and Gallo (2014) report that there are two key types of 
performance measures widely applied in corporate governance research: market-based 
measures (e.g. Tobin’s Q and portfolio returns), and accounting measures (e.g. ROE, 
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ROA and ROI). In this context, Gjerde et al., (2008) and Ahern and Dittmar (2011) 
comment on the usefulness of utilising the accounting measures, by reporting that changes 
in accounting rules make this type of performance measure less consistent than market-
based performance measures. However, such measures remain widely used in corporate 
governance literature as they reliably reflect firms’ financial performance.  
In the Sudanese Islamic Banking context, the available data lacks the required information 
to apply market-based indicators; however, the accounting measures are still the main 
target of this research. Following Shrader et al., (1997), Smith et al., (2005), Catalyst 
(2007), Adams and Ferreira (2008), Rovers (2010) and Alexandrina (2011), ROA and 
ROE are used as dependent variables for this part of the research. It may also be worth 
mentioning that these two measures are among the most commonly used profitability 
measures in literature. 
8.3.2. Independent Variables 
8.3.2.1. Board of Directors’ Gender Diversity 
Following Campbell and Vera (2007), Rose (2007) and Pathan et al., (2012), gender 
diversity in the Sudanese Islamic banks’ boards of directors is measured by the percentage 
of females on the board of each of the examined Sudanese bank. 
8.3.2.2. Gender Diversity of Departmental Managers 
The most restrictive definition of gender diversity in literature includes only the 
percentage with a female CEO in the firm (see Navarro and Gallo, 2014 and Vieito, 2012). 
Other research extended gender diversity to include both top management (CEO) and 
vice-directors, because of the limited number of female CEOs (Smith et al., 2006). As a 
large proportion of Sudanese Islamic Banks have limited number of females at CEO and 
vice-directors’ levels, the researcher follows the same approach as Prete and Stefani 
(2013) Alexandrina (2011) Shrader et al., (1997), Reinert et al., (2015) to introduce a 
broader definition of top management levels that includes senior managers. Accordingly, 
gender diversity among senior managers is measured by the number of female’ senior 
managers to total number departmental managers of each Sudanese bank. Such data is 
obtained from banks’ annual reports. To identify the gender of the board members and 
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senior managers the researcher uses the following parameters. First, she uses a 
photograph of the person in the banks’ annual report. If a photo is not presented, she bases 
her gender identification on the first name of the person.  
8.3.2.3. Size of Board of Directors 
Following Yermack (1996), Bhagat and Black (2002), Coles et al., (2008) and 
Alexandrina (2011)'s previous studies in measuring board size, the researcher uses a 
number of directors within each board of directors as a proxy for board size.  
8.3.2.4. Control variables  
Pathan et al., (2012) report that research on the impact of the structure of corporate 
governance on firm performance should control for endogeneity, at least in the board size 
variable. This is due to board size being influenced by firm characteristics, such as firm 
size. Accordingly, findings could be biased if these characteristics (sources of 
endogeneity) are not controlled for. Additionally, Ammari et al., (2014) considers 
‘dynamic endogeneity’, which they define as “the manner in which a firm’s current 
performance affects both its future performance and governance”, as an important source 
of endogeneity that should be controlled for in research that focuses on the association 
between governance and performance relation studies, so as to attain unbiased 
evaluations. However, Pathan et al., (2012) and Pathan and Skully (2010) argue that 
within the banking industry, dynamic endogeneity is less problematic because a bank’s 
past performance does not normally impact its board of directors’ size.  
Whatever the debate on the importance of controlling for endogeneity factors, the 
researcher has benefitted from the findings of Chapter Seven, which prove that bank age, 
bank type, leverage, management efficiency, assets utilisation, specialisation and PLS 
modes of finance are the factors significantly influencing the performance of Sudanese 
Islamic banks, and uses these variables as control variables. As bank size has no impact 
on Sudanese Islamic Banks performance, it has been excluded from among control 
variables. 
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8.4. Summary 
Within corporate governance context, this chapter focuses on the theoretical and 
empirical evidence of the impact of top management gender diversity on firms’ and 
banks’ financial performance. Its objective is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to review existing 
theoretical framework that attempts to identify the nature of the relationship between 
gender diversity in top management positions and the size of the board of directors on the 
financial performance. Secondly, to review the empirical literature on the link between 
gender diversity in top management positions, and the impact of the size of the board of 
directors on the financial performance.  
Although most of the empirical evidence stand for a positive relationship between gender 
diversity and financial performance, and a negative association between board size and 
financial performance, general evidence from practical studies on the relationship 
between the two factors and firms’ financial performance is still controversial. 
In this regard, the researcher has built six empirical models –will be explained in the next 
chapter-  in which she identifies, and compares, the relationship between gender diversity 
in top management positions, the board of directors’ size and the financial performance 
of Sudanese Islamic Banks. This will offer a unique opportunity to bring into existence 
first time comparative and comprehensive evidence on the impact of the two factors on 
these banks. Using these seven models, the next chapter will report the estimated 
empirical results on the impact of each studied factor on the performance of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks. 
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Chapter Nine 
The Empirical Results on Corporate Governance and Profitability 
9.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an empirical evidence on the determinants of Sudanese Islamic 
banks' performance within the corporate governance context. It provides findings on the 
interrelationship between profitability, which is seen here as depending on a number of 
factors covering gender diversity, of the board of directors and at departmental managers’ 
level, the board size and other key financial indicators, which are used as control 
variables. In addition, performance (i.e. profitability) is measured by ROA and ROE. By 
examining this relation, the researcher attempts to identify which of the three corporate 
governance factors is significant in explaining and predicting the performance of 
Sudanese Islamic banks. 
This chapter is divided into 5 main sections. Section 2 describes the sample and presents 
the descriptive statistics. Section 3 introduces the estimated regression results and section 
4 shows the findings of the robustness check conducted. Section 5 contains the summary 
and conclusion of the analysis and the findings. 
9.2. Sample and descriptive Analyses 
The sample for this study consists of 26 Sudanese Islamic banks, 9 of which are state 
banks and 17 private banks. Of the total number, 9 banks (34% of the total) have females 
on their board of directors and 11 banks (42% of the total) have females at the 
departmental manager level. Overall, only one bank has a female as a Chairman on the 
board of directors and as a CEO, which limits the possibility of applying any regression 
to assess their impact on the banks’ performance. The number of women on the board of 
directors and departmental managers ranges from 1 to 8 with a majority of banks having 
1 to 2 female board directors and 1 departmental managers. The fact that women are less 
likely to sit on the Board of Directors, at the Chairman or CEO positions, stands as an 
evidence of gender discrimination within top management positions in the Sudanese 
Banking industry, which proves the existence of a second glass ceiling within these banks. 
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Descriptive statistics, which provide an insight into the characteristics of the performance 
measures and indicators are shown in table 9.1.  
Table 9.1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables for 
Sudanese Islamic Banks  
Variable  Mean St dev Max Min No. of obs. 
ROA 0.0266  0.0341   0.3141 -0.0896 191 
ROE 0.1086 0.3177 0.5662 -3.8631 190 
Age 6.9648 0.6465 8.0000 6.0000 199 
Type  0.6793 0.4680 1.0000 0.0000 184 
Specialised   4.0039 1.3073 5.0000 2.0000 252 
Leverage1 0.5723 0.1906 0.9798 0.0000 191 
Mgt. Effici1 0.6894 0.2932 2.7848 0.0983 191 
Assets utilisn1 0.0817 0.0357 0.3619 0.0253 191 
PLS 0.3637 0.3239 1.0000  0.0000 177 
Brd size   10.699 1.4331 16.000 5.0000 153 
Fbsize   0.0643 0.1639 0.8889 0.0000 153 
Fecos 0.0788 0.1463 0.6667 0.0000 153 
Table 9.1 indicates that ROE has a notably higher mean and standard deviation compared 
to ROA.  A higher mean value of ROE means that the average value of ROE is remarkably 
higher than the average value of ROA. Higher values of standard deviation of ROE 
indicates that the data set of ROE are more dispersed from the mean than the ROA values. 
ROE also has a higher minimum and maximum values than ROA. 
Table 9.1 also shows that the mean value of the number of females at top departmental 
management levels, which is (0.0788), is almost similar to the mean value of number of 
females on the board of directors (0.0643), indicating that, on average,  there is no big 
difference in the percentage of female representation in both positions. 
Additionally, the minimum value for the number of females in both board of directors 
and top departmental management levels is 0, indicating that some banks do not employ 
females at these positions. On the contrary, the maximum values for these two factors are 
0.8889 for the board of directors and 0.6667 for departmental managers, confirming that 
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the maximum number of females within the two top management positions is lower at the 
board level rather than at the departmental level. 
Turning to the size of the board of directors, the average number of directors within the 
boards is 10 to 11 members, as the mean value is 10.699, with a minimum of 5 directors 
and a maximum of 16.  
With respect to the control variables, management efficiency has the higher mean value 
(of 0.6894) followed by leverage, with a mean value of 0.5723. Asset utilisation has the 
lowest mean value (of 0.0817) followed by PLS modes of finance which have a mean 
value of 0.3637.  
9.3 Estimated Results Using the Pooled Estimation Method for the Entire Sample  
This section of the study focuses on the impact of the set of profitability determinants on 
the performance of Sudanese Islamic banks, using the pooled estimation method. The 
researcher uses a basic equation of control variables to create seven models, which 
examines how the number of females within the board of directors, at departmental 
manager levels and the size of the board of directors impact the profitability of Sudanese 
Islamic banks. The three variables are substituted as follows to create the models:  
Firstly, the size of the board of directors, the number of females on the board of directors 
and the number of females at departmental manager levels are used in turn in the first 
three models. Model four uses board size and the number of females on the board of 
directors. Model five uses board size and the number of females in departmental 
managers’ levels. Model six uses the number of females on the board of directors and the 
number of females in the departmental managers’ levels. Finally, all the three variables 
are used to create model seven. 
After applying the regression steps, the researcher finds that the ordinary least square is 
the most suitable choice of analysis. This is due to the fact that the fixed effect model is 
rejected for the seven models at the higher likelihood ratio, which ranges from 0.2515 to 
0.2640 for ROA and 0.3923 to 0.7748 for ROE. 
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Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show the impact of the independent variables on ROA and ROE as 
found from the regression results. According to table 9.1, R2 for the first 7 models ranges 
between 0.7586 and 0.8661, indicating that if each variable in the model is increased by 
1%, the increase on the ROA will range between 76% and 87%. On the contrary, the 
observed R2 for ROE ranges between 0.4016 and 0.5083, meaning that if a similar 1% 
change occurred in all the independent variables, ROE will consequently change by 40% 
to 50%. 
The higher R2 value resulting from the application of the panel least squares method, 
when profitability is measured by ROA, shows that the variability in ROA of Sudanese 
Islamic banks is better explained by the set of independent variables than for ROE.  
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Table 9.2: Estimated Coefficient and their signs for the entire sample (ROA) 
 Variables Basic Equ Equation1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
Constant 0.1037*** 
(0.0186) 
0.1282*** 
(0.0244) 
0.0738*** 
(0.0144) 
0.0759*** 
(0.0134) 
0.1274*** 
(0.0245) 
0.0885*** 
(0.0183) 
0.0744*** 
(0.0151) 
0.1196*** 
(0.0257) 
Age -0.0071*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0087*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0040*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0090*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0038** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0077*** 
(0.0028) 
Type  0.0373*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0358*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0180* 
(0.0108) 
0.0182* 
(0.0105) 
0.0358*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0201* 
(0.0110) 
0.0183* 
(0.0111) 
0.0375*** 
(0.0069) 
Specialised   -0.0142*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0144*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0072* 
(0.0040) 
-0.0072* 
(0.0039) 
-0.0143*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0080* 
(0.0041) 
-0.0073* 
(0.0041) 
-0.0154*** 
(0.0026) 
Leverage1  -0.0440*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0494*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0340*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0346*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0490*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.0368*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0344*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0462*** 
(0.0100) 
Mgt 
Efficiency1 
-0.0358*** 
(0.0056) 
-0.0203** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0495*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0203** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0457*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0206** 
(0.0091) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
0.6224*** 
(0.0439) 
0.6615*** 
(0.0506) 
0.5780*** 
(0.0920) 
0.5746*** 
(0.0923) 
0.6627*** 
(0.0507) 
0.5741*** 
(0.0935) 
0.5808*** 
(0.0931) 
0.6633*** 
(0.0507) 
PLS   .0126*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0108** 
(0.0053) 
0.0070*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0116** 
(0.0054) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0133** 
(0.0056) 
Brd Size  -0.0021* 
(0.0011) 
  -0.0019 
(0.0011) 
-0.0009 
(0.0006) 
 -0.0020* 
(0.0011) 
FbSize    -0.0025 
(0.0044) 
 0.0082 
(0.0108) 
 -0.0021 
(0.0046) 
0.0063 
(0.0110) 
FEcos    -0.0018 
(0.0048) 
 -0.0005 
(0.0050) 
-0.0008 
(0.0050) 
0.0157 
(0.0159) 
R2 0.7774 0.7595 0.8661 0.8646 0.7587 0.8640 0.8646 0.7586 
Observations  168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. *, **and *** indicate         
significance levels of 10, 5, 1 percent respectively 
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Table 9.3: Estimated Coefficient and their signs for the entire sample (ROE) 
Variables Basic 
equation  
Equation1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
Constant 1.2017*** 
(0.2516) 
0.7395*** 
(0.1122) 
0.6750*** 
(0.1310) 
0.8779*** 
(0.0932) 
0.7403*** 
(0.1127) 
0.9169*** 
(0.1075) 
0.8893*** 
(0.0941) 
0.9181*** 
(0.1077) 
Age -0.0574* 
(0.0303) 
-0.0573*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.056*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.0846*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0570*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0850*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0874*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0872*** 
(0.0119) 
Type  0.0281 
(0.0860)  
0.0544* 
(0.0310) 
0.0558 
(0.0380) 
0.0189 
(0.0290) 
0.0544* 
(0.0311) 
0.0184 
(0.0291) 
0.0177 
(0.0290) 
0.0175 
(0.0291) 
Specialised   -0.0138 
(0.0308) 
-0.0171 
(0.0111) 
-0.0174 
(0.0143) 
0.0054 
(0.0109) 
-0.0171 
(0.0111) 
0.0053 
(0.0110) 
0.0064 
(0.0110) 
0.0062 
(0.0110) 
Leverage1 0.1828* 
(0.1112) 
-0.0163 
(0.0438) 
-0.0124 
(0.0479) 
-0.0791* 
(0.0415) 
-0.0167 
(0.0440) 
-0.0809** 
(0.0417) 
-0.0796* 
(0.0416) 
-0.0809* 
(0.0417) 
Mgt 
Efficiency1 
-0.9823*** 
(0.0762) 
-0.2108*** 
(0.0417) 
-0.224*** 
(0.0483) 
-0.2147*** 
(0.0362) 
-0.2107*** 
(0.0419) 
-0.2063*** 
(0.0380) 
-0.2128*** 
(0.0363) 
-0.2065*** 
(0.0381) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
-1.6664*** 
(0.5929) 
0.4429* 
(0.2321) 
0.4654** 
(0.2302) 
0.4371** 
(0.2103) 
0.4417* 
(0.2331) 
0.4232** 
(0.2115) 
0.4389** 
(0.2105) 
0.4278** 
(0.2120) 
PLS 0.1119* 
(0.058) 
0.0204 
(0.0243) 
0.0267 
(0.0247) 
-0.0168 
(0.0229) 
0.0196 
(0.0249) 
-0.0203 
(0.0234) 
-0.0150 
(0.0230) 
-0.0180 
(0.0237) 
Brd Size  -0.0056 
(0.0053) 
  -0.0058 
(0.0054) 
-0.0036 
(0.0048) 
 -0.0028 
(0.0049) 
FbSize    0.0016 
(0.0337) 
 -0.0085 
(0.049790) 
 0.0404 
(0.0448) 
0.0351 
(0.0460) 
FEcos    -0.3521*** 
(0.0652) 
 -0.3483*** 
(0.0655) 
-0.3615*** 
(0.0661) 
-0.3573*** 
(0.0667) 
R2 0.5465  0.4016 0.5090 0.4021 0.5073 0.5083 0.5057 
Observations  168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. *, **and *** indicate significance 
levels of 1,5,10 percent respectively
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To begin with, the regression results, as shown in Table 9.2, reveal that the board of 
directors’ size has a negative and significant impact (at 10% significance level) on the 
first and the seventh model. This indicates that if a board size of a Sudanese bank is 
increased by 0.21% and 0.20% for the first and seventh models respectively, ROA will 
decrease by 1%.   
This finding is supported by the argument advanced by Robb and Watson (2012), who 
report that larger boards lead to higher costs due to higher directors’ salaries and 
remuneration when compared to smaller size boards. It is also in consonance with the 
arguments of Eisenberg et al., (1998), Bøhren and Strøm (2007), Saravia (2010) and Robb 
and Watson (2012), who all report that large boards are more likely to suffer from issues 
related to coordination, communication, and decision-making, which leads to ineffective 
management and consequently poor performance. This finding is also consistent with the 
earlier finding of Yermack (1996) and the later findings of Pathan et al., (2012) and Robb 
and Watson (2012). Additionally, it contradicts the finding of Reinert et al., (2015) that 
prove a positive and significant impact of board size on the performance of banks in 
Luxembourg.  
On the contrary, board size is proved to have a negative but insignificant impact on ROA 
of Sudanese Islamic banks. This can be seen in models four and five and ROE (all 
models). This could take to mean that any increase in the board size will have a negative 
but insubstantial influence on the financial performance of Sudanese Banks. This is in 
line with the findings of Bhagat and Black (2002), Alexandrina (2011) and Shorouq 
Tomar and Bino (2012), who all prove no impact of board size on the performance of 
their studied sample. 
In the context of the Sudanese Banking industry, the inverse relationship between the size 
of the board of directors and profitability could possibly be related to the effect of 
corruption. According to the 2015 International Corruption Index, which measures the 
levels of public sector corruption, Sudan is one of the four most highly corrupt countries 
worldwide. Consequently, hiring or firing chief executives or members of the board may 
be related to special political relationships rather than being subject to qualifications and 
experience of the individuals who serve in these positions. Such attitude, therefore, 
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provides this level of management with unsuitable individuals who care more about their 
personal interest rather than that of the organisation. This, in turn, weakens the 
performance of the board of directors and consequently the financial performance of those 
banks.  
Regarding the impact of gender diversity on performance, the presence of women at the 
departmental level is seen to have a negative and highly significant impact (1% level of 
significance) on ROE of Sudanese Banks. This indicates that if the number of females at 
the departmental managers’ level increased by 1%, the ROE will decrease by around 35%. 
This finding agrees with the results of Bertand and Hallock (2001), who study the gender 
gap in top corporate jobs in the US and those of Metcalfe (2006), who studies the 
complexity of the interrelations between gender, organisation, and Islamic morals 
experiences of women professionals working in the Middle East. It also agrees with that 
of Prete and Stefani (2013), who study the impact of women representation on the Italian 
Banks’ board.  
This finding could be justified by the argument of Bertand and Hallock (2001) and Prete 
and Stefani (2013) who relate the negative and insignificant impact of women on the 
financial performance of their sample to the labour market discrimination and a lack of 
relatively long-term career commitment among women. Metcalfe (2006) report that due 
to strong and coherent gender roles in Islamic culture, women tend to have career 
development barriers. These constraints include business culture, which is characterised 
by stereotypical perceptions of female managers, lack of female role models, family 
commitments (such as children, grandparents and other relatives) and limited training 
opportunities. A notably negative association between departmental managers’ gender 
and firm performance has been found in the earlier study of Shrader et al., (1997). This 
finding, however, contradicts the findings of Smith et al., (2006), who prove that the 
impact of females’ at departmental managers’ level is varied from positive to insignificant 
with the performance of Danish firms. 
On the contrary, female representation is shown to have no significant impact at the 
departmental managers’ level, when profitability is measured by ROA. This finding is in 
line with some of the earlier results by Shrader et al., (1997) and later findings of Prete 
and Stefani (2013).  
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On the other hand, female representation on the board of directors is found to have no 
significant impact on both ROA and ROE of Sudanese Banks. This finding is supported 
by the argument of Rovers (2010), who report that encouraging women employment in 
the board is simply a symbolic value and has no impact on a firm’s performance. The 
finding is also consistent with the findings of Dutta and Bose (2006), Rose (2007) and 
Prete and Stefani (2013), who prove no impact on the financial performance of their 
samples. 
The insignificant impact of women on the board of directors on the profitability of 
Sudanese Islamic banks could be related to the critical mass theory, which is based on the 
number of females employed in a certain level of management. The number of females 
on the board of directors of Sudanese Islamic Banks is limited, which, according to Joecks 
et al., (2013), create a skewed group that is linked with poor performance. Accordingly, 
the presence of females within the board of directors becomes more symbolic and their 
power less certain. 
It may also be worth mentioning that the control variables had the same impact on ROA 
throughout the seven models as shown in table 9.2. However, findings on ROE, as can be 
seen from table 9.3, shows some changes concerning bank type, which remains positive 
but insignificant in models 2, 3, 5, 6, 7. Their basic equivalent is, in contrast, positively 
significant in models 1 and 4, when board size and number of females on the board are 
introduced. Furthermore, findings on leverage witnessed a dramatical change as it is 
shown to range between significantly positive, significantly negative and also 
insignificant throughout the seven models. Finally, the influence of PLS mode of finance 
changed from positively significant in the basic model to positively/negatively 
insignificant on the rest of the models. This could be possibly related to the impact of the 
risk-taking behaviour of females in top management positions. 
9.4. Robustness Check  
The researcher also applies four robustness checks in which she uses different measures 
of leverage, management efficiency and asset utilisation to test the validity of the 
regression findings. The following is an illustration of alternative measures used in the 
robustness check: 
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 With respect to leverage, she uses the ratio of long-term liability to total equity 
instead of total debt to total assets. 
 Regarding management efficiency, she uses the ratio of total cost to total assets 
and the ratio of total cost to net income to substitute the ratio of total cost to total 
income. 
 Finally, she uses investment to total deposit instead of operating income to total 
assets to measure assets utilisation.  
Table 9.4 to 9.17 show the findings of robustness checks, which provide extra evidence 
that supports almost all the findings of the earlier regression results. 
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Table 9.4: Robustness on the Impact of board size on ROA of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks 
Variables Measures 
Alternatives 
Original 
Equation 
Equ 1 Equ 2 Equ 3 Equ 4 
Constant   0.1282*** 
(0.0244) 
0.1759*** 
(0.0540) 
0.1648*** 
(0.0280) 
0.1476*** 
(0.0220) 
0.2947*** 
(0.0334) 
Age  -0.0087*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0100*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0123*** 
(0.0033) 
Type   0.0358*** 
(0.0067) 
0.03840** 
(0.0172) 
0.0377*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0370*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0384*** 
(0.0087) 
Specialised    -0.0144*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.01484** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0139*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0143*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0136*** 
(0.0031) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 -0.0576*** 
(0.0163) 
   
Total debt to 
total assets  
-0.0494*** 
(0.0095) 
 -0.0660*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0453*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.1085*** 
(0.0155) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2
,3 and 1 
Total cost to 
net income 
  -0.0001*** 
(5.57E-05) 
  
Total cost to 
total assets  
   -0.6698*** 
(0.0695) 
 
Total cost 
to: total 
income 
-0.0203** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0367*** 
(0.0113) 
  -0.0671*** 
(0.0106) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0048** 
(0.0021) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.6615*** 
(0.0506) 
0.5425*** 
(0.1506) 
0.6167*** 
(0.0478) 
0.7257*** 
(0.0385) 
 
PLS  0.0108** 
(0.0053) 
0.0091** 
(0.0042) 
0.00251 
(0.0051) 
0.0103*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0183*** 
(0.0069) 
Brd size  -0.0021* 
(0.0011) 
-0.0018 
(0.0012) 
-0.0031*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0014 
(0.0009) 
-0.0021  
(0.0016) 
Adjusted 
R2 
 0.7509 0.7746 0.7509 0.8463 0.6007 
Observatio
ns  
 142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
 
Findings on the size of the board of directors, as can be seen from the robustness check 
in Tables 9.4, 9.7, 9.8 and 9.10, confirm the previous finding on the impact of this 
indicator on the profitability of Sudanese Banks. The tables show that the impact remains 
either significantly negative or insignificantly negative.  
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Results from the robustness tables, as can be seen from Tables 9.5, 9.7, 9.9, 9.10, 9.12, 
9.14, 9.16 and 9.17, also support the earlier finding that the existence of women on the 
board of directors has an insignificant impact on both ROA and ROE. 
With regards the impact of gender diversity on departmental managers’ level, the 
robustness check, as shown in Tables 9.6, 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 9.13, 9.15, 9.16 and 9.17, all 
confirm previous findings that this factor either has a negative and significant or no 
impact on ROA and on ROE of Sudanese Banks. 
Findings of the robustness test on the control variables, when profitability is measured by 
ROA, almost confirmed previous findings. The difference in the result is found in 
equation four, which could possibly be linked to the ambiguity of the asset utilisation 
measure that was used in the fourth equation. Management efficiency and PLS also 
witnessed some changes in table 9.5 as both are shown to have an insignificant impact 
when management efficiency is measured by total cost to net income. 
Findings of the robustness check, when ROE is used as a performance measure, has 
revealed some changes in the fourth equation and on other control variables, such as the 
bank type, specialisation, leverage, assets utilisation and bank age. Nevertheless, the 
overall findings of the robustness check virtually confirmed previous findings. 
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Table 9.5: Robustness on the Impact of Females Representation in the Board of 
Directors on ROA of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Measures 
alternatives 
Original 
Equation 
Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.0738*** 
(0.0144) 
0.1558*** 
(0.0236) 
0.0936*** 
(0.0205) 
0.0267*** 
(0.0100) 
0.1611*** 
(0.0309) 
Age  -0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0104*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0092*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0065* 
(0.0039) 
Type   0.0180* 
(0.0108) 
0.0387*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0345*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0130* 
(0.0065) 
0.0411*** 
(0.0103) 
Specialised    -0.0072* 
(0.0040) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0133*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0048*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.0037) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 
 -0.0567*** 
(0.0094) 
   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0340*** 
(0.0090) 
 -0.0604*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0145** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0156 
(0.0150) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,
3 and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
  -0.0001* 
(5.49E-05) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
   -0.7472*** 
(0.0426) 
 
Total cost 
to: total 
income 
-0.049*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.0400*** 
(0.0077) 
  -0.0864*** 
(0.0116) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     0.0019 
(0.0020) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.5778*** 
(0.0920) 
0.5537*** 
(0.0490) 
0.7360*** 
(0.0444) 
0.8557*** 
(0.0400) 
 
PLS  0.0069*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0122** 
(0.0050) 
0.0114** 
(0.0052) 
0.0048*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0328*** 
(0.0077) 
FBsize  -0.0025 
(0.0044) 
0.0122 
(0.0103) 
0.0112 
(0.0108) 
0.0007 
(0.0028) 
0.0117 
(0.016346) 
Adjusted R2  0.8661 0.7723 0.7482 0.9477 0.4402 
No of Obs   142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
 
 
192 
 
Table 9.6: Robustness on the Impact of Females Representation in the 
departmental managers on ROA of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
Original 
equation  
Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.0759*** 
(0.0134) 
0.1523*** 
(0.0270) 
0.0834*** 
(0.0225) 
0.0766*** 
(0.0191) 
0.0957*** 
(0.0225) 
Age  -0.0040*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0096*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0076*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0052** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0070*** 
(0.0028) 
Type   0.0182* 
(0.0105) 
0.0390*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0358*** 
(0.0071) 
0.0380*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0379*** 
(0.0070) 
Specialised    -0.0072* 
(0.0039) 
-0.0150*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0143*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.0026) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
  -0.0563*** 
(0.0103) 
   
 -0.0346*** 
(0.0092) 
 -0.0586*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0227*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0451*** 
(0.0100) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,
3 and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -0.6433*** 
(0.0841) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -0.0001** 
(5.47E-05) 
 
Total cost 
to :total 
income 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0406*** 
(0.0077) 
  -0.0255*** 
(0.0087) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     0.6708*** 
(0.0508) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.5746*** 
(0.0923) 
0.5535*** 
(0.0501) 
0.7384 
(0.0445) 
0.7983*** 
(0.0381) 
 
PLS  0.0071*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0115** 
(0.0054) 
0.0122** 
(0.0055) 
0.0150*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0055) 
FEcos  -0.0018 
(0.0048) 
0.0021 
(0.0158) 
0.0140 
(0.0160) 
0.0135 
(0.0135) 
0.0150 
(0.0157) 
Adjusted R2  0.8646 0.769983 0.7477 0.8192 0.7554 
No of Obs. 142 142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.7: Robustness on the Impact of Board size and Females Representation in 
the board on ROA of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure  
Original 
Equation 
Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.1274*** 
(0.02453) 
0.1750*** 
(0.0268) 
0.1141*** 
(0.0197) 
0.0998*** 
(0.0214) 
0.2052*** 
(0.0368) 
Age  -0.0090*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0071*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0070*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0074* 
(0.0039) 
Type   0.0358*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0384*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0330*** 
(0.0100) 
0.0363*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0403*** 
(0.0102) 
Specialised    -0.0143*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0145*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0154*** 
(0.0036) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 
 -0.0574*** 
(0.0094) 
   
Total debt to 
total assets 
-0.0490*** 
(0.0095) 
 -0.0581*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0251*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0169 
(0.0148) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2
,3  and 1 
Total cost to 
:net income 
 
  -7.03E-05* 
(3.66E-05) 
  
Total cost to 
total assets  
 
   -0.6240*** 
(0.0859) 
 
Total cost to: 
total income 
-0.0203** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0366*** 
(0.0080) 
  -0.0771*** 
(0.0122) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     0.0028 
(0.0020) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.6627*** 
(0.0507) 
0.5446*** 
(0.0492) 
0.6904*** 
(0.0904) 
0.7825*** 
(0.0399) 
 
PLS  0.0116** 
(0.0054) 
0.0100* 
(0.0052) 
0.0021 
(0.0038) 
0.0134*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0279*** 
(0.0079) 
Brd size  -0.0019 
(0.0011) 
-0.0016 
(0.0011) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0010 
(0.0010) 
-0.0038** 
(0.0018) 
FBsize  0.0082 
(0.0108) 
0.0093 
(0.0104) 
-0.0032 
(0.00759) 
0.0118 
(0.0093) 
0.0059 
(0.016) 
R2  0.7587 0.7743 0.8064 0.8210 0.4549 
Observatio
ns  
 142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.8: Robustness on the Impact of Board size and Females Representation in 
Departmental managers on ROA of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
ROA Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.0885*** 
(0.0183) 
0.1725*** 
(0.0294) 
0.1252*** 
(0.0346) 
0.0935*** 
(0.0225) 
0.1980*** 
(0.0385) 
Age  -0.0043*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0097*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0054** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0060 
(0.0042) 
Type   0.0201* 
(0.0110) 
0.0388*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0364** 
(0.0160) 
0.0378*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0419*** 
(0.0104) 
Specialised    -0.0080* 
(0.0041) 
-0.0151*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0145** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0039) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 
 -0.0565*** 
(0.0102) 
   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0368*** 
(0.0096) 
 -0.0622*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0232*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0144 
(0.0155) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,
3 and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -6.82E-05 
(5.03E-05) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -0.6166*** 
(0.0859) 
 
Total cost 
to: total 
income 
-0.0457*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0365*** 
(0.0080) 
  -0.0772*** 
(0.0122) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     0.0028 
(0.0020) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.5741*** 
(0.0935) 
0.5449*** 
(0.0500) 
0.6985*** 
(0.1223) 
0.7811*** 
(0.0399) 
 
PLS  0.0069*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0097* 
(0.0055) 
0.0077 
(0.0063) 
0.0139*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0291*** 
(0.0082) 
Brd Size  -0.0009 
(0.0006) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0011) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0013 
(0.0009) 
-0.0040*** 
(0.0017) 
FEcos  -0.0005 
(0.0050) 
0.0045 
(0.0158) 
0.0134 
(0.0117) 
0.0152 
(0.0135) 
0.0152 
(0.0236) 
R2  0.8640 0.7731 0.7701 0.8205 0.4561 
Observation
s 
 142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.9: Robustness on the Impact of Females Representation in the Board of 
directors and departmental managers on ROA of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
ROA Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.0744*** 
(0.0151) 
0.1567*** 
(0.0272) 
0.0864*** 
(0.0228) 
0.0805*** 
 (0.0192) 
0.1130*** 
(0.0201) 
Age  -0.0038** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0060** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0018 
(0.0018) 
Type   0.0183* 
(0.0111) 
0.0386*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0357*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0377*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0353*** 
 (0.0130) 
Specialised    -0.0073* 
(0.0041) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0141*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0152*** 
 (0.0022) 
-0.0126*** 
 (0.0047) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 
 -0.0569*** 
(0.0103) 
   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0344*** 
(0.0093) 
 -0.0584*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0225*** 
 (0.0090) 
0.0015 
  (0.0097) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,3  
and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -0.0001** 
(5.50E-05) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -0.6443*** 
 (0.0838) 
 
Total cost 
to: total 
income 
-0.049*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0400*** 
(0.0077) 
  -0.0798*** 
(0.0109) 
Assets 
utitilisation2 
     0.0019** 
 (0.0009) 
Assets 
utitilisation1 
 0.5808*** 
(0.0931) 
0.5532*** 
(0.0500) 
0.7377*** 
(0.0445) 
0.7971*** 
 (0.0380) 
 
PLS  0.0069*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0120** 
(0.0054) 
0.0127** 
(0.0055) 
0.0156*** 
 (0.0046) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0046)  
FBSize  -0.0021 
(0.0046) 
0.0123 
(0.0105) 
0.0099 
(0.0110) 
0.0126 
 (0.0092) 
0.0051 
(0.0066) 
FEcos  -0.0008 
(0.0050) 
-0.0010 
(0.0160) 
0.0117 
(0.0162) 
0.0106 
 (0.0136) 
0.0008 
 (0.0059) 
R2  0.8646 0.7706 0. 7473 0.8204 0.6252 
Observations   142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.10: the Impact of Board Size, Females Representation in the Board of 
directors and departmental managers on ROA of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure  
ROA Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.1196*** 
(0.0257) 
0.1736*** 
(0.0294) 
0.1166*** 
 (0.0260) 
0.0936*** 
(0.0225) 
0.1983*** 
(0.0387) 
Age  -0.0077*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0103*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0080*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0060** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0062 
(0.0044) 
Type   0.0375*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0386*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0356*** 
  (0.0070) 
0.0376*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0418*** 
(0.0105) 
Specialised    -0.0154*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0144*** 
 (0.0026) 
-0.0153*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0163*** 
(0.0039) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 -0.0569*** 
(0.0102) 
   
total equity   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0462*** 
(0.0100) 
 -0.0567*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0230*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0143 
(0.0155) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,
3  and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -9.65E-05* 
 (5.44E-05) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
    
-0.6221*** 
(0.0860) 
 
Total cost 
to :total 
income 
-0.0206** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0365*** 
(0.0080) 
  -0.0773*** 
(0.0122) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     0.0028 
(0.0020) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.6633*** 
(0.0507) 
0.5456*** 
(0.0080) 
0.7103*** 
  (0.0455) 
0.7832*** 
(0.0399) 
 
PLS  0.0133** 
(0.0056) 
0.0103* 
(0.050109 
0.0055) 
0.0106* 
(0.0055) 
0.0146*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0294*** 
(0.0083) 
Brd Size  -0.0020* 
(0.0011) 
-0.0017 
(0.0011) 
-0.0026** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0011 
(0.0010) 
-0.0040** 
(0.0018) 
FbSize   0.0063 
(0.0110) 
0.0091 
(0.0107) 
0.0047 
 (0.0111) 
0.0102 
(0.0095) 
0.0042 
(0.0166) 
FEcos  0.0157 
(0.01598) 
0.0019 
(0.0161) 
0.01618 
(0.0161) 
0.0125 
(0.0137) 
0.0142 
(0.0240) 
R2  0.7586 0.7726 0.7551 0.8207 0.4522 
No of Obs   142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.11: Robustness on the Impact of board size on ROE of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks 
Variable  Alternative 
measure 
Coefficient Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.7395*** 
(0.1122) 
0.5643*** 
(0.1248) 
0.7191*** 
 (0.1199) 
0.6381*** 
 (0.1140) 
0.7675*** 
 (0.1134) 
Age  -0.0573*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.0443*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.0627*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0539*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0533*** 
(0.0118) 
Type   0.0544* 
(0.0310) 
0.0611** 
(0.0302) 
0.0417 
(0.0334) 
0.0556*** 
(0.0311) 
0.0557* 
(0.0314) 
Specialised    -0.0171 
(0.0111) 
-0.0207* 
(0.0108) 
-0.0094 
(0.0119) 
-0.0156 
 (0.0111) 
-0.0173 
(0.0112) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to  
 
 0.0988** 
(0.0437) 
   
total equity   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0163 
(0.0438) 
 -0.1192*** 
(0.0425)  
0.0108 
(0.0464) 
-0.0094 
(0.0456) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,3  
and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -0.0006*** 
 (0.0002) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -2.2896*** 
(0.4567) 
 
Total cost 
to :total 
income 
-0.2108*** 
(0.0417) 
-0.2231*** 
(0.0372) 
  -0.2443*** 
(0.0377) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0045 
(0.0063) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.4429* 
(0.2321) 
0.5368** 
(0.2285) 
0.9464*** 
 (0.2202) 
1.2291*** 
 (0.2120) 
 
PLS  0.0204 
(0.0243) 
0.0205 
(0.0239) 
-0.0078 
 (0.0251) 
 0.0045 
 (0.0237) 
0.0312 
(0.0239) 
Brd size  -0.0056 
(0.0053) 
-0.0048 
(0.0052) 
-0.0123** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0079 
(0.0052) 
-0.0056 
(0.0055) 
R2  0.406524 0.4278 0.3247 0.405240 0.3926 
Observations   142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.12: Robustness on the Impact of Females Representation in the Board of 
Directors on ROE of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variable  Alternative 
measure  
Coefficient Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.6750*** 
(0.1310) 
0.5082*** 
(0.1096) 
0.5622*** 
(0.0999) 
0.5378*** 
(0.0929) 
0.7008*** 
(0.0943) 
Age  -0.0563*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.0436*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0611*** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0531*** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0511*** 
(0.0120) 
Type   0.0558 
(0.0380) 
0.0620** 
(0.0302) 
0.0438 
(0.0341) 
0.0577* 
(0.0313) 
0.0568* 
(0.0315) 
Specialised    -0.0174 
(0.0143) 
-0.0208* 
(0.0109) 
-0.0093 
(0.0122) 
-0.0157 
(0.0112) 
-0.0177 
(0.0113) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 0.1008** 
(0.0438) 
   
Total debt to 
total assets 
-0.0124 
(0.0479) 
 -0.1249*** 
(0.0434) 
0.0169 
(0.0467) 
-0.0086 
(0.0459) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2
,3  and 1 
Total cost to 
net income 
 
  -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
  
Total cost to 
total assets  
 
   -2.4462*** 
(0.4490) 
 
Total cost to 
:total 
income 
-0.2240*** 
(0.0483) 
-0.2333*** 
(0.0357) 
  -0.2581*** 
(0.0354) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0061 
(0.0062) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.4654** 
(0.2302) 
0.5627** 
(0.2277) 
1.0784*** 
(0.2164) 
1.3289*** 
(0.2032) 
 
PLS  0.0267 
(0.0247) 
0.0264 
(0.0235) 
0.0027 
(0.0254) 
0.0132 
(0.0237) 
0.0372 
(0.0235) 
FBsize  0.0016 
(0.0337) 
0.0042 
(0.0479) 
0.0030 
(0.0530) 
0.0184 
(0.0490) 
-0.0062 
(0.0498) 
R2  0.4016 0.4241 0.2988 0.3954 0.3879 
No of Obs   142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.13: Robustness on the Impact of Females Representation in the 
departmental managers on ROE of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
Coefficient Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.8779*** 
(0.0932) 
0.7539*** 
 (0.1167) 
0.7760*** 
 (0.1003) 
0.7521*** 
 (0.0915) 
0.9048*** 
 (0.0928) 
Age  -0.0846*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0706*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0900*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0817*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0801*** 
(0.0118) 
Type   0.0188 
(0.0290) 
0.0330 
 (0.0290) 
0.0066 
(0.0320) 
0.0191 
(0.0289) 
0.0188 
(0.0293) 
Specialised    0.0053 
(0.0109) 
-0.0016 
 (0.0110) 
0.0136 
(0.0120) 
0.0077 
(0.0109) 
0.0056 
(0.0111) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 
 0.0242 
 (0.0445) 
   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0791* 
(0.0415) 
 -0.1887*** 
(0.0415) 
-0.0501 
(0.0435) 
-0.0793** 
(0.0434) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,3  
and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -0.0006*** 
 (0.0002) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -2.4295*** 
(0.4032) 
 
Total cost 
to :total 
income 
-0.2147*** 
(0.0362) 
-0.2435*** 
(0.0334) 
  -0.2449*** 
(0.0321) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0068 
(0.0055) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.4370** 
(0.2103) 
0.3890* 
(0.2164) 
1.0244*** 
(0.1983) 
1.2700*** 
(0.1827) 
 
PLS  -0.0167 
(0.0229) 
-0.0130 
 (0.0234) 
-0.0412* 
(0.0245) 
-0.0323 
(0.0224) 
-0.0073 
(0.0225) 
FEcos  -0.3520*** 
(0.0652) 
-0.3004*** 
 (0.0685) 
-0.3628*** 
(0.0713) 
-0.3679*** 
(0.0649) 
-0.3577*** 
(0.0659) 
R2  0.5090 0.4967 0.4129 0.5124 0.4988 
No of Obs  142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.14: Robustness on the Impact of Board size and Females Representation in 
the board on ROE of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
Coefficient Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.7403*** 
(0.1127) 
0.5647*** 
 (0.1254) 
0.7208*** 
 (0.1203) 
0.6377 
 (0.1146) 
0.7680*** 
 (0.1138) 
Age  -0.0570*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0441*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0619*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0541 
(0.0117) 
-0.0526*** 
(0.0121) 
Type   0.0544* 
(0.0311) 
0.0611** 
(0.0303) 
0.0415 
(0.0335) 
0.0556 
(0.0312) 
0.0556* 
(0.0315) 
Specialised    -0.0171 
(0.0111) 
-0.0207* 
 (0.0109) 
-0.0096 
(0.0120) 
-0.0156 
(0.0111) 
-0.0175 
(0.0113) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 0.0987** 
(0.0439) 
   
Total debt to 
total assets 
-0.0167 
(0.0440) 
 -0.1202 
(0.0428) 
0.0110 
(0.0467) 
-0.0106 
(0.0460) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,
3  and 1 
Total cost to 
net income 
 
  -0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
  
Total cost to 
total assets  
 
   -2.2913*** 
(0.4591) 
 
Total cost to 
:total income 
-0.2107*** 
(0.0419) 
-0.2231*** 
(0.0374) 
  -0.2439*** 
(0.0378) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0047 
(0.0063) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.4417* 
(0.2331) 
0.5358** 
(0.2296) 
0.9427 
(0.2212) 
1.2298*** 
(0.2131) 
 
PLS  0.0196 
(0.0249) 
0.0201 
(0.02446) 
-0.0096 
(0.0256) 
0.0048 
(0.0243) 
0.0297 
(0.0245) 
Brd size  -0.0058 
(0.0054) 
-0.0049 
(0.0053) 
-0.0127* 
 (0.0055) 
-0.0078 
(0.0053) 
-0.00591 
(0.0056) 
FBsize  -0.0085 
(0.0497) 
-0.0043 
(0.0488) 
-0.0200 
(0.0532) 
0.0033 
(0.0499) 
-0.0150 
(0.0505) 
R2  0.4021 0.4235 0.3204 0.4007 0.3884 
No of Obs.  142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.15: Robustness on the Impact of Board size and Females Representation in 
departmental managers on ROE of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
Coefficient Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.9169*** 
(0.1075) 
0.7856*** 
 (0.1281) 
0.9326*** 
 (0.1287) 
0.8206*** 
 (0.1082) 
0.9402*** 
 (0.1082) 
Age  -0.0850*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0708*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0988*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0824*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0808*** 
(0.0119) 
Type   0.0184 
(0.0291)  
0.0328 
(0.0291) 
0.0181 
(0.0274) 
0.0183 
(0.0289) 
0.0186 
(0.0294) 
Specialised    0.0053 
(0.011002) 
-0.0017 
(0.0111) 
0.0088 
(0.0113) 
0.0074 
(0.0109) 
0.0055 
(0.0111) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 
 0.0240 
(0.0446) 
   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0809** 
(0.041728) 
 -0.2063*** 
(0.0416) 
-0.0524 
(0.0435) 
-0.0793* 
(0.0435) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,
3  and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -2.3209*** 
(0.4129) 
 
Total cost 
to :total 
income 
-0.2063*** 
(0.038063) 
-0.2370*** 
(0.0352) 
  -0.2372*** 
(0.0343) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0060 
(0.0057) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 
 0.4232** 
(0.211593) 
0.3756* 
(0.2180) 
0.7807*** 
(0.1912) 
1.2003*** 
(0.1918) 
 
PLS  -0.0203 
(0.023495) 
-0.0159 
(0.0240) 
-0.0434* 
(0.0251) 
-0.0366 
 (0.0227) 
-0.0105 
(0.0231) 
Brd Size  -0.0036 
(0.004875) 
-0.0029 
(0.0049) 
-0.0050 
(0.0069) 
-0.0055 
(0.0047) 
-0.0032 
(0.0050) 
FEcos  -0.3483*** 
(0.065586) 
-0.2967*** 
(0.0689) 
-0.3585*** 
(0.0652) 
-0.3609*** 
(0.0651) 
-0.3539*** 
(0.0663) 
R2  0.5073 0.4943 0.4648 0.5138 0.4965 
No of Obs.  142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.16: Robustness on the Impact of Females Representation in the Board of 
directors and departmental managers on ROE of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
Coefficient Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.8893*** 
(0.0941) 
0.767*** 
 (0.1179) 
0.7894*** 
 (0.1015) 
0.7699*** 
 (0.0923) 
0.9391*** 
 (0.0947) 
Age  -0.0874*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0732*** 
(0.0127) 
-0.0928*** 
(0.0130) 
-0.0853*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0858*** 
(0.0123) 
Type   0.0177 
(0.0290) 
0.0319 
(0.0291) 
0.0058 
(0.0320) 
0.0175 
(0.0288) 
0.0200 
(0.0296) 
Specialised    0.0064 
(0.0110) 
-0.0006 
(0.0111) 
0.0146 
(0.0121) 
0.0090 
(0.0109) 
0.0075 
(0.0112) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity 
 
 0.0224 
(0.0446) 
   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0796* 
(0.0416) 
 -0.1879*** 
(0.0416) 
-0.0492 
(0.0434) 
-0.1049** 
(0.0456) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,
3  and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -2.4339*** 
(0.4021) 
 
Total cost 
to :total 
income 
-0.2128*** 
(0.0363) 
-0.2418*** 
(0.0335) 
   -0.2243*** 
(0.0335) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0053 
(0.0057) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.4389** 
(0.2105) 
0.3880* 
(0.2166) 
1.0216*** 
(0.1985) 
1.2644*** 
(0.1823) 
 
PLS  -0.0150 
(0.0230) 
-0.0115 
(0.0235) 
-0.0391 
(0.0247) 
-0.0294 
(0.0225) 
-0.0174 
(0.0233) 
FBSize  0.0404 
(0.0448) 
0.0381 
(0.0455) 
0.0436 
(0.0492) 
0.0585 
(0.0444) 
0.0277 
(0.0458) 
FEcos  -0.3615*** 
(0.0661) 
-0.3102*** 
(0.0696) 
-0.3730*** 
(0.0723) 
-0.3813*** 
(0.0655) 
-0.3801*** 
(0.0671) 
R2  0.5083 0.4956 0.4120 0.5150 0.5000 
No of Obs.  142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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Table 9.17: Robustness on the Impact of Board Size, Females Representation in the 
Board of directors and departmental managers on ROE of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks 
Variables Alternative 
measure 
Coefficient Equ1 Equ2 Equ3 Equ4 
Constant   0.9181*** 
(0.1077) 
0.7896*** 
(0.1285) 
0.9308*** 
(0.1297) 
0.8213*** 
 (0.1081) 
0.9427*** 
(0.1085) 
Age  -0.0872*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0731*** 
(0.0128) 
-0.1004*** 
(0.0149) 
-0.0853*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0827*** 
 (0.0123) 
Type   0.0175 
(0.0291) 
0.031 
(0.0292) 
0.0171 
(0.0273) 
0.0171 
(0.0289) 
0.0180 
(0.0295) 
Specialised    0.0062 
(0.0110) 
-0.0008 
(0.0112) 
0.0095 
(0.0113) 
0.0086 
(0.0109) 
0.0061 
(0.0112) 
Leverage2 
and 1 
Long term 
liability to 
total equity   
 
 0.0225 
(0.0448) 
   
Total debt 
to total 
assets 
-0.0809* 
(0.0417) 
 -0.2063*** 
(0.0415) 
-0.0511 
(0.0435) 
-0.0784* 
(0.0437) 
Mgt 
Efficiency2,3  
and 1 
Total cost 
to net 
income 
 
  -0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
  
Total cost 
to total 
assets  
 
   -2.3473*** 
(0.4134) 
 
Total cost 
to :total 
income 
-0.2065*** 
(0.0381) 
-0.2371*** 
(0.0352) 
  -0.2378*** 
(0.0344) 
Assets 
utilisation2 
     -0.0057 
(0.0057) 
Assets 
utilisation1 
 0.4278** 
(0.2120) 
0.3780* 
(0.2184) 
0.7863*** 
(0.1931) 
1.2101*** 
(0.1919) 
 
PLS  -0.0180 
(0.0237) 
-0.0138 
(0.0242) 
-0.0414 
(0.0262) 
-0.0332 
(0.0229) 
-0.0085 
(0.0234) 
Brd Size  -0.0028 
(0.0049) 
-0.0022 
(0.0050) 
-0.0041 
 (0.0078) 
-0.0044 
(0.0048) 
-0.0026 
(0.0051) 
FbSize   0.0351 
(0.0460) 
0.0339 
(0.0466) 
0.0249 
(0.0382) 
0.0493 
(0.04567) 
0.0283 
(0.0466) 
FEcos  -0.3573*** 
(0.0667) 
-0.3063*** 
(0.0703) 
-0.3647*** 
(0.0668) 
-0.3737*** 
(0.0661) 
-0.3611*** 
(0.0675) 
R2  0.5057 0.4925 0.462091 0.5144 0.4941 
No of Obs   142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
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9.5. Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence on the influence of some 
corporate governance structure on performance. The corporate governance structure 
includes the size of the board of directors, the proportion of women on the board and 
departmental managers’ positions. This chapter provides evidence of the impact of these 
structures on the profitability of Sudanese Islamic banks. 
The results show that the pooling estimation method is the ideal method of estimation, 
except for rare cases where the Fixed Effect Model has been accepted and both Pooling 
and Random Effect Model are rejected. With regards the impact of the size of the board 
of directors on performance measures, the empirical result suggests that the impact is 
varied: the findings ranges from insignificant to negative and significant on ROA, whilst 
showing as having an insignificant relationship with ROE. 
 The existence of women on the board of directors is shown to be the only factor in the 
corporate governance structure that does not have a significant influence on ROA and 
ROE alike. On the other hand, the existence of women in departmental managers’ 
positions is found to have an insignificant impact on ROA and a negative and significant 
impact on ROE of the understudy sample.  
Finally, the control variables are shown to have the same impact on ROA and ROE, 
except for bank type, which varied from positive to insignificant. Leverage varied from 
negative and significant to positive and significant while the PLS mode of finance varied 
from positive and significant to having no impact on ROE of Sudanese Islamic banks. 
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Chapter Ten   
Corporate Governance and Bank Risk  
10.1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis provides evidence for the influence of bank risk-taking on 
financial stability and consequently on the worldwide economy. It highlights the 
importance of identifying the determinants of bank risk-taking (Skała and Weill, 2015). 
In this context, there is a plethora of literature examining these factors with a specific 
focus on risk-taking incentives of bank managers. The first strand of these research 
investigates how factors at the bank level or at the country level impact the risk-taking 
behaviour of bank managers (e.g., Boyd and Nicoló, 2005 and Berger et al., 2009 for 
competition; Berger and Young, 1997 for efficiency). The second strand of literature 
focuses on how risk-taking behaviour of top management can be affected by the 
compensation and incentives policies of the firm (see Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). 
Studies with a focus on behavioural finance of corporate governance emphasise the 
impact of personal traits such as managers’ gender, age and educational background on 
firms’ financial outcomes. An example of these studies can be seen in Barber and Odean 
(2001), Campbell and Vera (2007), Rovers (2010), Pathan et al., (2012) and Berger et al., 
(2012).  
In this study, the researcher examines the effect of gender and the number of highly 
educated managers, PhD holders, on bank risk. The aim is to find out whether the presence 
of females and PhD holders reduces/increases or has no impact on banks risk. Although 
it seems interesting to examine the impact of managers’ age on banks’ risk, such factor 
has been excluded due to data availability. This part of the study focuses on the impact of 
gender diversity and the number of highly educated management, with a focus on PhD 
holders, on risk taking of Sudanese Islamic Banks. By covering such issue the researcher 
provides a comprehensive picture of one of the most influential factors on banks’ 
performance.  
This chapter introduces theoretical framework and findings of previous studies on the 
impact of gender diversity and educational background on risk taking. It also provides an 
operational definition of these factors.  
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10.2. Theoretical framework 
10.2.1. Gender and Risk-Taking Decisions 
Various literature provides evidence of the existence of greater risk aversion among 
females when taking investment decisions (see Jianakopoulos and Bernasek, 1998 and 
Agnew et al., 2003). Skała and Weill (2016) report that the hypothesis that females are 
more risk averse than males is built on the observation of differences in behaviour towards 
risk between males and females.  
Barber and Odean (2001) explain that this higher risk aversion of females is because of 
their lower overconfidence when compared to male. Overconfidence is defined by Berger 
et al., (2012) as very low-risk perception/assessment. Barber and Odean (2001) 
emphasise the idea that human beings are varied in their overconfidence about their 
abilities, knowledge and future predictions. In the same vein, Goel and Thakor (2008) 
report that overconfident managers invest less in information acquisition, which leads to 
poorer investment decisions. Barber and Odean (2001) also report that such 
overconfidence has been observed in areas such as finance, including investment bankers, 
and it is linked to greater trading and to lower expected value. Additionally, they report 
that rational investors agree on certain transaction only if they expect gains to go above 
transactions costs. However, overconfident investors misjudge the information accuracy 
and consequently their investment expected gains, which make them take a decision to 
invest in some transactions even if the expected net profits are negative.  
Furthermore, Goel and Thakor (2008) report that such characteristic also affects the 
quality of the information supplied by the CEO to the board of directors, which also leads 
to poor corporate investment decisions. Barber and Odean (2001) report that women are 
less overconfident than men, therefore, women will perform better than men. On the 
contrary, Berger et al., (2012) report that compared to men, women make poorer 
investment decisions because they face more difficulties in obtaining information about 
investment projects. 
Further opinion on top managers risk taking behaviour is discussed by Malmendier et al., 
(2011) and Skała and Weill (2016) who note the difference in the risk-taking behaviour 
to be because of the personal traits of the corporate decision maker rather than the gender 
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characteristics and circumstances. Malmendier et al., (2011) report that a top manager 
who has experienced excessive depression tends to avoid risky decisions. Skała and Weill 
(2016) report that managers with military experience are prone to adopt more aggressive 
corporate strategies. 
Risk-taking behaviour with regards gender differences and investment decision has been 
investigated by Barsky et al., (1997), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Barber and Odean 
(2001) and Agnew et al., (2003). A separate growing literature focuses on the effects of 
gender, in the context of corporate governance arrangements (see Berger et al., 2014 and 
Skała and Weill, 2015).  
10.2.2. Education and Risk-Taking Decisions 
The literature on the relationship between risk taking behaviour and educational 
background of the top management is limited, but can still be found. Some of the 
arguments provided by some literature indicate that a positive relationship exists between 
the two factors, whilst some support a negative association between the two factors. 
Evidence of no relation between the educational background of the senior management 
team and risk performance also exists. Studies that focus on the links between educational 
background and risk-taking behaviour can be seen in Grable (2000), Christiansen et al., 
(2008), Ahern and Dittmar (2011) and Berger et al., (2012). 
Ahern and Dittmar (2011) argue that individual characteristics (such as education and 
professional experience) of board members, to a large extent, influences top management 
ability to perform their work. Additionally, Berger et al., (2012) report that educational 
requirements for bank top managers have been suggested in the past as a way to improve 
corporate governance. Nevertheless, not too much is known about the impact of this factor 
on firm performance and whether the existence of such educated members may increase 
or reduce bank risk. In the same vein, Berger et al., (2012) report that international efforts 
that aim to reduce banks’ risk taking encourage the idea that banks should have managers 
with adequate banking experience to enable effective governance. However, they report 
that defining work experience is difficult as CEOs with higher education such as PhD 
degrees have fewer years of work experience than CEOs who does not have a PhD degree.  
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Studies that support the argument for the relationship between educational background 
and risk taking behaviour can be seen in Grable (2000), Bertrand and Schoar (2002) and 
Christiansen et al., (2008). 
Grable (2000) argue that higher educational attainment raises individual’s tendency to 
take risks in their financial decisions. He links education to risk-taking behaviour in 
household money matters. Christiansen et al., (2008) also suggest that higher level of 
education enhance risk-taking behaviour in terms of participation in stock market 
investments. This opinion is also supported by Bertrand and Schoar (2002) who argue 
that executives with MBAs make more risky policies and tend to be more aggressive. 
On the contrary, Graham and Harvey (2001) provide evidence on the effect of the 
education of CEOs on firm financing policies. They suggest that when executives with 
MBAs estimate their cost of capital, they use sophisticated project assessment techniques 
more often than CEOs without such degrees. Therefore, they argue that using more of 
these techniques should consequently reduce firm risk. Further opinion is given by Berger 
et al., (2014) who report that the use of sophisticated tools in decision making, with 
regards risk in banks, does not necessarily rely on education as these techniques already 
exist. However, they claim that education affects managers’ understanding of these 
methods and helps them utilise these techniques for effective management decisions. 
In contrast, Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) do not find a significant association between 
education and risk attitudes in a sample of U.S. households. Such weak association 
between the two factors is justified by Rose (2007) who report that the nature of the work 
of corporate governance does not require any specific educational background more than 
a university degree or equivalent skills which could be obtained from a substantial 
experience in business life. 
 
 
 
 
209 
 
10.3. Empirical evidence on the Impact of Gender Diversity and Education on Risk 
Earlier, Barsky et al., (1997) use questionnaire responses to hypothetical situations to 
identify any behavioural differences in economic risk tolerance between males and 
females in the health sector. They find that females are significantly more risk averse than 
males.  
Barber and Odean (2001) use accounting data for over 35,000 households from a large 
discount brokerage in the US for the period 1991 to 1997. They find that due to 
overconfidence reasons women are found to be significantly less risk averse in trading 
behaviour than men, which increase their returns more than the men counterpart. This 
finding is supported by Farrell and Hersch (2005) who prove a negative relationship 
between firm risk and the presence of females on the board of directors of a set of firms 
on the US Fortune 500 in 1990. This finding is also in line with those of Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) and Charness and Gneezy (2012), who suggest that women are more risk 
averse in their assembled data from 15 different countries.  
Gulamhussen and Santa (2010) use data from 461 large banks in Norway, Sweden, Spain 
and France to assess the role of women in bank boardrooms. They document a positive 
relationship between the percentage of female representation in boardrooms and risk-
taking, as measured by loan loss provisions and impaired loans ratio. 
Further studies on gender differences are carried out by Agarwal and Wang (2009), Beck 
et al., (2009) and Bellucci et al., (2010), who all focus on risk-taking in the banking sector 
but limited to loan officers. They prove that default rates for loans assessed and originated 
by female loan officers are lower than those assessed and originated by their male 
counterpart. They use this finding to argue that women are less overconfident and, 
therefore, more risk averse than men. 
Adams and Funk (2012) use a survey data to investigate whether females are more risk 
averse than men within the board of directors of Swedish companies. They find that 
female directors are slightly less risk averse than male directors. Atkinson et al., (2003) 
compare the performance and investment behaviour of men and women as fixed-income 
mutual fund managers. They find differences in risk behaviour between men and women 
in their funds manage techniques, however, the variation was not significant. They 
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suggest that differences in this aspect may be related to investment knowledge and wealth 
constraints. 
Skała and Weill (2016) investigate the influence of CEO gender diversity on bank risk 
using data from 347 Polish Cooperative Banks. They use capital adequacy, equity to 
assets ratios, loan loss provision and non-performing loans as risk measures. They find 
that banks headed by female CEOs are less risky when risk is measured by capital 
adequacy and equity to assets ratios, proving that the presence of a female bank manager 
improves the capital adequacy and equity to assets ratios without a simultaneous increase 
in their credit risk. Accordingly, they support the view that female CEOs contribute to 
reducing risk-taking behaviour. Their estimation results also suggest no significant 
impact of the existence of female CEO on banks’ credit risk measures. Additionally, Skała 
and Weill (2016) prove that it is not the case that female CEOs are appointed in their 
positions in less risky and wealthier capital banks or that higher capital adequacy has been 
adopted because females have been appointed to their positions at problematic banks.  
Further evidence on the impact of gender and education of executive teams on risk taking 
of German banks during 1994-2010 is provided by Berger et al., (2012). They use risk-
weighted assets to total assets and a Herfindahl-Hirschman as risk measures and find that 
higher risk taking is positively linked to female CEOs members, supporting the idea that 
the presence of women in a top management position is associated with risk, especially 
when the females is at a young age. Berger et al., (2012) also suggest an inverse 
relationship between the proportion of executives with PhD and risk taking. They also 
argue that females’ executives with PhD. have less expertise at the CEOs level than those 
who held no PhD counterparts.  
Rose (2007) investigates the impact of gender and educational background and their 
influence on stimulating firm performance. He found that board members’ education does 
not influence firm performance.  
Prete and Stefani (2013) find a negative relationship between education and the number 
of women on Italian bank boards. They use this interesting finding as signals to tokenism 
in corporate governance choices. Their evidence also shows no impact of gender diversity 
on Italian Banks’ risk performance. They find that expertise that is obtained by a person 
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during an extended membership is an important requirement to be chosen to participate 
in decision-making positions. Their evidence also proves that gaining only a B.A. degree 
reduces the chance of being in top positions as a senior manager. They also find that the 
middle management is in general characterised by a lower level of education compared 
to higher levels of management. Additionally, they suggest that managers who hold a 
B.A. reduce the probability of being isolated from the board.  
In the Islamic banking context, the only study that focuses on gender and education is the 
one which was carried out by Al-Tamimi et al., (2009) who examine whether there is a 
significant difference in customers’ opinion on UAE Islamic banks based on gender and 
education. They confirm a significant difference in the image of UAE Islamic bank 
customers based on the two factors. Further to the researcher’s knowledge, there is no 
other study that focuses on the impact of gender and education on Islamic banks’ risk.  
To conclude, Table 10.1 and 10.2 provide a brief summary of studies that focus on the 
impact of gender diversity and educational background on performance.  
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Table 10.1: Studies on the Impact of Gender Diversity on Risk Performance 
 
 
  
Study  Nature of Impact  
Barsky et al., (1997) 
 
Barber and Odean (2001) 
 
Farrell and Hersch (2005)  
 
Croson and Gneezy (2009)  
 
Charness and Gneezy (2012) 
 
Prete and Stefani (2013) 
 
Gulamhussen and Santa (2010) 
 
Skała and Weill (2015) 
 
Berger et al., (2012) 
 
(-) 
 
(-) 
 
(-) 
 
(-) 
 
(-) 
No impact 
 
(+) 
 
Varied from negative to insignificant 
 
(+) 
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Table 10.2: Studies on the Impact of Educational Background on Risk Performance  
 
10.4. Variables Definition 
This part of the research use gender and education of top management position as 
independent variables and banks’ risk measure as dependent variables.  
To measure the impact of top management educational background, the researcher 
follows Berger et al., (2012), who use the fraction of board members with a PhD and the 
fraction of departmental managers and CEOs with PhDs. 
To measure banks’ risk, the researcher uses capital adequacy, equity to assets ratio and 
loan loss provision, which have all been defined in previous chapters.  
The following are the justifications for using these measures for bank risk: 
 
Study   Nature of Impact 
Christiansen et al., (2008) 
 
Bucciol and Miniaci (2011) 
 
Bertrand and Schoar (2002) 
 
Berger et al., (2012) 
 
(+) 
 
No impact 
 
(-) 
 
(-) 
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 Capital adequacy ratio closely reflects banks risk attitude as higher capital 
adequacy ratios reflect risk aversion policy, whilst lower ratios indicate CEOs risk 
tendency.  
 Equity to Assets ratio is an alternative risk measure that can be used to provide 
complementary information to capital adequacy ratio. This ratio echoes whether 
capital is seized depending on risk weightings or as a simple nominal reserve 
buffer in the case of adverse conditions. It can also be seen as a comprehensive 
measure that takes into consideration major types of risk as well as reflecting 
current bank policy to retain more or less conservative reserves.  
 As the main source of risk for Sudanese Islamic Banks is a credit risk, loan loss 
provision to total loan is used  
 Loan loss provision to total assets is used for comparison reasons. It reflects the 
consequences of earlier policy conducted by executive managers.  
It may worth mentioning that these ratios are most commonly used in the literature on 
bank risk indicators. Examples of such studies are Berger and DeYoung (1997), Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999), Berger (2009), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2009), Ali et al., (2011) and 
Skała and Weill (2015). 
It may also be worth mentioning that although non-performing loans and z-score are 
useful measures in this respect, the first one has not been used due to limited data 
availability whilst the second on is eliminated because the study period of time is too 
short to allow computing relevant measures. 
Additionally, the researcher also uses previously mentioned definitions, of a number of 
females in the departmental managers’ levels and the number of females on the board of 
directors, as measures of gender diversity in top management positions of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks. She also uses the number of males in the level of departmental managers 
to total managers at this level and the number of males on the board of director to the total 
number of directors to identify their impact and compare it with the females’ impact. 
The researcher also uses factors that have been defined and reviewed in the theoretical 
framework and literature review of previous chapters as control variables. These factors 
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include bank type, age, specialisation, size, operational efficiency and size of the board 
of directors. It also includes staff expenses and assets utilisation. Factors that are of 
relation to Islamic banking industry are profit and loss sharing modes of finance, non-
profit and loss sharing mode of finance and Salam mode of finance.  
 10. 5. Summary 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of gender 
and educational background of the top management team (especially the board of 
directors and departmental managers) on firms’ and banks’ risk-taking. Firstly, various 
literature document the existence of gender differences concerning risk taking. These 
differences are justified by the variation in the overconfidence of males and females; as 
males, in most of the literature, are proved to be more overconfident than females. 
Secondly some literature document differences in behaviour and personal traits of the 
corporate decision maker as a reason that increases or decreases the managers’ 
susceptibility to take decisions that are characterised by risk. Empirical evidence on the 
impact of gender background on banks’ risk is contradicted as it shows positive, negative 
or even no impact of gender on risk-taking decisions. 
Additionally, this chapter provides the theoretical framework which aims to identify the 
nature of the relationship between the top managers’ educational background and risk-
taking decisions. In this vein, some opinions stand for no relationship between top 
managers’ educational background, reporting that the nature of the work of these 
managers does not require any particular educational background more than a university 
degree or equivalent skills, which could be gained from a substantial experience in 
business life. In contrast, other opinions argue that individual characteristics of corporate 
governance, such as education, extend the top managers’ ability in decisions making. 
The next chapter analyzes the estimated empirical results on the impact of gender, 
educational background and other examined variables on the performance of Sudanese 
Islamic Banks. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Analysis of the Influence of Gender and Education of Corporate Governance on 
Bank Risk  
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the determinants of risk, in the context of 
corporate governance, in the Sudanese Islamic Banking Industry. More specifically, it 
shows the impact of gender diversity in the top management team (this includes the board 
of director and departmental managers) on banks’ risk. It also focuses on the impact of 
the level of education of the top management (such as PhD qualification) on banks’ risk 
performance. Banks’ risk behaviour is measured by total equity to total assets, capital to 
assets ratio, loan loss provision to total loan and loan loss provision to total assets.  
This chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 11.2 provides descriptive statistics 
of the variables examined. Section 11.3 introduces the estimated regression results of the 
determinants of Sudanese Banks’ risk performance. Section 11.4 discusses the findings 
of the robustness check on the relationship between banks’ risk measures and 
determinants. Section 11.5 contains the chapter summary and conclusion. 
11.2 Descriptive Analyses 
Table 11.1 provides insights into the descriptive statistics of all the variables examined. 
It shows that total equity to total assets (CAPAD1) have the highest mean, standard 
deviation and max values than other risk measures. This is followed by capital to assets 
ratio (CAPAD2), which has the second largest scores. A higher standard deviation of 
these variables indicates that large proportions of the data sets are distributed away from 
their mean values. On the other end, CREDR3 has the lowest mean and standard 
deviation, followed by (CREDR1). A lower standard deviation of these variables 
indicates that large proportions of the data set are distributed closer to their mean values. 
Turning to the descriptive statistics of the independent variables, the table shows that bedu 
has a remarkably high mean, standard deviation and max value, compared to Ecoedu: this 
indicates that the number of highly educated staff on the board of directors, in average, is 
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more than those in the departmental levels. Nevertheless, the standard deviations of these 
two factors are almost similar, indicating that there are no differences between the 
distributions of these factors around their mean values.  
Table 11.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables for 
Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Max  Min  No of Obs. 
CAPAD1  0.2447 0.2592 2.6724 0.0000 191 
CAPAD2 0.1849 0.2448 2.5216 0.0000 191 
CREDR1 0.0613 0.0733 0.4071 0.0000 170 
REDR3   0.0214  0.0224 0.1538 0.0000 164 
AGE 6.9648  0.6464 8.0000 6.0000 199 
TYPE 0.6793 0.4680 1.0000 0.0000 184 
Specialised 4.0039 1.3073 5.0000 2.0000  252 
log(Totass)   20.489 0.9806 22.938 17.134 191 
MGT1 0.6894  0.2932 2.7848 0.0982 191 
OVER2   0.4271  0.1556 1.0738 0.0000 191 
ASSUT1 0.0817 0.0357 0.3618 0.0252 191 
PLS 0.3637  0.3239 1.0000 0.0000 177 
SLM 0.0162 0.0396 0.3074 0.0000 177 
MURBH   0.4661 0.2936 1.0000 0.0000 177 
Bsize 10.699 1.4330 16.000 5.0000 153 
FBSIZE 0.0643  0.1639 0.8888 0.0000 153 
FECOS 0.0788  0.1463 0.6666 0.0000 153 
Ecoedu 0.0962 0.1093 0.5000 0.0000 153 
bedu  0.2159  0.1126 0.5454 0.0000 153 
 
11.3 Main Estimation Results Using the Pooled Estimation Method  
In this section of the study, the researcher investigates the impact of the set of risk 
determinants on the selected Sudanese Islamic banks’ performance, using the pooled 
estimation method. The likelihood ratio test (the F-test) reveals that the fixed effect 
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variables are redundant in the equations (it was 0.150 for CAPAD1, 0.689 for CAPAD2, 
0.86 for CREDR1 and 0.94 for CREDR3). Therefore, the fixed effect model is rejected 
and the ordinary panel least square regression is accordingly used.  
However, in some of the robustness checks that will come later in this chapter, the fixed 
effect model has been accepted as the random model is rejected. Table 1.3 shows the 
regression results for the four dependent variables using the panel least squares method.  
According to the table, the estimated value of the adjusted R-square (R2) for CAPAD1 is 
0.5158, CAPAD2 is 0.4487, CREDR1 is 0.1667 and CREDR3 is 0.1927. This finding 
shows that the variability of CAPAD1 and CAPAD2 are more affected by the linear 
correlation between the two measures and their independent variables than CREDR1 and 
CREDR3. According to this finding, if 1% change occurred in all independent variables, 
CAPAD1 and CAPAD2 will consequently change by 51.58% and 44.87% respectively. 
On the contrary, if 1% change occurred in all independent variables, CREDR1 and 
CREDR3 will consequently change by only 16.67% and 19.27% respectively.  
Table 11.2 displays the main results, which shows the impact of gender and other 
explanatory variables on the four alternative measures of bank risk. 
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Table 11.2: Coefficient Estimates of the impact of the independent variables on 
Risk Measures (CAPAD1, CAPAD2, CREDR1 and REDR3) of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks 
Variable Name CAPAD1 CAPAD2 CREDR1 CREDR3   
Constant 1.4279*** 
(0.4836) 
1.5400*** 
(0.5020) 
-0.2226 
(0.2161) 
-0.0776 
(0.0591)  
 
AGE 0.0840*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0800*** 
(0.0222) 
-0.0066 
(0.0085) 
0.0007 
(0.0024) 
TYPE 0.0857 
(0.0633) 
-0.0186 
(0.0657) 
0.0091 
(0.0252) 
-0.0089 
(0.0068) 
Specialised -0.0266 
(0.0224) 
-0.0108 
(0.0233) 
-0.0048 
(0.0089) 
0.0027 
(0.0024) 
log(Totass)   -0.0769*** 
(0.0168) 
-0.0959*** 
(0.01745) 
0.0117* 
(0.0072) 
0.0030 
(0.0020) 
MGT1 -0.2251*** 
(0.0733) 
-0.1649** 
(0.0761) 
0.0652** 
(0.0321) 
0.0336 
(0.0086) 
OVER2    -0.0582 
(0.0991) 
-0.1746* 
(0.1028) 
-0.0149 
(0.0406) 
-0.0022 
(0.0113) 
ASSUT1 -0.0696 
(0.4641) 
-0.3004 
(0.4817) 
0.0792 
(0.2645) 
0.1303 
(0.0718) 
PLS -0.1321* 
(0.0706) 
-0.0257 
(0.0732) 
0.0003 
(0.0280) 
-0.0173 
(0.0086) 
SLM 0.6528 
(0.3979) 
-0.0407 
(0.4130) 
-0.0449 
(0.1543) 
-0.0516 
(0.0420) 
MURBH   -0.2331*** 
(0.0746) 
-0.0197 
(0.07753) 
0.0649** 
(0.0290) 
-0.0112 
(0.0084) 
Bsize 0.0019 
(0.0095) 
0.0168* 
(0.0099) 
0.0042 
(0.0037) 
0.0014 
(0.0011) 
FBSIZE -0.1023 
(0.0844) 
-0.0827 
(0.0876) 
0.0066 
(0.0327) 
0.0138 
(0.0088) 
FECOS 0.5521*** 
(0.1223) 
0.4615*** 
(0.1270) 
0.0156 
(0.0476) 
-0.0083 
(0.0135) 
Ecoedu 0.5139*** 
(0.1414) 
0.3183** 
(0.1468) 
-0.0101 
(0.0548) 
-0.0109 
(0.0164) 
bedu  0.3524*** 
(0.1277) 
0.4565*** 
(0.1326) 
-0.1095** 
(0.0501) 
-0.0461 
 (0.0150) 
Adjusted R2 0.5158 0.4487 0.1667 0.1927 
Obs 142 142 138 125 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
 
Focusing on capital adequacy risk measures, the table shows that the impact of FECOS 
is significantly positive on both CAPAD1and CAPAD2. This means that the higher the 
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number of females employed in these positions, the higher the levels of capital in terms 
of both capital adequacy and equity to assets ratios. It may be worth mentioning that 
capital represents an essential buffer against the unexpected bank’s loss distribution and 
it also plays an important role in offsetting losses resulting from non-performing loans, 
in the case that the loan loss provisions are not sufficient. It is, therefore, possible that 
females who hold management positions maintain higher capital ratios because they adopt 
a high credit risk policy. Therefore, it becomes of interest to re-estimate the analysis with 
default credit risk measures Credr1 and Credr3 (loan loss provision to total loan and loan 
loss provisions to total assets). 
The estimation results, as can be seen from table 11.2, shows no significant relationship 
between FECOS and credit risk measures, implying that females, who are departmental 
managers, do not adopt high credit risk policy, within Sudanese banks context. This 
means that higher capital and equity ratio of these banks are not related to high credit risk 
policy.  
Positive and significant relationship between female departmental managers and capital 
adequacy indicators in one hand, and insignificant relationship between female 
departmental managers and credit risk measures on the other hand, provide strong 
evidence that employing females as departmental managers in Sudanese Islamic Banks is 
linked to conservative risk policy, which means that females at these levels adopt policies 
that reduce banks liabilities. 
This finding is consistent with the finding of Skala and Weill (2016), who prove 
significant positive association exists between female CEO and capital adequacy and 
equity to assets ratios, as well as the insignificant relationship between female CEO and 
credit risk, in 347 Polish Cooperative Banks. It is also contradicted by the findings of 
Berger et al., (2014) who examine the relationship between gender diversity at CEO level 
of Deutsche Bundesbank during 1994 – 2010 and prove that female existence in the CEOs 
levels tends to increase risk-taking behaviour of German Banks.  
To get a more comprehensive picture of the impact of gender diversity on the risk 
performance of Sudanese Islamic banks, the researcher examines the relationship between 
the presence of male departmental managers and risk in Sudanese banks, as measured by 
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total equity to total assets. Findings of the regression result in this aspect is shown in 
Table 11.3. The table also compares these findings with the earlier findings of female 
departmental managers. 
Table 11.3: Comparison of the Impact of Females and Males Representation on 
CAPAD1 of Sudanese Islamic Banks 
Variable Name Females  Males  
Constant 1.4279*** 
(0.4836) 
2.4544*** 
(0.447347) 
AGE 0.0840*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0573*** 
(0.0214) 
TYPE 0.0857 
(0.0633) 
-0.0040 
(0.0554) 
Specialised -0.0266 
(0.0224) 
-0.0269 
(0.0206) 
log(Totass)   -0.0769*** 
(0.0168) 
-0.0884*** 
(0.0153) 
MGT1 -0.2251*** 
(0.0733) 
-0.1926*** 
(0.0709) 
OVER2   -0.0582 
(0.0991) 
-0.1121 
(0.0925) 
ASSUT1 -0.0696 
(0.4641) 
-0.0502 
(0.4430) 
PLS -0.1321* 
(0.0706) 
-0.0698* 
(0.0667) 
SLM 0.6528 
(0.3979) 
0.5388 
(0.3761) 
MURBH   -0.2331*** 
(0.0746) 
-0.1883*** 
(0.0704) 
Bsize 0.0019 
(0.0095) 
-0.0081 
(0.0091) 
Gender of 
BSIZE 
-0.1023 
(0.0844) 
-0.0924 
(0.0811) 
Gender of 
ECOS 
0.5521*** 
(0.1223) 
-0.4381*** 
(0.1158) 
Adjusted R2 0.4487 0.5534 
Obs 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent 
respectively 
 
The table shows that the presence of male directors is negatively and significantly 
associated with capital adequacy. This indicates that contrary to the findings on female 
departmental managers, male departmental managers adopt high-risk policies, which is 
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supported by the argument of Skała and Weill (2015), who reports that females are more 
risk averse than males. 
The overall results on the impact of gender diversity in departmental managers indicate 
that employing females at those positions in Sudanese Islamic Banks improves the capital 
adequacy and equity to assets ratios. As a result, employing females in these levels in 
Sudanese Islamic Banks is associated with more cautious capital adequacy ratios, which 
leads to more performance stability of these banks. 
Findings on the impact of the presence of females on the board of directors on risk 
performance of Sudanese Islamic banks show no impact on both capital and equity ratios 
and credit risk measures. The regression result is shown in table 11.3. This result could 
be related to the critical mass theory, which is based on the number of females employed 
in a certain level of management. The number of females on the board of directors of 
Sudanese Islamic Banks is limited, which, according to Joecks et al., (2013), create a 
skewed group that is associated with weakened performance. Accordingly, the presence 
of females within the board of directors becomes more symbolic and their influence less 
definite. 
Overall, findings on the relationship between gender diversity and credit risk show that 
the presence of females in top management positions of Sudanese banks does not affect 
their default risk. 
Turning to the impact of highly educated top managers (measured by the ratio of Ph.D. 
degree holders) on risk performance of Sudanese Islamic banks, the result, as seen from 
table 11.3, shows that the proportion of holders of this degree in departmental managers 
level  has significant positive relationship with capital to assets ratio and equity to assets 
ratio. This indicates that increase in the number of highly educated managers in these 
positions will increase bank capital adequacy and equity to assets ratio. Furthermore, 
findings on their impact on credit risk showed no significant relation exists.  
In contrast, findings on the impact of the presence of highly educated top managers on 
the board of directors’ show that there is a significant positive impact on both capital to 
assets and equity to assets ratios. Furthermore, it reveals that there is a significantly 
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negative impact on credit risk when it is measured by loan loss provision to total loan, 
and insignificant negative impact when measured by loan loss provision to total assets. 
This finding is in line with those of Berger et al., (2014), who also prove adverse 
relationship between proportion of directors with PhD and risk-taking behaviour exists. 
It is, therefore, could be supported by his argument in which he claims that being a highly 
educated top manager enhances one’s decision making and risk taking techniques.  
The latter two findings could be interpreted to mean that highly educated members of 
departmental managers adopt conservative bank policy by increasing banks’ 
capitalisation and reducing (or at least not increasing) credit risk. In addition, the 
conservative approach adopted by these managers could also be traced to the high level 
of inflation in Sudan. This is because the high level of inflation may influence the 
tendency of decision makers at this level to reduce the possibilities of delaying or losing 
all or part of the banks expected profits, investments (loans) or both. This interpretation 
may seem to be more realistic if seen under the nature of some of the Islamic banking 
modes of finance (such as Morabahah, Modarabah and Salam, which are all commodity 
contract based).  
The findings also show no significant impact of highly educated board of directors on 
risk, when measured by loan loss provision to total assets. This finding is in line with 
Rose (2007), who justify the lack of relationship between firms’ performance and the 
educational background of board members. He notes that this is because the nature of the 
work of corporate boards does not necessitate any educational background higher than a 
university degree or equivalent skills, which could be gained from a substantial 
experience in business life. Further comment on this aspect is given by Berger et al., 
(2014), who report that the insignificant association between these two factors indicate 
that top managers who have higher education tend to act moderately. Therefore, it is likely 
that those with PhD are not as risk prone as non-PhD holders.  Berger et al., (2014) also 
remark that an increase in highly educated CEOs members has an important impact on 
the decision-making process of banks. They argue that an executive with a PhD degree 
considerably increases the amount and quality of information available to the top 
management positions, which will consequently make decisions taken by such managers 
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more moderate or even conservative. This is because these decisions will be built on 
appropriate information and evidence, which prevents intensive risk taking.  
Finally, the size of the board of directors is proved to have a significant impact only on 
capital to assets ratio, when the ratio is limited to capital at its smallest value. Board size 
is shown to have no significant impact on all other three measures.  
This finding may also be interpreted according to the report by Berger et al., (2014), who 
argue that senior executive managers are to some extent independent of the board of 
directors. This independence lessens the CEOs’ tendency to disclose information to the 
members of the board of directors, in order to avert interference into their management 
decisions. As a result, members of the board of directors become less informed and 
consequently cannot effectively perform their advisory role in recommending the type of 
project and the degree of risk the firm should pursue. 
Turning to the impact of the control variables on banks’ risk, bank size and management 
efficiency are inversely related to capital adequacy and equity to assets measures, and 
positively related to loan loss provision to total loan. It also proves to have no impact on 
loan loss provision to total assets. Furthermore, overhead expenses are found to have a 
significant negative impact only on capital to assets ratio. This impact is proved to be 
insignificant in all other three risk measures. Additionally, bank age is positively and 
significantly related to capital adequacy and equity to assets ratio, whilst proving to have 
no significant relationship with credit risk measures. Moreover, bank type, specialisation 
and assets utilisation are all found to have no significant impact on all four risk measures. 
PLS mode of finance has a negative and significant impact on equity to assets ratio, and 
no impact on other risk measures. Meanwhile, non-PLS mode of finance is shown to have 
a negative and significant impact on equity to assets ratio. These findings indicate that 
these two modes of finance weaken the capitalisation of Sudanese Islamic Banks. Non-
PLS mode of finance is also shown to have a positive and significant impact on loan loss 
provision to total loan. This indicates that it increases bank default risk. Finally, Salam 
mode of finance is found to have no impact on risk measures, which could be linked to 
the earlier findings that prove no relation between this mode of finance and profitability. 
11.4 Robustness Check 
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In order to obtain a broader view and validate the robustness of the findings, the researcher 
re-estimates the main models by two different ways. Firstly, loans to assets ratio are 
included as an explanatory variable. Secondly, the researcher excludes the control 
variables from the first model. The following is a detailed explanation of the two types of 
robustness check. 
First, it seems as if loans to assets can be considered as prime control variables in the first 
model because it takes into account the structure of assets. However, the reason behind 
excluding this indicator from among the control variables is that this ratio can be 
considered as an indicator for bank risk, which could lead to misleading results. 
Nevertheless, the researcher includes this ratio in the main model to assess its impact on 
the explained variables. 
Table 11.4 displays the estimations with the loans to assets ratio.  
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Table 11.4: Robustness check: With Loans to Assets 
Variable Name CAPAD1  CAPAD2 CREDR1 REDR3   
Constant 1.3724*** 
(0.4807) 
1.4494*** 
(0.4899) 
-0.2441 
(0.1915)  
-0.0802 
(0.0583) 
AGE 0.0773*** 
(0.0216) 
0.0692*** 
(0.0220) 
0.0022 
(0.0076) 
0.0020 
(0.0025) 
TYPE 0.0851 
(0.0628) 
-0.0197 
(0.0640) 
0.0101 
(0.0224) 
-0.0087 
(0.0067) 
Specialised -0.0293 
(0.0223) 
-0.0151 
(0.0227) 
-0.0019 
(0.0079) 
0.0031 
(0.0024) 
log(Totass)   -0.0754*** 
(0.0166) 
-0.0934*** 
(0.0170) 
0.0125** 
(0.0064) 
0.0029 
(0.0020) 
MGT1 -0.2143*** 
(0.0730) 
-0.1471** 
(0.0744) 
0.0514* 
(0.0285) 
0.0319*** 
(0.0086) 
OVER2   -0.0759 
(0.0988) 
-0.2036** 
(0.1006) 
-0.0045 
(0.0360) 
-0.0002 
(0.0112) 
ASSUT1 -0.1297 
(0.4616) 
-0.3985 
(0.4704) 
0.4206* 
(0.2415) 
0.1693** 
(0.0735) 
PLS -0.0948 
(0.0732) 
0.0353 
(0.0745) 
-0.0361 
(0.0256) 
-0.0213*** 
(0.0087) 
SLM 0.6875 
(0.3952) 
0.0158 
(0.4027) 
-0.0834 
(0.1369) 
-0.0586 
(0.0416) 
MURBH   -0.1888*** 
(0.0782) 
0.0526 
(0.0797) 
0.0121 
(0.0272) 
-0.0184** 
(0.0091) 
Bsize 0.0014 
(0.0094) 
0.0161* 
(0.0096) 
0.0057* 
(0.0033) 
0.0016 
(0.0011) 
FBSIZE -0.1421 
(0.0868) 
-0.1479* 
(0.0884) 
0.0556* 
(0.0302) 
0.0187** 
(0.0091) 
FECOS 0.5894*** 
(0.1232) 
0.5225*** 
(0.1433) 
-0.0235 
(0.0427) 
-0.0107 
(0.0134) 
Ecoedu 0.4973*** 
(0.1406) 
0.2911** 
(0.1255) 
0.0101 
(0.0487) 
-0.0092 
(0.0162) 
bedu  0.3579*** 
(0.1267) 
0.4654*** 
(0.1291) 
-0.1043** 
(0.0444) 
-0.0436*** 
(0.0149) 
Loans / assets 0.1396* 
(0.0797) 
0.2282*** 
(0.0812) 
-0.1733*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.0192** 
(0.0096) 
Adjusted R2 0.5236 0.477371 0.3454 0.2142 
Obs 142 142 138 125 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the 
standard deviations. *, **and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5,1 percent 
respectively 
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The results are consistent with the main results:  
 Female departmental managers have a significant positive impact on capital 
adequacy and Equity to assets ratios and have no significant influence on credit 
risk measures.  
 Education of departmental managers is significantly positive when the capital 
adequacy and Equity to assets are used as explained variables, and not significant 
for credit risk measures.  
 Education of directors is significantly positive when the capital adequacy and 
Equity to assets are used as explained variables, and negatively significant for loan 
loss provision to total loan. 
 
As can be seen from the table, differences obtained from including loan to assets ratio 
(MGT1, ASSUT1, PLS, MURBH, FBSIZE and bedu) are mostly found on credit risk 
measures, which are more likely to be interpreted by the by the nature of loan to assets 
ratio – which has a connection with other credit risk measures.  
For the second type of robustness check, the researcher excludes management efficiency, 
overhead expenses, assets utilisation, the size of the board and education of departmental 
managers and members of the board. Tables 11.5, 11.6, 11.7 and 11.8 shows the findings 
when these tests were applied. 
Tables 11.5 and 11.6 shows the result when the capital adequacy and equity to assets ratio 
are used as independent variables. 
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Table 11.5: Robustness check: Dependent Variable is CAPAD1 
Variable Name  Original Equ Equ1 Equ2  Equ3 Equ4 Equ5 
Constant  1.4279*** 
(0.4836) 
0.7448* 
(0.4434) 
0.7606* 
(0.4165)  
1.4940*** 
(0.2911) 
1.8648*** 
(0.2775) 
1.6673 
(0.2565) 
AGE  0.0840*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0995*** 
(0.0215) 
0.0993*** 
(0.0213) 
0.0727*** 
(0.0163) 
0.0827*** 
(0.0208) 
0.0852 
(0.0202) 
TYPE  0.0857 
(0.0633) 
0.1289** 
(0.0638) 
0.1277** 
(0.0626) 
0.1092** 
(0.0570) 
0.0563 
(0.0505) 
0.0497 
(0.0507) 
Specialised  -0.0266 
(0.0224) 
-0.0375* 
(0.0229) 
-0.0374* 
(0.0228) 
-0.0382* 
(0.0203) 
-0.0471*** 
(0.0175) 
-0.0419 
(0.0181) 
log(Totass)    -0.0769*** 
(0.0168) 
- 0.0547*** 
(0.0156) 
- 0.0550*** 
(0.0153) 
-0.0757*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.0881*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0903 
(0.0099) 
MGT1 MGT1 -0.2251*** 
(0.0733) 
  XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding Mgt    XXXX XXX XXX 
OVER2   OVER2   -0.0582 
(0.0991) 
0.0106 
(0.0996) 
 XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding OVER2      XXXX XXX XXX 
ASSUT1 ASSUT1 -0.0696 
(0.4641) 
0.7546** 
(0.3909) 
0.7460** 
(0.3811) 
XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
ASSUT1 
   XXXXX XXX XXX 
PLS  -0.1321* 
(0.0706) 
-0.1859*** 
(0.0706) 
-0.1865*** 
(0.0701) 
-0.0427 
(0.0764) 
-0.0191 
(0.0744) 
-0.0129 
(0.0780) 
SLM  0.6528 0.4980 0.4964 0.2571 -0.1138 3.25E-05 
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(0.3979) (0.4076) (0.4057) (0.4713) (0.4544) (0.4841) 
MURBH    -0.2331*** 
(0.0746) 
-0.2510*** 
(0.0769) 
-0.2518*** 
(0.0762) 
-0.1150 
(0.0815) 
-0.1202 
(0.0782) 
-0.1439 
(0.0822) 
Bsize   0.0019 
(0.0095) 
-0.0068 
(0.0094) 
-0.0069 
(0.0093) 
-0.0200*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.0199*** 
(0.0084) 
 
 
XXXX 
Excluding Bsize      XXXX 
FBSIZE  -0.1023 
(0.0844) 
-0.0981 
(0.0872) 
-0.0985*** 
(0.0868)  
-0.0689 
(0.0553) 
-0.0532 
(0.0586) 
-0.0262 
(0.0566) 
FECOS  0.5521*** 
(0.1223) 
0.5712*** 
(0.1262) 
0.5723*** 
(0.1253) 
0.5942*** 
(0.0876) 
0.5624*** 
(0.0951) 
0.5370 
(0.0977) 
Ecoea  0.5139*** 
(0.1414) 
0.5354*** 
(0.1459) 
0.5321*** 
(0.1420) 
0.4585*** 
(0.1675) 
  
Excluding ECOs 
educated 
      
bedu   0.3524*** 
(0.1277) 
0.3643*** 
(0.1318) 
0.3619 
(0.1295) 
0.3251*** 
(0.0983) 
  
Excluding board 
educated 
      
Adjusted R2  0.5158 0.4837 0.4877 0.5177 0.4591  
Obs  142 142 142 142 142  
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. *, **and *** indicate significance levels of 
1,5,10 percent respectively 
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Table 11.6: Robustness check Dependent Variable CAPAD2 
Variable Name  Original  Equ1 Equ2  Equ3 Equ4 Equ5 
Constant  1.5400*** 
(0.5020) 
1.0397** 
(0.4522) 
0.8557** 
(0.4272) 
1.0426*** 
(0.3870) 
1.3494*** 
(0.3971) 
1.4138*** 
(0.3811) 
AGE  0.0800*** 
(0.0222) 
0.0914*** 
(0.0219) 
0.0939*** 
(0.0218) 
0.0916*** 
(0.0217) 
0.1035*** 
(0.0225) 
0.1034*** 
(0.0224) 
TYPE  -0.0186 
(0.0657) 
0.0129 
(0.0650) 
0.0266 
(0.0642) 
0.0188 
(0.0637) 
-0.0728 
(0.0620) 
-0.0728 
(0.0619) 
Specialised  -0.0108 
(0.0233) 
-0.0187 
(0.0233) 
-0.0198 
(0.0234) 
-0.0157 
(0.0231) 
-0.0103 
(0.0234) 
-0.0111 
(0.0233) 
log(Totass)    -0.0959*** 
(0.01745) 
-0.0796*** 
(0.0159) 
-0.0762*** 
(0.0157) 
-0.0815*** 
(0.0149) 
-0.0880*** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0879*** 
(0.0147) 
MGT1 MGT1 -0.1649** 
(0.0761) 
xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding Mgt  Xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
OVER2   OVER2   -0.1746* 
(0.1028) 
-0.1242 
(0.1016) 
Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
OVER2   
  
 
Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
ASSUT1 ASSUT1 -0.3004 
(0.4817) 
0.3033 
(0.3986) 
0.4034 
(0.3909) 
XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
ASSUT1 
   Xxxx XXX XXX 
PLS  -0.0257 
(0.0732) 
-0.0651 
(0.0720) 
-0.0587 
(0.0719) 
-0.0625 
(0.0718) 
-0.0956 
(0.0733) 
-0.1001 
(0.0728) 
SLM  -0.0407 -0.1541 -0.1352 -0.1695 -0.4861 -0.5352 
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(0.4130) (0.4156) (0.4161) (0.4149) (0.4308) (0.4218) 
MURBH    -0.0197 
(0.07753) 
-0.0328 
(0.0784) 
-0.0240 
(0.0782) 
-0.0328 
(0.0777) 
-0.0861 
(0.0793) 
-0.0827 
(0.0789) 
Bsize  0.0168* 
(0.0099) 
0.0104 
(0.0096) 
0.0114 
(0.0095) 
0.0085 
(0.0091) 
0.0056 
(0.0094) 
XXXX 
Excluding 
Bsize 
  Xxxxx Xxxxxx Xxxx XXXX 
FBSIZE  -0.0827 
(0.0876) 
-0.0797 
(0.0889) 
-0.0750 
(0.0890) 
-0.0754 
(0.0890) 
-0.0673 
(0.0941) 
-0.0778 
(0.0922) 
FECOS  0.4615*** 
(0.1270) 
0.4755*** 
(0.1286) 
0.4632*** 
(0.1285) 
0.4547*** 
(0.1283) 
0.3643*** 
(0.1329) 
0.3722*** 
(0.1319) 
Ecoea  0.3183** 
(0.1468) 
0.3340** 
(0.1488) 
0.3727*** 
(0.1456) 
0.3815*** 
(0.1454) 
  
Excluding 
ECOs 
education 
    Xxxx Xxxxx 
bedu   0.4565*** 
(0.1326) 
0.4652*** 
(0.1344) 
0.4926*** 
(0.1328) 
0.4771*** 
(0.1320) 
Xxxx Xxxxxx 
Excluding 
board education 
     Xxxxx 
Adjusted R2  0.4487 0.432739 0.4305 0.4302 0.4302 0.3662 
Obs  142 142 142 142 142 142 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 10, 
5,1 percent respectively
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The results are consistent with the findings from the main model:  
 Female departmental managers have a significantly positive effect when the capital adequacy 
and Equity to assets are used as explained variables. 
 
 The existence of females in the board of directors has no significant impact on capital 
adequacy and equity to assets ratio. 
 
 Education of departmental managers is significantly positive when the capital adequacy and 
equity to assets are used as explained variables.  
 
 Education of board directors is significantly positive when the capital adequacy and equity to 
assets ratios are used as explained variables.  
Tables 11.7 and 11.8 shows the findings when credit risk measures are used as dependent variables. 
The results are consistent with the findings from the main models:  
 The existence of females in the departmental manager's levels and board of directors has no 
significant impact on the two measures of credit risk. 
 
 Education of departmental managers and directors of the board has an insignificant impact on 
the two measures of credit risk. 
 
 Education of board directors is either insignificant or significantly negative when loan loss 
provision to total loan and loan loss provision to total assets are used as explained variables.  
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Table 11.7: Robustness Check Dependent Variable Crd Risk1 
Variable 
Name 
Variable 
Measure  
Original  Equ1 Equ2  Equ3 Equ4 Equ5 
Constant  -0.2226 
(0.2161) 
0.0237 
(0.1811) 
-0.0355 
(0.1725) 
-0.1304 
(0.1444) 
-0.1488 
(0.1415) 
-0.1488 
(0.1415) 
AGE  -0.0066 
(0.0085) 
-0.0118 
(0.0082) 
-0.0109 
(0.0081) 
-0.0099 
(0.0081) 
-0.0100 
(0.0079) 
-0.0100 
(0.0079) 
TYPE  0.0091 
(0.0252) 
-0.0062 
(0.0244) 
-0.0014 
(0.0240) 
0.0017 
(0.0238) 
0.0202 
(0.0221) 
0.0202 
(0.0221) 
Specialised  -0.0048 
(0.0089) 
-0.0005 
(0.0088) 
-0.0010 
(0.0087) 
-0.0025 
(0.0086) 
-0.0060 
(0.0083) 
-0.0060 
(0.0083) 
log(Totass)    0.0117* 
(0.0072) 
0.0040 
(0.0062) 
0.0051 
(0.0061) 
0.0077 
(0.0055) 
0.0064 
(0.0052) 
0.0064 
(0.0052) 
MGT1 MGT1 0.0652** 
(0.0321) 
Xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
Mgt 
 Xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
OVER2   OVER2   -0.0149 
(0.0406) 
-0.0415 
(0.0389) 
Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
OVER2   
 Xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
ASSUT1 ASSUT1 0.0792 
(0.2645) 
-0.2392 
(0.2157) 
-0.2161 
(0.2147) 
XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
ASSUT1 
 Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxx XXX XXX 
PLS  0.0003 
(0.0280) 
0.0162 
(0.0273) 
0.0174 
(0.0273) 
0.0215 
(0.0269) 
0.0342 
(0.0262) 
0.0342 
(0.0262) 
SLM  -0.0449 
(0.1543) 
-0.0108 
(0.1553) 
-0.0033 
(0.1552) 
0.0103 
(0.1546) 
0.0643 
(0.1532) 
0.0643 
(0.1532) 
MURBH    0.0649** 
(0.0290) 
0.0674** 
(0.0293) 
0.0705*** 
(0.0292) 
0.0744*** 
(0.0289) 
0.0891*** 
(0.0282) 
0.0891*** 
(0.0282) 
Bsize  0.0042 
(0.0037) 
0.0060* 
(0.0036) 
0.0064* 
(0.0036) 
0.0077** 
(0.0034) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0033) 
Excluding 
Bsize 
 Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX 
FBSIZE  0.0066 
(0.0327) 
0.0051 
(0.0331) 
0.0066 
(0.0331) 
0.0068 
(0.0331) 
0.0047 
(0.0334) 
0.0047 
(0.0334) 
FECOS  0.0156 
(0.0476) 
0.0092 
(0.0481) 
0.0049 
(0.0479) 
0.0095 
(0.0477) 
0.0289 
(0.0471) 
0.0289 
(0.0471) 
Ecoea  -0.0101 
(0.0548) 
-0.0152 
(0.0554) 
-0.0031 
(0.0543) 
-0.0052 
(0.0543) 
 Xxxxx 
Excluding 
ECOs 
education 
 Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxx Xxxxx 
bedu   -0.1095** 
(0.0501) 
-0.1166** 
(0.0506) 
-0.1083** 
(0.0500) 
-0.0989** 
(0.0491) 
Xxxx Xxxxxx 
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Excluding 
board 
education 
Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxx 
Adjusted 
R2 
 0.1667 0.1456 0.1446 0.1445 0.1304 0.1304 
Obs  138 138 138 138 138 138 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard 
deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent respectively 
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Table 11.8: Robustness Check: Dependent Variable Crd Risk3 
Variable 
Name 
 Original  Equ1 Equ2  Equ3 Equ4 Equ5 
Constant  
 
-0.0776 
(0.0591) 
0.0489 
(0.0522) 
0.0258 
(0.0498) 
0.0144 
(0.0416) 
0.0025 
(0.0413) 
0.0379 
(0.0416) 
AGE  0.0007 
(0.0024) 
-0.0019 
(0.0025) 
-0.0015 
(0.0025) 
-0.0014 
(0.0024) 
-0.0013 
(0.0024) 
-0.0021 
(0.0025) 
TYPE  -0.0089 
(0.0068) 
-0.0168*** 
(0.0069) 
-0.0149** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0146** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0072 
(0.0064) 
-0.0075 
(0.0067) 
Specialised  0.0027 
(0.0024) 
0.0050** 
(0.0025) 
0.0049** 
(0.0025) 
0.0047** 
(0.0024) 
0.0039 
(0.0024) 
0.0034 
(0.0025) 
log(Totass)    0.0030 
(0.0020) 
-0.0009 
(0.0018) 
-0.0005 
(0.0018) 
-0.0002 
(0.0017) 
-0.0008 
(0.0016) 
-0.0005 
(0.0016) 
MGT1 MGT1 0.0336 
(0.0086) 
Xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
Mgt 
 Xxxxx Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
OVER2   OVER2   -0.0022 
(0.0113) 
-0.0160 
(0.0114) 
Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
OVER2   
  Xxxxx XXXX XXX XXX 
ASSUT1 ASSUT1 0.1303 
(0.0718) 
-0.0340 
(0.0615) 
-0.0257 
(0.0615) 
XXXX XXX XXX 
Excluding 
ASSUT1 
 Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxx XXX XXX 
PLS  -0.0173 
(0.0086) 
-0.0098 
(0.0089) 
-0.0086 
(0.0089) 
-0.0079 
(0.0087) 
-0.0013 
(0.0086) 
-0.0013 
(0.0089) 
SLM  -0.0516 
(0.0420) 
-0.0339 
(0.0443) 
-0.0313 
(0.0445) 
-0.0295 
(0.0441) 
-0.0084 
(0.0446) 
-0.0307 
(0.0459) 
MURBH    -0.0112 
(0.0084) 
-0.0103 
(0.0090) 
-0.0091 
(0.0090) 
-0.0086 
(0.0088) 
-0.0043 
(0.0090) 
-0.0005 
(0.0093) 
Bsize  0.0014 
(0.0011) 
0.0024** 
(0.0011) 
0.0025** 
(0.0011) 
0.0027** 
(0.0010) 
0.0034*** 
(0.0010) 
XXXX 
Excluding 
Bsize 
  
xxx 
Xxx Xxx Xxx XXXX 
FBSIZE  0.0138 
(0.0088) 
0.0129 
(0.0094) 
0.0135 
(0.0094) 
0.0135 
(0.0094) 
0.0126 
(0.0096) 
0.0076 
(0.0099) 
FECOS  -0.0083 
(0.0135) 
-0.0115 
(0.0143) 
-0.0127 
(0.0143) 
-0.0122 
(0.0142) 
-0.0027 
(0.0142) 
-0.0008 
(0.0148) 
Ecoea  -0.0109 
(0.0164) 
-0.0131 
(0.0174) 
-0.0074 
(0.0170) 
-0.0080 
(0.0168) 
Xxxx xxxx 
Excluding 
ECOs 
education 
xxx xxxx Xxxx Xxxx Xxxx Xxxxx 
bedu   -0.0461 
(0.0150) 
-0.0498*** 
(0.0159) 
 
-
0.0455*** 
(0.0157) 
-0.0441** 
(0.0153) 
Xxxx Xxxxxx 
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Excluding 
board 
education 
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx xxxxxxx Xxxxx 
Adjusted 
R2 
 0.1927 0.0901 0.0820 0.0888 0.0377 -0.0439 
Obs  125 125 125 125 125 125 
* Numbers without brackets are the coefficients and numbers in brackets are the standard 
deviations. ***, **and * indicate significance levels of 1,5,10 percent respectively 
 
11.5. Summary 
This chapter shows the empirical findings on the relationship between gender diversity at the 
departmental managers’ and board of directors’ levels and risk-taking behaviour of Sudanese Islamic 
Banks. It also examines the impact of highly educated staff at these two levels. To achieve this goal, 
capital adequacy, equity to assets ratio and two credit risk measures are used as dependent variables.  
The overall evidence shows that the presence of a female departmental manager is associated with 
lower bank risk in two terms. Firstly, the presence of a female departmental manager is correlated 
with higher capital adequacy and equity to assets ratios, which enhance the banks’ ability to be 
protected against unexpected loss. It also makes the banks more able to offset losses resulting from 
non-performing loans in the case that loan loss provisions are not adequate enough to meet these type 
of losses. When focusing on this result, it may come to mind that females who hold these positions 
encourage higher capital ratios policies because they implement a high credit risk policy. However, 
examining the impact of female departmental managers on the two measures of credit risk shows 
insignificant association between credit risk and females at these levels of management, which means 
that higher capital adequacy and equity to assets ratio does not stem from lower asset quality and it 
is, therefore, more likely to be related to higher risk aversion by the departmental manager.  
Findings on the impact of female existence at the board of directors’ level prove an insignificant 
relationship exists between this factor and all risk measures in most of the cases.  
Findings on the impact of better-educated people prove positive association exists between the 
proportions of PhD holders in top management positions in both departmental managers’ levels and 
board of directors in one hand and capital to assets ratio and equity to assets ratio on the other hand. 
This means that the presence of highly educated top managers enhances the managers’ decision-
making capabilities and risk taking techniques. Furthermore, the findings prove that highly educated 
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top managers on the board of directors have a significantly negative impact on credit risk when it is 
measured by loan loss provision to total loan. It also shows no significant relationship between the 
highly educated board of directors’ member and risk when measured by loan loss provision to total 
assets. 
In a nutshell, the main conclusion of this chapter is that the presence of female departmental 
managers, and females on the board of directors of Sudanese Islamic Banking Industry supports the 
view that women appointed to these positions are often risk averse and therefore tend to contribute 
to reducing the banks’ risk exposure. 
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Chapter Twelve 
Conclusions 
12. 1. Introduction 
This chapter contains the conclusions of the research. To begin with, the reader needs 
to be aware of the following: 
1. This study is an explanatory study that is confined to one country, Sudan.  
2. The study covered the period from 2005-2013 only. In essence, the findings of this 
study only apply to the period of the study. 
3. Out of the total of 36 Sudanese banks, the sample of study consists of 27 Sudanese 
Islamic Banks, 10 state banks and 17 private banks. 9 banks are excluded either because 
they are foreign banks which do not allow granting their financial statements (whether 
through their websites or from their headquarters) or because they are recently 
established and therefore they do not have financial statements for the study period. 
12.2. Conclusions 
The first generation of Islamic banks in Sudan was established in the 1970s. However, 
since that time, no in-depth study has been conducted to investigate the performance 
determinants of these banks.  
Bearing in mind that sustainable profitability and healthy performance are vital in 
maintaining the stability of the banking system (Vong and chan 2009; Flamini et al., 
2009; Javaid et al., 2011), this study aims to provide a practical overview of the main 
performance determinants of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
This study provides an empirical evidence on the performance of Sudanese Islamic 
banks by building three models, each of which supplies practical evidence on the 
performance of these banks. Together, these models provide a comprehensive picture 
of the performance of selected Sudanese banks. Furthermore, given that Sudan has a 
vast potential for growth in the productive sectors, particularly in the agriculture 
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industry, and that this potential is yet to be realised; which has been argued to be partly 
due to lack of capital. This study also focuses on the interrelationship between 
profitability and Salam mode of finance. This to find out whether the banking industry 
in Sudan is well positioned to play a major role in enhancing the agriculture sector.  
Aside from identifying the main profitability determinants, the research also aims to 
provide evidence on the impact of the structure of corporate governance of these banks 
on their profitability and risk-taking behaviour.  In this respect, three factors – gender 
diversity in top management, educational background of the members of the top 
management team and size of the board of directors – are focused upon.    
The general consensus in the area of performance determinants reveals that the widely 
used linear parametric econometric approach form is the relevant functional form for 
examining the determinants of bank performance. Studies such as Short (1979), Bourke 
(1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Bashir (2000), Naceur (2003), Hassan and 
Bashir (2003), Goddard et al., (2004) and Athanasoglou et al., (2005) prove that the 
linear regression form is widely used in the literature to estimate the impact of various 
factors that may be important in explaining bank profits. These studies also provide 
evidence that the linear regression estimation produces reliable findings that are equal 
to any other functional form.  
Accordingly, to achieve the study objectives, the study follows previous studies’ 
methodology, the study uses linear regression to identify and evaluate the 
interrelationship between the performance measure and the main performance 
determinants of Sudanese Islamic bank. 
To generate a comprehensive picture of such interrelationship, three models of 
performance measures and determinant are built. These models then use performance 
measures (indicated by profitability and risk) as dependent variables and performance 
determinants (financial and industry indicators, gender diversity and educational 
background amongst corporate governors) as independent variables.  
The first model investigates the nature of the interrelationship between profitability as 
a performance measure and a comprehensive set of determinants. To measure the 
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profitability, the Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are used as 
dependent variables.  
The profitability determinants, which represent the independent variables are the banks’ 
age, size and type as measured by ownership and specialisation. This also includes 
capitalisation, liquidity, credit risk, leverage, operational efficiency, staff expenses, and 
assets utilisation. The set also includes profit and loss sharing (Modarabah and 
Mosharkah), non-profit and loss sharing (Morabahah) and Salam mode of finance. 
These are all established types of modes of finance upon which Islamic Banking 
operations are based.  
The second model focuses on the impact of corporate governance on profitability. It 
consists of six sub-models through which the study can identify and compare the effect 
of gender diversity in top management positions, at the departmental levels and board 
of directors, on financial performance. This model also focuses on how corporate 
governance, in terms of the size of the board of directors, influences bank profitability. 
ROA and ROE are used as dependent variables whilst gender diversity on the board of 
directors, gender diversity in senior management positions and size of the board of 
directors are the independent variables. This model also uses variables that proved to be 
significant for the first model as control variables. 
The third model focuses on the banks’ risk-taking behaviour as a performance measure, 
whilst gender diversity and educational background of the board of directors and 
departmental managers as performance determinants. Risk taking behaviour is 
measured by capital adequacy, equity to assets ratio, loan loss provisions to total loan 
and loan loss provision to total assets. The model also uses variables that are proved to 
be significant for the first model as control variables.  
The empirical results suggest that the main performance determinants on ROA of the 
entire sample are capitalisation and assets utilisation, which have a positive and 
significant impact, indicating that any increase in capitalisation or improvement in the 
internal monitoring and future planning concerning optimal use of assets will increase 
the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks. 
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Additionally, ROA is significantly adversely affected by operation efficiency, 
indicating that Sudanese Islamic Banks are unable to transfer their operational 
efficiency to their customers. The result also shows that leverage has a negative impact 
on the profitability of these banks, indicating that the management of these banks lacks 
the capability to predict and avoid the risk associated with leverage. With regards to 
bank age, finding prove that newly established banks are able to create better profits 
opportunity than old established Sudanese banks. Furthermore, specialised banks are 
proved to profit opportunities due to their limited area of investment. 
With regard the profitability determinants, in relation to the Islamic banking industry, 
only PLS (Modarabah and Mosharakah) is found to have a significant impact, with 
positive signs on both ROA and ROE. This is due to the policy of the Central Bank of 
Sudan which encourage banks to use Mosharakah mode of financing all economic 
activities as well as giving each bank the right to determine the Modarabah’s percentage 
share in the profits. 
Furthermore, bank size is proved to have no significant impact on the profitability of 
Sudanese Islamic banks, which could be related to the high rate of inflation in the 
Sudanese economy. Such rate minimises the actual value of Sudanese pounds and 
makes the profitability of these banks more related to the quality of investment than the 
quantity of their assets. 
Finally, other determinants, such as liquidity and Morabaha are established to have no 
impact on the profitability of the entire sample of Sudanese Islamic Banks.  
In relation to the impact of the examined profitability determinants on state banks and 
private banks, the empirical results show that private banks are more profitable than 
state banks. This is because their management takes more rational decisions with respect 
to capitalisation, credit risk, assets utilisation, leverage and liquidity.  
Interestingly, the impact of PLS and Morabahah is shown to be positive and significant 
on the profitability of private banks, whilst prove to have an insignificant impact on the 
profitability of state banks. This result indicates that private banks are more committed 
to the PLS modes of finance than to non-PLS modes of finance. These findings could 
be justified by the strategies used by state and private banks. According to the 2010 
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annual report of the Central Bank of Sudan, although Central Bank’s policy does not 
differentiate between the two types of banks (as it specifies the same minimum and 
maximum rate for the potential profit of both PLS and non-PLS modes of finance), for 
competition purposes, the state banks prefer to use the minimum profit rate, because 
they are satisfied with the profits generated from their privilege on large government 
projects. On the other hand, the private banks choose the maximum rate of potential 
profits in their quest for profit maximisation. 
Evidence from the second model shows that the presence of women in departmental 
managers’ positions has a negative and significant impact on ROE of the entire sample. 
This has been justified by the restricted role of women in the Islamic culture which lead 
women to have career development barrier. It has also been related to lack of female 
role model and family commitment.  
Meanwhile, the impact of the size of the board of director on the profitability of 
Sudanese Islamic banks varies from negative and significant to insignificant which has 
been justified by the higher cost related to higher directors’ salaries and remunerations, 
when compared to smaller board size. It has also been related to coordination and 
communication problems resulting from enlarging the board size. Such problems affect 
the quality of decisions taken by the board and leads to ineffective decisions and 
consequently poor performance.  
The existence of women in the board of director is proved to be the only factor among 
corporate governance factors that does not have a significant influence on the 
profitability of Sudanese Islamic banks. This has been related to the critical mass theory, 
which is based on the number of females employed in a certain level of management. 
As the number of females on the board of directors of Sudanese Islamic Banks is limited, 
which, according to Joecks et al., (2013), creates a skewed group that is linked with 
poor performance. Accordingly, the presence of females within the board of directors 
becomes more symbolic and their power less certain. 
Findings from the third model suggest that females as departmental managers reduce 
bank’s credit risk. It also proves to be associated with more cautious capital adequacy 
ratio. This provides an evidence that females departmental manager at Sudanese Islamic 
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banks have a risk aversion attitude and, therefore, they reduce banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour, which leads to more performance stability of these banks. 
Finally, the model proves that the proportions of PhD holders in top management 
positions at both departmental managers and board of directors’ levels enhance the 
managers’ understanding of decision making and risk taking techniques. 
12.3 Implications for the Decision Making Process 
The important roles of the banking sector, which are to act as the financial intermediator 
for the society and to improve the allocation of resources, creates an essential need for 
comprehensive studies that will enhance a more accurate decision-making process. 
Given the facts that this research is the first to use an inclusive set of performance 
determinants of Sudanese Islamic banks’ performance as well as advanced econometric 
techniques to understand the interrelationships between the various performance 
measures and their determinants, findings of this study, therefore, will enhance better 
understanding of the interrelationships between performance measures and 
determinants, which can improve estimations of key inputs in the decision-making 
process. Such deeper understanding should provide policy and decision makers with an 
important part of the framework needed to provide quality outcomes. 
Findings of this study provide some beneficial insights on performance determinants to 
the policymakers, industry leaders, as well as bank managers. Accordingly, those parties 
could enhance the profitability of Sudanese Islamic Banks by improving capitalisation 
and assets utilisation and by improving banks operation efficiency, leverage and the size 
of the board of directors.  
industry leaders and bank managers could also benefit from the findings on Bank age 
which suggest that they can learn from the experience of newly established banks, as 
the latter are shown to be able to utilise their resources to generate more profits.  
Findings of this research also reveal that privately owned banks earn higher profits 
compared to state owned. Accordingly, managers of state banks could possibly benefit 
from the resources management technique used by Private Banks.  This seems 
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practically possible as State-owned banks face the same local conditions as Private 
Banks. 
Evidence on higher risk aversion of women departmental managers advances the 
understanding of the determinants of risk-taking behaviour in Sudanese Banks, which 
has a broad and particular implications for bank regulators and authorities. Accordingly, 
measures implemented to minimise excessive risk-taking behaviour of banks should not 
be limited to capital requirements. Regulators may also need to improve corporate 
governance of Sudanese banks by including female representation in the banks’ 
executive structures or encourage males, departmental managers, to take less risky 
decisions. 
Finally, the findings on the impact of highly educated top management provide support 
for the view that regulators and industry leaders should favour employing highly 
educated people in both top management positions of Sudanese Islamic Banks to reduce 
risk-taking behaviours.  
12.4 Limitations of the Thesis  
Due to non-availability of data, it was difficult to get the required information relating 
to the market value of Sudanese Islamic Banks. Such data is neither available from the 
Khartoum stock exchange, as they do not keep an organised record for the average stock 
price for the banks during the study period, nor from banks’ financial reports. As a 
consequence, the study uses alternative financial measures, ROA and ROE, as proxies 
for banks’ performance. These measures have been widely used in related research. 
Another limitation of this study is related to the limited number of females’ 
representation at CEO levels in Sudanese Islamic Banks, which makes running 
regression analysis to examine the impact of this factor problematic. 
12.5 Potential Future Research 
There are limitless opportunities for future research in the Islamic Banking Industry; 
whether they operate as a single banking system or side by side with traditional banks. 
A few possible future research areas that relate to the findings of this research and to the 
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broad subject of Islamic Banks financial performance include: in the area of cost and 
profit efficiency levels, including a comparative analysis of the efficiency of these banks 
across countries and between conventional and Islamic banks. In addition, further 
research may focus on the perceptions of policymakers, industry leaders and bank 
managers on the main performance determinants of Islamic Banks in general and 
Sudanese Islamic banks in particular. Other issues that could be covered in future 
research include the relationship between Islamic Banks performance and their sources 
and uses of funds.  Such research may possibly examine whether banks’ policies 
effectively encourage sources of funds that are linked to better banks performance. It 
may also be interesting to carry out the same research but with comparisons among 
countries that completely adhere to the Islamic Financial System. 
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